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Thesis summary
In capitalist societies it is the role of the state to establish the precondi-
tions that promote societal well-being through proper functioning markets.
On the other hand enterprises have a right to provide goods and services in
return for private profit. This sharp contrast between government and cor-
porate responsibilities is created by a theoretical idealized first-best world.
Only governments have the legitimacy and the power to overcome free rid-
ing and collective action problems which cause market inefficiencies such as
negative externalities and underprovision of public goods. With this classical
dichotomy between state and corporate responsibilities in mind, at first glance
it seems puzzling that some firms also seem to provide public goods. They
offer goods and services or operate in a manner which can be characterized
as the private provision of public goods.
This thesis asks how information about the voluntary private provision
of public goods, also known as corporate social responsibility (CSR), affects
asset prices. Since the stock market has a disciplining effect on corporations,
stock price reactions capture the possibilities and limits of voluntary cor-
porate action. The thesis proposes some answers to the question of whether
corporate acts that do primarily benefit stakeholders without share ownership
are against the interest of shareholders, and, if so, under which circumstances.
The first chapter starts with a broad introduction to the topic. It discusses
the role of government on the basis of welfare theory and market failures. In
addition, it emphasizes the moral dimension of voluntary action and explains
the link between the private provision of public goods and CSR. Because the
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thesis studies asset price reactions, relevant finance concepts are introduced.
Furthermore, the ambition and contribution of the thesis is outlined. The
first chapter gives short summaries of chapter two to five and offers a primer
on portfolio theory to foster understanding of the last two chapters. It closes
with a description of the findings and discusses their implications.
Chapters 2 and 3 contribute to the literature on voluntary firm action
by introducing the role of regulatory pressure for asset price reactions. Both
chapters study corporate efforts to reduce carbon emissions. Chapter 2 asks
whether the carbon intensity of a firm carries any information on its growth
opportunities as measured by Tobin’s Q. Panel regressions that account for
unobserved firm heterogeneity and autocorrelation, tackle this question by
using carbon emission data on the global firm level. In order to obtain in-
sight into the role of regulatory pressure for the relationship between carbon
intensity and Q, two countries with different regulatory regimes are juxta-
posed.
Chapter 3 explores one specific motivation for firms to join voluntary envi-
ronmental agreements: the anticipation of more restrictive future regulation.
The research design explores in an event-study stock market reactions for
firms in two popular corporate climate initiatives, when the likelihood for
stricter federal carbon emission regulation suddenly increases. Additionally,
the market reactions for membership announcement in these initiatives are
evaluated and discussed.
The last two chapters investigate whether voluntary investment screens
used in socially responsible investing (SRI) have any implications for finan-
cial performance. These two chapters are complementary and analyze the risk
adjusted return performance of synthetically constructed portfolios that are
unaffected by skill or luck of asset managers. Chapter 3 analyzes portfolios
of high market capitalization firms from Europe and the United States. Even
though firms from many industries are excluded in the screening process, the
risk adjusted returns for these SRI portfolios are neutral in both markets. In
Chapter 4 a distinct portfolio of small European growth firms with an inno-
XV
vative strategic CSR implementation is put to the test. Bad model problems
prevalent for portfolios with the observed characteristics are addressed by
using a novel robustness check and the finding of positive abnormal perfor-
mance obtained by conventional methods is confirmed. It is argued that two
different hypotheses, one of them under appreciated in the literature, might
be responsible for this apparent market inefficiency.

Kurzfassung
In marktwirtschaftlich organisierten Gesellschaften ist es Aufgabe des Staates,
fu¨r die Rahmenbedingungen zu sorgen, die sicherstellen, dass das Wirken der
Marktkra¨fte zur gesellschaftlichen Wohlfahrt beitra¨gt. Unternehmen auf der
anderen Seite du¨rfen durch die Bereitstellung von Gu¨tern und Dienstleistun-
gen private Profite machen. Diese theoretisch idealisierte Sichtweise impliziert
dichotome Verantwortungsbereiche zwischen Staat und Unternehmen. Nur
die Regierung verfu¨gt u¨ber die no¨tige Legitimita¨t und Macht, um Trittbrett-
fahrerprobleme und Probleme des kollektiven Handelns zu u¨berwinden, um
Marktineffizienzen wie negative Externalita¨ten und die Unterversorgung von
Gemeinschaftsgu¨tern zu beheben. Aus Sichtweise der klassischen Dichotomie
erstaunt es, dass auch Unternehmen Gemeinschaftsgu¨ter bereitstellen. Sie
bieten Gu¨ter und Dienstleistungen an oder arbeiten in einer Weise, die als
private Bereitstellung von o¨ffentlichen Gu¨tern interpretiert werden kann.
Diese Doktorarbeit untersucht, ob Informationen u¨ber die freiwillige Bere-
itstellung von o¨ffentlichen Gu¨tern, auch corporate social responsibility (CSR)
genannt, Vermo¨genspreise beeinflussen. Da Aktienma¨rkte einen disziplin-
ierenden Effekt auf Kapitalgesellschaften haben, zeigen Aktienpreisreaktio-
nen Mo¨glichkeiten und Grenzen freiwilligen unternehmerischen Handelns auf.
Die vorliegende Arbeit gibt Antworten auf die Frage, ob unternehmerisches
Handeln, welches auf den ersten Blick prima¨r den Stakeholdern ohne Ak-
tienbesitz dient, gegen die Interessen der Anteilseigner ist und gegebenenfalls
unter welchen Bedingungen.
Das erste Kapitel bietet eine Einfu¨rung in das Thema. Es erla¨utert
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auf Basis von Wohlfahrtso¨konomie und Marktversagen die Rolle des Staates
und betont die moralphilosophischen Implikationen von freiwilligem Handeln.
Ferner wird der Zusammenhang zwischen der o¨ffentlichen Bereitstellung von
o¨ffentlichen Gu¨tern und CSR aufgezeigt. Da die Dissertation Preisreaktio-
nen untersucht, pra¨sentiert Kapitel 1 die relevanten finanzwissenschaftlichen
Konzepte und arbeitet Ziel und Beitrag der Thesis heraus.
Kapitel 2 und 3 untersuchen Aktienpreisreaktionen im Zusammenhang
mit freiwilligem unternehmerischem Handeln und vertiefen dabei die Rolle
des regulatorischen Drucks. Beide Kapitel fokussieren auf unternehmerische
Anstrengungen, um Kohlendioxidemissionen zu reduzieren. Kapitel 2 fragt,
ob die Kohlenstoffintensita¨t einer Aktiengesellschaft Schlu¨sse u¨ber deren Wach-
stumsmo¨glichkeiten, gemessen mit Tobins Quotient, zulassen.
Kapitel 3 erforscht eine mo¨gliche Motivation, warum Unternehmen frei-
willigen Umweltprogrammen beitreten: Das Antizipieren strengerer Regula-
tion. Das Forschungsdesign nutzt die unerwartete Wahrscheinlichkeitserho¨hung
der bundesstaatlichen Regulierung von Kohlendioxidemissionen, um die Ak-
tienmarktreaktionen fu¨r Mitglieder in zwei klimafreundlichen Initiativen in
einer Ereignisstudie zu eruieren. Zudem werden die Marktreaktionen fu¨r Mit-
gliedschaftsanku¨ndigungen in diesen Initiativen methodisch einheitlich unter-
sucht.
Die letzten zwei Kapitel pru¨fen, ob die freiwilligen Investitionsbeschra¨n-
kungen bei ethischen Investitionen das finanzielle Ergebnis beeinflussen. Diese
zwei Kapitel analysieren die risikobereinigten Renditeergebnisse von synthe-
tisch konstruierten Portfolien und sind daher nicht beeinflusst durch Ko¨nnen
oder Glu¨ck des Anlageverwalters. Kapitel 4 untersucht Portfolien von Fir-
men mit einer hohen Marktkapitalisierung fu¨r den europa¨ischen und nor-
damerikanischen Aktienmarkt. Obwohl Unternehmen in zahlreichen Indus-
trien im ethischen Anlageauswahlverfahren heraus gefiltert werden, sind die
risikobereinigte Renditen fu¨r diese Portfolien neutral. In Kapitel 5 wird
das Renditeergebnis eines Portfolios bestehend aus kleinkapitalisierten eu-
ropa¨ischen Wachstumsfirmen mit einer innovativ-strategischen CSR Imple-
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mentierung gepru¨ft. Da Modellprobleme bekannt sind fu¨r Portfolien mit den
beobachteten Charakteristiken, wird in einem neuartigen Verfahren die Ro-
bustheit der Resultate inspiziert. Die Resultate besta¨tigen das Vorliegen posi-
tiver abnormaler Renditen. Ferner wird aufgezeigt, dass zwei unterschiedliche
Hypothesen fu¨r die beobachtete Marktineffizienz verantwortlich sein ko¨nnten.

Chapter 1
Introduction
In a world dominated by mercantilist thinking, Adam Smith formulated in
1776 the concept of the invisible hand. This Smithian idea states that indi-
viduals in the pursuit of their self interest also endorse the public interest.
To date, market systems navigated by a myriad of self-interested participants
have created a lot of wealth. The Malthusian reasoning that population
growth is limited due to constrained food production was disproved by the
rapid economic growth in the 20th century. Malthus (1798) proposed at the
end of the 18th century that population growth has to be restricted in order to
maintain per capita production levels. Economists have identified several key
factors explaining on the one hand the wealth explosion in the 20th century
and on the other the high cross sectional variation in growth rates. The first
neoclassical growth models explained differences in income per capita by us-
ing different paths of factor accumulation. The causes of the different growth
paths such as saving rates, preferences or technology (total factor produc-
tivity) were exogenously given (Solow, 1956; Cass, 1965; Koopmans, 1965).
Later models incorporated spillovers and found that steady-state growth can
be sustained by positive externalities from physical or human capital accu-
mulation (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988). The next generation of models was
pioneered by Romer (1990) and endogenized steady-state growth and techni-
cal progress.
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The view that the economy is not independent but a subsystem of the
larger ecosystem gained popularity in the seventies. In 1972 the report
“Limits to Growth” for the Club of Rome spurred controversy (Meadows
et al., 1972). The authors of the report pointed out that decreasing lev-
els of exhaustible resources and increasing pollution will challenge economic
growth prospects. Two years later, the theoretical growth models of Das-
gupta and Heal (1974), Solow (1974) and Stiglitz (1974a,b) emphasized that
with exhaustible resources as production inputs, key determinants of long
term growth are the elasticity of substitution between them and other inputs,
(resource-augmenting) technical progress, and increasing returns to scale. To
date, economic growth has raised living standards and reduced poverty, but
it has been historically very dependent on fossil fuels. A decoupling is needed
in order to mitigate global warming caused by the accumulation of carbon
dioxide emissions in the atmosphere. Otherwise, irreversible warming pro-
cesses will cause substantial and unevenly distributed adaptation costs (IPPC,
2007).
The pressing issue today is not the exhaustion of fossil fuels but rather
pollution. In order to limit global warming to less than two degrees, less than
half of the proven and economically recoverable fossil fuel reserves can still
be used for combustion (Meinshausen et al., 2009). If limited global warming
is a serious policy goal, fossil fuel reserves on the books of governments and
firms have to be valued differently (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2011). But so
far, a global climate agreement has not yet been achieved. Instead, several
countries have taken unilateral action by setting standards, introducing taxes
or cap and trade systems and by promoting voluntary emission reductions.
If firms voluntarily reduce emissions, they mitigate a negative externality,
say, a public bad. The present thesis investigates the potential for voluntary
provision of public goods by firms from a stock market perspective, thereby
emphasizing carbon emission reductions. The focus of the thesis is on how
the stock market values information related to the private provision of public
goods.
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The next section discusses the economic view of the role of governments,
markets, and why the concept of voluntary action is powerful. Subsequently,
some theoretical issues in the private provision of public goods, also called
corporate social responsibility (CSR), are examined in a separate section. The
following short overviews on financial markets and asset prices lead to the
discussion of the ambition and contribution of the thesis. The next sections
summarize the four papers that constitute the subsequent chapters of this
dissertation. Because the last two papers are portfolio analyses, they are
preluded by an introduction to portfolio theory. The last section of this
chapter finishes with the findings and implications of the thesis.
1.1 Welfare theory and market failures
Microeconomists have put a lot of effort into the search for the theoreti-
cal conditions under which the concept of the invisible hand is valid. This
quest culminated in the formulation of the two fundamental welfare theo-
rems attributed to Kenneth Arrow (1951) and Gerard Debreu (1959). The
first welfare theorem states that a pareto efficient competitive equilibrium
allocation results under some conditions if self-interested market participants
act perfectly competitively in a complete set of markets. The second wel-
fare theorem establishes the converse by showing that any Pareto efficient
allocation can be attained through the price system, given some convexity
restrictions. When Pareto efficient outcomes cannot be achieved, economists
like to speak of market failures. According to Stiglitz (1991), the major con-
tribution of Arrow (1951) and Debreu (1959) was to show the limitations
of the concept of the Smithian invisible hand. Since the economic yardstick
for policy recommendation is efficiency, the identification of market failures
justifies government interventions in order to attain Pareto improvements.
The aspirations to the ideal state of the economy with a maximized social
product has therefore important ramifications for the perception of the role
of government.
4 INTRODUCTION
Early discussions of market failures focused on natural monopolies, exter-
nalities and public goods (Stiglitz, 1991). An externality constitutes a direct
effect of a market participant’s decision on another market participant that
is not a party to that decision. A prime example for a negative externality
is environmental pollution as a byproduct of production. In the traditional
view an externality is internalized by taxing the emitter or by making him
liable for his activity. The tax that induces complete internalization of an
externality is called Pigouvian tax. Coase (1960) critiques in “The problem
of social cost” that most economists have adopted the Pigouvian approach.
He points out that if transaction costs are sufficiently low, parties affected by
an externality can find an agreement maximizing the social product if prop-
erty rights are well defined and enforceable. Stigler dubbed this reasoning the
Coase Theorem (Coase, 1988). But Coase (1960) never believed that market
exchange has zero transaction cost, because he wrote earlier, in 1937 , that
firms exist due to transaction costs. His critique was that in a world with
zero transaction costs, as often assumed in economic models, a Pigouvian tax
is obsolete because private costs equal social costs. However, this Coasian
view highlights that externalities can either be internalized by taxes, quotas,
or by fostering bargaining over the extent of the externality when transaction
costs are sufficiently low. The latter solution is less intrusive but, as every
transaction, requires well defined and enforceable property rights. Crucially,
the role of government as an enabler of Pareto improvements should therefore
depend on the institutional context.
The provision of public goods also justifies government intervention. These
goods are characterized by a high degree of nonexcludability and nonrivalrous
consumption. Since nonpayers cannot be excluded from consumption of exist-
ing public goods, free-riding causes an undersupply of these goods in the first
place. Textbook examples for public goods are national defense, fireworks
and lighthouses. Coase (1974) attacks the assumption that lighthouses can
only be provided by the government as proposed by famous economists (Mill,
Sidgwick, Pigou, Samuelson). In detail he describes how private individuals
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and organizations played a vital role in providing lighthouses in nineteenth
century Britain. The authority that built and maintained lighthouses, Trinity
House, operated in 1820 just 24 lighthouses, while private individuals and or-
ganizations operated 22. Coase (1974, p.375) concludes that “The role of the
governments was limited to the establishment and enforcement of property
rights in the lighthouse.” The potential for market failure reductions by this
approach is supported by the increasing trend at the end of the twentieth
century toward contracting delivery of public good and services to the pri-
vate sector and public-private partnerships (Besley and Ghatak, 2001). To
sum up, government intervention can remedy the supply of public goods by
quantity or price based interventions as well as by defining individual prop-
erty rights in some cases. For policy recommendation, accounting for the
institutional context is fundamental.
Although the first-best world perspective establishes the classical dichotomy
between government and profit maximizing enterprises, there is no unique and
generalizable view of the role of government from an efficiency perspective.
Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) argue that reality never satisfies simultaneously
the first-best conditions of the welfare theorems. They show that if one Pareto
optimum condition can not be attained due to some constraints, trying to sat-
isfy the other Paretian conditions is no more desirable. The authors (p.12)
summarize their findings as “The general theorem of the second best states
that if one of the Paretian optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled a second
best optimum situation is achieved only by departing from all other optimum
conditions”. However, policy recommendations referring to the second best
theorem should not be reduced to stating that because the ideal market is
a fantasy, an ideal government should fix outcomes. Aside from inconclusive
formal theories, arguments in support of market systems are that they work
better than any known alternative to coordinate economic activity. Mar-
kets do this relatively efficiently by producing price signals that contain some
relative scarcity information (Lipsey, 2007).
6 INTRODUCTION
1.2 Moral implications of voluntary action
Moral philosophy offers arguments in favor of market systems. Market sys-
tems promote autonomy and individual freedom (Hausman and McPherson,
2010). An (ideal) market transaction is executed voluntarily and is therefore
less intrusive than freedom limiting state regulation with the inherent ten-
dency to increase the reach of government. Judging an action or inaction as
voluntary has far reaching moral consequences. Illustrative of the implied con-
sequences is the controversy spurred by the claim of new classical economists
that unemployment is such as any other economic choice (Lucas, 1978). In
their view unemployed workers merely choose voluntarily to consume more
leisure instead of working. Opposed to this voluntary unemployment argu-
ment is a Keynesian market view. With market imperfections like rigid wages,
employment and not the wage adjusts to clear the market after disruptions,
producing unemployment in equilibrium. Hausman and McPersons (2006,
p.36) give a more nuanced definition for voluntary choice: “..., whether a
choice is ‘voluntary’ depends both on the quality of the alternatives and on
the circumstances bringing about the occasion for choice.”
Overall, good reasons exist to be supportive of a market system. It pro-
motes autonomy and individual freedom and seems to be the least bad sys-
tem from an efficiency perspective. In the presence of mutual benefit market
transactions occur voluntarily, creating win-win situations. Libertarians favor
voluntary action because they judge government interventions to be coercive.
The more the course of action is influenced by mandatory governmental for-
mal rules, the less this action is voluntary. The appeal of voluntary over co-
erced action is rooted in moral philosophy and the argument that it produces
less private costs. However, an efficiency assessment of coercive regulation
should not only account for private costs but also for social benefits.
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1.3 Private provision of public goods and CSR
This thesis investigates voluntary action in the market place contributing to
the common good. The initiatives studied might also be viewed as acts of cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR). Heal (2005, p.1) defines CSR as “... pro-
gram of actions taken to reduce externalized costs or to avoid distributional
conflicts. It is an institution that has evolved in response to market failures,
a Coasian solution to some problems associated with social costs.” Within
the classical dichotomy view, CSR seems to invade undisputed government
tasks of correcting market failures. However, in a second-best world CSR can
contribute to welfare improvements. But CSR can only achieve second-best
levels of public good provision (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012). Besley
and Ghatak (2007) show that CSR has the greatest institutional advantage
in providing a public good, when the public good is naturally bundled with
the production of a private good. They identify CSR “ ... with the creation
of public goods and curtailment of public bads jointly with the production of
private goods”.
In general, most firms seek the goodwill of employees, shareholders, finan-
cial institutions, neighboring communities, local governments, and citizens.
Ultimately, all stakeholders have options to influence the business operations
of a firm directly or more indirectly, through social pressure or the regulatory
framework. Strategic CSR is according to Baron (2001), either induced by
demand side pressure or a hedging strategy against the risk of activism or
future regulation. For Friedman (1970) the socially responsible purpose of a
firm is to maximize its profits. After all, investors can decide for themselves
to donate excess profits. Yet this view has the drawback of allowing only for
end-of-pipe solutions even if problems might be avoidable in the first place.
Tirole (2001, p.1) identifies three stumbling blocks on the way to a stake-
holder society: “The implementation of the stakeholder society strikes three
rocks: dearth of pledgeable income, deadlocks in decision-making, and lack of
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clear mission for management.” Tirole argues that poorly defined stakeholder
priorities and objectives can hamper good governance. Good governance
mechanisms are needed in order to minimize dysfunction in corporations re-
lated to the delegation of tasks from a principal to an agent. Good governance
should reduce moral hazard, inefficient investments, self dealing, and guaran-
tee an effort level in the interest of the principal (Tirole, 2006). But whereas
CSR to satisfy manager preferences might constitute moral hazard, CSR to
satisfy nonclassical preferences of investors, employees, and consumers does
not (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012). Firms might also take the interests
of various stakeholders into account to the degree that this serves profit max-
imization. This shareholder value definition with a broad set of factors to be
considered in the maximization process is also called instrumental stakeholder
theory (Jones, 1995).
1.4 Financial markets and CSR
This thesis asks whether corporate action directed at stakeholder interests,
by providing public goods or reducing public bads, is detrimental to share-
holder value. Shareholder value is key for investors with classical preferences.
These investors derive utility exclusively from pecuniary benefits. Moreover,
institutional investors are usually subject to a fiduciary duty and therefore
mandated by law to care about shareholder value.
The value of an asset is its price, such as the stock price, and the return
of an asset incorporates information about the development of the asset price
over time. Asset prices are the result of heterogeneous valuations of time,
risk and beliefs (Hens and Rieger, 2010). Equity prices contain important
fundamental information. Corporate investments and the stock market are
positively correlated. The traditional explanation for this is that stock prices
reflect the marginal product of capital (Baker et al., 2003). Barro (1990) finds
that the stock market has substantial explanatory power for investments.
The stock market also determines the cost of funds and influences external
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financing. These effects impact the weighted average cost of capital (WACC)
of a firm and therefore corporate investments (Wall, 1995). Furthermore,
stock markets can exert pressure on managers because managers have to
cater to investors’ opinions to avoid forced removal or takeover (Randall et al.,
1990). Firms with good corporate governance usually design compensation
systems so that executives are incentivized to care about the stock market
value of their firm (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). Theorists argue that financial
markets and institutions reduce the firm’s cost of raising money from outsiders
by helping a firm overcome problems of moral hazard and adverse selection.
In this sense, Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that financial development,
typically measured by the level of credit and the size of the stock market, has
a substantial supportive influence on the rate of economic growth.
Different notions about the efficiency of financial markets exist. Under
the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), the market is efficient with respect
to an information set if asset prices are fully reflective of that information
set. The semi-strong EMH states for instance that all public information is
reflected in the stock price (Fama, 1970). But market efficiency per se is not
testable because it must be tested jointly with some equilibrium model, say,
an asset pricing model. This gives rise to the joint hypothesis problem because
the interpretation of anomalous evidence is ambiguous: Either the market is
not efficient or the wrong equilibrium model has been used (Fama, 1991).
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) add an equilibrium degree of disequilibrium to
the efficient market concept by declaring that security prices only capture
fully all available information if information and trading costs are zero.
In support of the EMH are short run return predictability tests. The pre-
dictability of short run returns is so weak that exploitation is not possible in
the presence of trading costs (e.g. Fama and Blume, 1966). Short run returns
basically follow a random walk. On the other hand, long-run volatility tests
are harder to reconcile with the concept of efficient markets (Shiller, 1981b,a).
But, in contrast to short-run return tests, these tests have to deal with the
joint-hypothesis problem because expected returns vary substantially through
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time (Fama, 1991). However, investors might not be as rational as assumed in
the EMH. Psychologists and later behavioral economists have identified em-
pirical flaws in the concept of rational human behavior (Kahneman, 2012).
But in order to observe irrational asset prices either rational market par-
ticipants have to be inexistent or institutional constraints forestall efficient
arbitrage activities. Otherwise, arbitrage activities by rational investors elim-
inate mispricings and irrational investors run out of money. To date, seem-
ingly extreme mispricings in the form of so called asset bubbles can only be
rationalized ex-post after they have burst. Because these bubbles are rare,
there is so far no statistical evidence that reliable identification of sustained
divergence of cumulative returns from equilibrium returns is possible.
This thesis takes the perspective that to date evidence favors more the
view that prices sometimes deviate from fundamentals, but exploitation is
very difficult. After all, relative efficiency of financial markets is a more
useful concept than the all or nothing view (Campbell et al., 1996).
1.5 Ambition and contribution of the thesis
The previous sections emphasized the virtuous nature of voluntary market
exchange and identified from an economic perspective situations when some
kind of government intervention is needed. I discussed that the idealized
first-best world implies a clear dichotomy between governmental and private
sector tasks but that the real world contradicts this view. Moreover, number-
ing social benefits from public good provision or reduction of public bads has
the potential for controversy, whereas quantification of increased short-run
private costs through regulatory changes is less ambiguous. These obstacles
and coordination issues, for instance in addressing global problems such as
climate change, can result in political stalemate. As a consequence, insuf-
ficient or no regulatory steps are taken and public goods are undersupplied
or public bads (negative externalities) not sufficiently reduced. Coase has
suggested that small intrusive government interventions that rely on mar-
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ket forces might attain in certain circumstances Pareto improvements in the
presence of market failures. My thesis empirically researches that claim for
certain cases. It sheds light on the potential role of publicly listed firms in the
private provision of public goods from a stock market perspective. The sub-
sequent chapters ask how information about the private provision of public
goods is gauged by the stock market. This question is not only relevant for
investors but also for the real economy because asset prices convey important
information, as argued in the previous section. Therefore, the findings and
their interpretation have policy implications. My thesis applies state of the
art empirical techniques and tackles the general research question by using
different methodological approaches.
The first two papers extend the literature by focusing on the interplay
between voluntary greenhouse gas reduction efforts and regulatory pressure.
Because a first-best global regulatory solution to the looming public bad
caused by climate change is out of sight and also unilateral regulation often
faces opposition, the chosen focus gains particular relevance.
The last two papers investigate portfolios of CSR firms and therefore adopt
more an investor perspective. Over the last two decades socially responsible
investing (SRI) has gained substantial market share and various investor ini-
tiatives have been created to pressure firms to pursue good environmental
conduct. Even the United Nations became active in the field and initiated
in 2006 the Principles for Responsible Investment. Yet asset screens used by
SRI could lead to suboptimally diversified portfolio composition. The ana-
lyzed portfolios are constructed with the help of SRI ratings from a Swiss
bank. The synthetic constructed portfolios have distinct characteristics and
the papers address some neglected theoretical issues.
1.6 The carbon-intensity paper
Pollution Release and Transfer Registers ensure transparency about emissions
from facilities and plants above a certain threshold. They have become pop-
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ular around the world and some researchers even regard them as a policy tool
for environmental protection (Khanna et al., 1998). This study systematically
surveys the empirical literature on eco-efficiency and identifies the distinct
characteristics between toxic and carbon emissions. Then cost reducing and
revenue increasing arguments with regard to a firm’s global carbon-intensity
are discussed. I make the distinction between two types of cost sources in
this paper. Regulatory costs are related to regulatory interventions or down-
side risks related to future government interventions, while inherent costs are
principally driven by the development of input prices.
The relevance of these two cost sources is evaluated by investigating
whether, depending on the regulatory context, the global carbon-intensity
of a firm has any relationship to its financial performance as measured by
Tobin’s Q. The use of global firm level emissions in a panel is unique and
possible due to a recently developed emission accounting standard. Based on
a comprehensive overview of related micro econometric studies on the firm
level, I justify my battery of control variables. In the model formulation at-
tention is devoted to the construction of Q in order to avoid a look-ahead
bias.
To understand the role of regulatory pressure, I estimate firm valuation
models for two regions with different regulatory frameworks. The firm panels
for the time period 2003 to 2007 account for firm heterogeneity and auto-
correlation. The study analyzes firm panels in the United States (US) and
the United Kingdom (UK) because both countries have well developed stock
markets but different regulatory environments. Whereas in the UK legisla-
tion governs carbon emissions and the continuation and potential tightening
of the regulatory scheme has been signaled, federal legislation is missing in
the US. The study finds evidence for a negative relationship between car-
bon intensity and Q in both markets, however, twice as large in the United
Kingdom. Put differently, an increase in carbon intensity has about twice
the penalty in terms of Q in the United Kingdom and vice versa, a decrease
twice the reward. These results highlight the role of regulatory pressure for
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that markets reward climate friendly behavior. Moreover, they suggest that
rapidly rising input prices, the oil price for instance has tripled during the
study period, help steer markets towards greener behavior.
1.7 The Waxman-Markey Bill paper
In this paper we explore one crucial motivation for firms to join voluntary
environmental programs (VEP). The membership in VEP sends a credible
signal to different stakeholders but can also be instrumental in preparing for
anticipated future regulation. We study whether publicly listed members
of two popular climate initiatives are rewarded for their engagement when
the likelihood for the imposition of a federal carbon emission trading system
suddenly increases. The paper builds on two closely related studies that
investigate aspects of the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) and the Climate
Leaders (CL) program. The study of monthly returns for CCX membership in
a difference-in-difference approach and by Gans and Hintermann (2013) and
CL membership announcement returns investigated by Fisher-Vanden and
Thorburn (2011) in an event-study. Our paper integrates these two study
subjects and standardize the statistical methods to explore the effect of the
narrow passing of H.R. 2445, the “American Clean Energy and Security act
of 2009” by the US House of Representatives. We argue that the passing
of this bill on 26, June 2009, also dubbed Waxman Markey Bill, lends itself
exceptionally well for an short-horizon event study analysis.
We find for both samples positive short horizon abnormal returns in the
light of this unexpected regulatory event. However, when we control for
industry affiliation of the corporate members in these VEPs, only positive
significant results remain for the CCX sample. To understand theses differ-
ences, it helps to know that the CCX can be considered as a blueprint for the
cap and trade emission system proposed in the bill. The CL program on the
other hand was solely focused on cost effective GHG reductions of its mem-
bers. Although the program enjoyed a good and credible reputation because
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it was harbored by the Environmental Protection Agency, it was not judged
to be of considerable advantage against the backdrop of the introduction of a
cap and trade system. In fact, Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011) find neg-
ative announcement returns for firms joining the CL program and for firms
announcing reduction target. They argue that firms with hostile shareholder
governance were more likely to join CL in the first place. However, we also
investigate with the event-study methodology the announcement returns for
CCX membership and find no stock market reaction whatsoever. Based on
our findings we conclude that it pays to be green in the tangible presence
of regulatory pressure. However, the efforts to be green need to correspond
to the envisioned regulatory design favored by the government for possible
implementation.
1.8 Portfolio analysis: 2 complementary pa-
pers
I start this section with a short primer on portfolio theory and empirical
applications because the last two papers deal with firm portfolios.
The importance of the covariance among securities for portfolio construc-
tion was realized by Markowitz (1952). Markowitz (1959) also laid the ground-
work for the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) with his insight that
a mean-variance efficient portfolio offers the highest expected return for a
given level of variance. That implies for investors that non-systematic risk
can be eliminated by holding a well diversified portfolio. Therefore, investors
should only demand compensation for systematic risk, say, risk that can not
be eliminated by holding a well-diversified portfolio.
The CAPM was developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin
(1966). It states that if investors are homogeneous and share a common
subjective joint distribution of rates of return means, the market portfolio
is the mean-variance efficient portfolio. An issue for empirical CAPM tests
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identified by Roll (1977) is the unobservability of the true return on the
market portfolio and that instead a proxy has to be used. But as long as
there is reason to believe that the correlation between the true market return
and the proxy is high, this problem is attenuated. Moreover, Stambaugh
(1982) shows that the CAPM is not sensitive to the proxy used. However,
the CAPM has been challenged by the empirically driven anomalies litera-
ture. Using a two-step approach to deal with the problem of cross-sectional
correlation, Fama and MacBeth (1973) find that CAPM betas indeed explain
differences in expected returns across stocks. That the intercept in the regres-
sion proved to be larger than the risk-free rate was, however, inconsistent with
the CAPM. Various other CAPM anomalies established that stock character-
istics are related to differences in expected returns. Banz (1981) found that
size helps to explain expected returns. Various other anomalies are related to
scaled versions of the inverse of the stock price. The price-earnings ratio has
marginal explanatory power for expected returns (Basu, 1977) and leverage
is positively related to expected returns (Bhandari, 1988). Chan et al. (1991)
and Fama and French (1992) find that book-to-market equity has strong re-
turn explanatory power. Motivated by these systematic anomalies, Fama and
French (1993) propose a CAPM model extended by two additional factors.
They add long-short portfolio returns from going long in small market value
and shorting big market value firms. To this“small-minus-big” (SMB) factor
they add long-short portfolio returns for “high-minus-low” (HML) book-to-
market ratio stocks. This so called Fama-French three factor model proved
to be much more robust in empirical applications than the CAPM. Based
on the momentum anomalies established by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) and
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Carhart (1997) suggests to use momentum as
a fourth factor. The momentum factor, resulting from going long in stocks
with high past returns and shorting stocks with low past returns, is now com-
monly added to the Fama-French benchmark model. This model is called the
four-factor model.
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1.8.1 Big firms
Portfolio analyses for markets outside the United States are rare because until
recently, Fama-French factors have been available only for the US market. In
this study we analyze US as well as European SRI portfolios based on ratings
obtained from a Swiss Bank. The rating process starts with a universe of
large capitalization stocks and in a first step certain industries are excluded
in a negative screening process. The firms in the remaining industries are
then screened for good environmental, social, and governance performance.
For the portfolio analysis from 1998 to 2009 we use and present a recently
constructed financial databank comprising the common market return, size,
value, and momentum factors (Schmidt et al., 2011). We find that SRI is
associated with large-sized firms and that this investment strategy generally
leads to insignificant abnormal returns when all four risk factors are con-
sidered. These results indicate that markets work fairly efficiently for large
capitalization stocks. These stocks are usually very liquid and have high an-
alyst coverage. Potential concerns by investors that negative screens cause
suboptimal diversification and therefore subpar performance are refuted by
our results. From this perspective, the result of neutral performance in both
markets might indicate that the positive screening process did identify some
value relevant firm characteristics.
1.8.2 Small and middle sized firms
In this study we analyze portfolios of strategic CSR firms in Europe. These
firms are mainly small growth stocks with a focus on strategic CSR innova-
tion. The share of firms in renewable energy and alternative electricity in this
portfolio is for instance relatively high. We find for this distinct portfolio ab-
normal returns, say, a significantly positive alpha (intercept). Notwithstand-
ing the general empirical robustness of the four-factor model, it is known
that bad model problems are more frequent for portfolios of small growth
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stocks. This gives rise to the joint hypothesis problem. Therefore, we use in
a robustness check a novel propensity score matching method to construct
control portfolios with similar characteristics. We then estimate four-factor
models for these portfolios in order to compare the alphas of the SRI portfolio
to similar control portfolio alphas. Although in expectation the alpha should
be zero, we find positive alphas for the control portfolios in a resampling pro-
cedure. But the alpha of the SRI portfolio outperforms the control portfolios
by about 1% monthly.
We argue that two explanations lend themselves to positive abnormal
returns for this portfolio. They are the strategic CSR implementation of the
firms and the strong growth in SRI during the analyzed period from 2003
to 2009. This last point has so far not received attention in the literature.
With the available data we can not distinguish if the alpha was driven by
a transition to a new equilibrium induced by a demand shift, or because
of a systematic underestimation of the expected fundamental performance.
Furthermore, the rolling alpha estimation also shows no trend that would
distinguish between the two hypotheses. There is, however, one caveat for the
implementation of the analyzed investment strategy. It would be somewhat
less attractive than the positive abnormal performance identified in this study
because research and transaction costs can be substantial for small stocks
given their limited capacity to absorb funds.
1.9 Findings and implications
This thesis finds no evidence that firms engaging in the provision of public
goods act against the pecuniary interests of their shareholders, rather the
contrary. Firms that practice CSR perform at least as well or better than one
would expect. Overall the results are supportive of the instrumental stake-
holder theory. Because one can argue that within a separating equilibrium
some firms provide public goods to stakeholders while others do not, this
finding does not necessarily imply that firms should generally engage more
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with their stakeholders.
The papers on the interplay between voluntary climate initiatives and reg-
ulatory pressure find that voluntary initiatives do not substitute but rather
complement regulatory pressure. The negative relationship in the US between
carbon intensity and Tobin’s Q indicates that market valuations react to a
rapid market driven price increase of fossil fuels. However, to rely on the mar-
ket driven price path of fossil fuels to move towards a greener economy seems
risky because the price increase during the period analyzed was somewhat
exceptional. As long as the sum of extraction costs and scarcity rent of fossil
fuels is not fully reflective of the costs caused by pollution and global warming
and no cheap backstop technology is available, market forces create a socially
suboptimal outcome. This creates the opportunity for Pareto improvements
through voluntary action and voluntary initiatives. Yet the market logic in-
herently limits the effectiveness of these approaches. On the other hand, the
efficacy of regulatory pressure is illustrated by the finding that markets are
twice as sensitive in the valuation of corporate carbon intensity in the UK
as compared to the US. The robustness checks for both countries are in line
with the view that some underinvestment in green technologies might be an
issue. Other potential explanations for the observed patterns are for instance
changes in product portfolio or management.
The positive abnormal returns for members in the CCX when the Waxman-
Markey Bill passed in the House of Representatives offers hints for the design
of voluntary environmental initiatives. Namely, the design should fit well
with the type of government intervention that is most likely. In that man-
ner, VEP membership guarantees a head start if regulatory interventions are
implemented. Moreover, we find no short-run market reaction for firms an-
nouncing CCX membership while Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011) find
a negative reaction for firms announcing CL membership. The comparison
of these results to the market reactions when the Bill was passed indicates,
that shareholders value membership in voluntary climate initiatives only in
the light of regulatory pressure.
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The two SRI portfolio analyses illustrate that investing with self imposed
constraints does not necessarily imply subpar financial performance. Even
though we find no risk adjusted abnormal returns for portfolios consisting
of big firms, the financial performance of this portfolios is not negatively af-
fected by the extensive use of negative industry screens. SRI characteristics
are priced correctly for these big firms with wide analyst coverage. However,
we find substantial positive abnormal returns for a portfolio of small growth
firms with a focus on strategic CSR. This result also persists when in ro-
bustness checks the joint hypothesis problem is addressed. We argue that
two different hypotheses might produce the observed result. Either valuable
SRI characteristics of theses strategic CSR firms are not priced correctly or
SRI affects the stock price of these firms. Because the portfolio consists of
small and middle sized firms, both explanations seem plausible. Information
on small firms is less readily available and to cover research costs is more
difficult because the price reacts more elastic to demand shocks. Therefore,
firm characteristics can potentially be incorrectly priced. But because SRI
experienced high growth rates in the analyzed period, a demand shock might
account for positive abnormal returns in the transition to a new equilibrium.
Yet the available data and the results at hand do not allow to disentangle
these two hypotheses.

Chapter 2
Corporate carbon intensity and
firm valuation: The effect of
regulatory pressure
Abstract
This paper investigates whether carbon intensity of firms is related to financial
performance as measured by Tobins’ Q. The carbon intensity of publicly
listed firms is assessed at the overall firm level. I distinguish between two
potential costs related to corporate carbon emissions, inherent and regulatory
costs. While regulatory costs are related to regulatory interventions or risks
related to future government interventions, inherent costs are driven by the
development of input prices. The existence of these two sources of costs is
addressed by means of a dynamic panel framework. I estimate firm valuation
models for two regions with well developed stock markets that are distinct
with respect to federal carbon emission policies, namely the United States and
the United Kingdom. There is evidence for a negative relationship between
carbon intensity and Tobin’s Q in both markets, however twice as large in
the United Kingdom. Put differently, an increase in carbon intensity has
about twice the penalty in terms of Q in the United Kingdom and vice versa,
a decrease twice the reward. The results highlight the role of regulatory
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pressure for markets to reward climate friendly behavior and suggest that
rapidly rising input prices, as observed during the period analyzed, help steer
markets towards greener behavior.
2.1 Introduction
In 1986 the Environmental Protection Agency of the United States started
a program with the intention of using information provision as a regulatory
instrument. To this end, two years later the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI)
was initiated. In 1992 the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development affirmed the right of communities to know about toxics, chem-
icals, and other substances. Currently more than 30 countries have adopted
so-called pollutant release and transfer registers.1 These registers ensure the
measurement of plant emissions above a certain threshold. Emission mea-
surement is a necessary condition for efficient emission management. But is
the mere measurement and disclosure of emissions enough to incentivize firms
to reduce emissions? A pecuniary incentive for active emission management
would be given if it were an obviously a profitable strategy from the firm’s
perspective. However, whether unrealized profitable emission reductions ex-
ist due to investment-inefficiencies in green technologies actually exist is a
controversial subject.
In the last decades voluntary efforts aiming at better corporate environ-
mental performance, such as industry initiatives and shareholder activism,
have gained popularity. Admittedly, the distinction between voluntary and
coerced action is rather gradual than clear cut. The term voluntary is often
used in the absence of intrusive government intervention, but often there is
also disagreement about the intrusiveness of an action (Klein, 2007). In 1989
one of the first investor backed initiatives was launched to pressure corpo-
rations to endorse their code of corporate environmental conduct (Coalition
1http://www.prtr.net/en/links/, visited on February 10 2012
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for Environmental Responsible Economies). Recently, some investors have
been particularly concerned about the carbon emissions of big corporations.
For instance, the Carbon Disclosure Project, an initiative of 543 investors
with assets of USD 64 trillion, has urged companies to disclose their carbon
emissions and their associated risks.2
This study investigates if an improvement in corporate carbon efficiency
is valued by the stock market. More specifically, I analyze whether there is
a link between corporate carbon intensity and Tobin’s Q (Q). I opt for Q as
the financial performance measure because it proxies for firm value, captur-
ing future growth opportunities and indicating future profitability. In what
follows, I differentiate between two types of costs: Regulatory and inherent.
By assessing the relationship between corporate greenhouse gas (GHG) in-
tensity and Q for firms based in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United
States (US), this study sheds light on the role of the regulatory context. In
the absence of taken, threatened, or imminent federal action by the regula-
tory authorities in the US, the expected inherent costs of carbon emissions
are of crucial concern from a risk management perspective. With expected
costs I mean the net present value of costs capturing current costs plus the
future distribution of costs. In Section 2.3 I identify the market driven price
path of fossil fuel energy sources (such as oil) as main origin of inherent costs.
Because of existing federal legislation addressing carbon emissions and threat-
ened further regulatory steps, expected regulatory costs of carbon emissions
seem more relevant in the UK than in the US. It is not readily obvious, how-
ever, if a link between carbon intensity and Q exists and whether institutional
differences affect this relationship. I argue that the role of regulatory pressure
can be inferred by comparing the explanatory power of the carbon intensity
variable in the valuation models for the UK and US market.
To this end, this study uses new carbon emission data on the global firm
level of publicly listed companies from Trucost, a UK based data provider.
2https://www.cdproject.net/CDPResults/CDP-2010-G500.pdf, visited on Novem-
ber 18 2010
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Whereas related eco-efficiency studies make inference from aggregated eco-
performance of some plants and facilities of a firm on its overall financial
performance, this study uses global firm level emissions in the inference. Ac-
counting for global firm level emissions has recently only become feasible due
to the development of a corporate GHG accounting and reporting standard
issued in 2001 under the title ”The Greenhouse Gas Protocol”.
Existing studies have been focusing exclusively on local pollutants such as
toxic emissions. This study adds corporate GHG intensity akin to Busch and
Hoffmann (2011) to this strand of literature. As a novelty, I conduct a static
and dynamic panel data analysis with environmental outcome data (Arellano
and Bond, 1991; Baltagi, 2008). In addition, I compare two regions with a
different policy approach to carbon emissions. Based on a short overview of
the relevant eco-efficiency literature for this paper (Table A2.5), I argue that
unobserved firm-heterogeneity is a principal concern. This claim is in line with
King and Lenox (2001), Elsayed and Paton (2005), and Telle (2006). For the
model specification, I derive the control variables and the dependent variable
Q based on a brief literature survey (Table A2.6). The results highlight that
some variable specifications might produce time-inconsistencies in the model
estimations, potentially resulting in a look-ahead bias.
This study finds a negative link between the carbon intensity of a firm
and Q. A decrease of carbon emission per value of output is associated with
a significant increase in Q. Compared to the US, this relationship is about
twice as large in the UK. This difference is likely attributable to substantially
higher regulatory pressure in the UK. Still, the findings for the US suggest
that even low regulatory pressure provides markets some incentives for higher
carbon intensities.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a
short overview of the eco-efficiency literature. The relevant issues of this liter-
ature with respect to corporate carbon emissions are identified in Section 2.3.
In section 2.4 I layout the model specification and describe the data. Based
on a discussion of the empirical results in Section 2.5, Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Literature and theory
In a perfect market the environmental performance of a firm should not be
related to its financial performance because each firm is investing in environ-
mental technologies until marginal costs equal marginal benefits. Whether
there exist investment-inefficiencies due to information asymmetries or high
hurdle rates due to short sighted management is a controversial debate (e.g.
Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Nadel and Therese, 2012; Anderson and Newell,
2004; Howarth et al., 2000). However, in their survey on the long run economic
impacts of voluntary environmental firm performance Blanco et al. (2009)
conclude that being green relates neutrally or positively to financial perfor-
mance. This suggests that over-investment in green technologies is absent
and that improving eco-efficiency is not merely a cost factor but creates rev-
enue increasing and cost decreasing opportunities. Ambec and Lanoie (2008)
identify the following three revenue increasing opportunities: Better access to
certain markets, differentiating products, and selling pollution control tech-
nologies. On the other hand, they identify four costs reducing opportunities:
Risk management and relations with external stakeholders, cost of materials,
energy and services, cost of capital and cost of labor. Russo and Fouts (1997)
relate corporate environmental performance to the resource based view of the
firm which stresses the importance of intangible resources3 of firms as key to a
competitive advantage (Villalonga, 2004). Other authors also see reputation
as a driving force for good corporate behavior. But Karpoff et al. (2005) have
shown that the short run stock market reaction to corporate environmental
violations is largely explained by legal and regulatory penalties, leaving no
explanatory power for reputational penalties.
Different methodological approaches have been taken in the empirical lit-
erature to show that eco-efficiency is not a mere cost factor. Event studies (see
e.g. Hamilton, 1995; Konar and Cohen, 1997) have uncovered that publicly
3intangible assets such as corporate culture, brand name, reputation, particular tech-
nology, accumulated consumer informations.
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published reports on the corporate environmental performance (CEP) affect
short-term stock market prices of the respective companies. By assuming
semi-strong market efficiency, meaning that all publicly available informa-
tion is priced into stock prices (Fama, 1970), this illustrates that investors
do react to new corporate environmental information. Another branch of the
literature takes a portfolio approach and sorts firms based on some corpo-
rate environmental performance measure into eco-efficient and eco-inefficient
portfolios. Derwall et al. (2005) for instance use environmental ratings from
Innovest as a sorting variable and find positive abnormal returns for the more
eco-efficient portfolio. But in their survey of portfolio studies (Ambec and
Lanoie, 2008) find no clear evidence for abnormal returns.4 A third strand
of empirical approaches adopts the long term view by investigating in a mi-
cro econometric approach the relation between corporate environmental and
financial performance such as Q, return on assets, return on sales or return
on equity. The more recent of these studies are using a panel data, allowing
to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity by using fixed firm effects (King
and Lenox, 2001, 2002; Elsayed and Paton, 2005; Telle, 2006).
A brief overview of relevant eco-efficiency studies for this paper is pre-
sented in Table A2.5 in the appendix. Other detailed surveys on eco-efficiency
and financial performance can be found in Ambec and Lanoie (2007) and
Blanco et al. (2009). Table A2.5 illustrates that many studies make inference
based on cross-sectional samples, neglecting unobserved firm heterogeneity
(Hart, 1995; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Dowell et al., 2000; Konar and Cohen,
2001; Guenster et al., 2011; Busch and Hoffmann, 2011) . On the other hand
King and Lenox (2001, 2002) and Telle (2006) account for fixed firm effects
and Elsayed and Paton (2005) even exploit the dynamic panel structure of
their data. The studies of King and Lenox (2001, 2002); Telle (2006); Konar
4The appeal of the portfolio approach is its robustness to outliers on the firm level but
this comes at the cost of abnormal returns having an ambiguous interpretation. Without
additional investigations only an error in expectations related to some firm characteristics
is revealed but the driver of abnormal returns remains (often) unclear.
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and Cohen (2001) use environmental outcome data derived from plant and
facility level emissions and Busch and Hoffmann (2011) use as explanatory
variables GHG emissions on the overall firm level. Generally, the use of envi-
ronmental outcome data seems to be more meaningful than to rely on ratings
or firm policies.
Only few eco-efficiency studies focus specifically on carbon emissions. To
date two studies investigate if voluntary disclosed information on corporate
carbon efficiency or management of companies has an impact on long run
financial performance. Busch and Hoffmann (2011) investigate if corporate
carbon intensity and carbon management are related to corporate financial
performance (CFP). In a cross sectional analysis they find that Q is signifi-
cantly negative related to the carbon intensity of a firm. Ziegler et al. (2011)
find weak evidence that the stringency of institutional pressure might lead
to higher stock performance of firms that assert to take climate change se-
riously when forming portfolios based on the level of disclosed responses to
climate change. Similarly two event-studies look at the short run market reac-
tion to corporate membership announcements in voluntary climate initiatives.
While Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011) find a negative market reaction
for firms joining the government-partnership program Climate Leaders, Gans
and Hintermann (2013) find a positive reaction for corporate membership
announcement in the Chicago Climate Exchange in a difference-in-difference
approach with monthly data. The later also find positive abnormal stock
returns for their sample when proposed GHG legislation (Waxman-Markey
bill) was passed on June 26, 2009, in the US House of Representatives. Mollet
and Ilic (2013) apply a proper event study methodology for members in these
two voluntary agreements and find no significant announcement returns for
Chicago Climate Exchange membership. Investigating the market reaction to
the Waxman-Markey event they find a positive abnormal returns for Chicago
Climate Exchange members but not for Climate Leader members and relate
this difference to program design.
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2.3 Hypothesis and test strategy
Carbon-emissions are fundamentally different from toxic emissions: They are
more diffuse and have a less immediate impact. Due to these characteristics
lowering carbon emissions is a less likely candidate for labor cost savings
because the proximity of employees and neighbors to the emission source is not
putting their health at risk. Therefor litigation and legal costs have a lower
occurrence probability unless carbon and toxic emissions are emitted jointly.
The global impact of carbon emissions makes it more difficult for stakeholders
to organize than in the case of local toxic emissions and therefore a coasian
bargaining solutions is less likely due to high transaction costs (Coase, 1960).
Within Ambec and Lanoie’s framework (2008) predominantly cost reduc-
ing opportunities arise with respect to corporate carbon-efficiency in the form
of better risk management and enhanced relations with external stakehold-
ers.5 Substantial costs and downside risks in the area of risk management
arise also out of current or uncertain future carbon emission regulation,6
allowing companies with a carbon management system in place to develop
better strategies in response to uncertainties about the future regulatory en-
vironment. Another downside risk independent of regulatory action consists
of the uncertainty about the price path development of fossil fuels. Due to a
combination of exhaustible supply and rising worldwide demand these prices
tend to shift upward (Hotelling, 1931; Kilian, 2009). Over the period ana-
lyzed in this study for instance, the oil price tripled.7 Because the UK and US
5Excluded in this analysis are the risks faced by corporations as constituted by shifting
temperature and weather patterns and their physical (see IPCC, 2007) and macro economic
(see Nordhaus, 2007; Stern, 2007)implications.
6Regulation could be directed towards pricing carbon emissions, increasing taxes on
fossil fuels or using command and control instruments to impose minimal efficiency stan-
dards.
7From 2003 to 2008 the price for a barrel of oil rose according to the London Brent
Crude Oil Index from around 30 USD to over 100. With the onset of the financial crisis
the price crashed to 40 and rose again to over 90 USD at the end of 2010.
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both depend on imported fossil fuels, they have roughly the same exposure
to these uncertain net present value costs.
Different stakeholders are concerned with climate change and would like
to see corporations address the issue by operating carbon efficiently and by
innovating carbon efficient products. The Carbon Disclosure Project asks
corporations to address carbon risks and to disclose carbon emissions. Several
other investor backed initiatives such as the Investor Network on Climate Risk
(INCR) supported by Ceres and also institutions of the United Nations8 show
substantial interest in corporate emissions. This wide investor base concerned
with corporate carbon emissions and the related expected costs, caused by
current or potential future costs, tries to exert pressure on companies.
In this paper I postulate that carbon emitters are faced with two factors
affecting expected costs: The inherent and the regulatory current and future
costs. The expected inherent costs of carbon emissions are not related to reg-
ulation. If these expected costs were of sufficient magnitude, market forces are
capable of moving corporations towards more carbon-efficiency. The expected
regulatory costs on the other hand arise from current regulation or threat-
ened future regulatory action aiming at making carbon-emissions directly or
indirectly more expensive. In this study I refer to these governmental actions
also as regulatory pressure.
I evaluate the effect of carbon-efficiency on Q in two different regulatory
regimes by estimating a model with the forward looking financial performance
measure Q separately for the US and the UK market. In contrast to Ziegler
et al. (2011) I look at effective carbon emissions and I do not analyze the
entire region covered by the mandatory European Union Emission Trading
System (EU ETS) but focus on the UK market. This focus reduces sample
size but has two advantages: Looking at a the biggest homogenous European
stock market and not having to worry about currency conversion. The UK
is a member state in the EU ETS, workable since 2005, and also created in
8http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/global_framework.pdf, visited on
July 6 2011
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2002 already the voluntary “UK Emission Trading Syste”. Carbon emissions
in the UK are therefore priced and the EU has signaled that also in the fu-
ture carbon emissions will be priced. Almer and Winkler (2012) even find
only for the UK an emission reduction effect among the Kyoto signatories.
The USA on the other hand have very high per capita carbon emissions and
never signed the Kyoto protocol. There are currently no federal standards,
taxes or other regulation that put a price on carbon emissions in the US.
However, regional and local initiatives do exist.9 The US have always been
very active in promoting voluntary initiatives (e.g. Lyon and Maxwell, 2003).
Bo¨hringer and Vogt (2004) illustrate that the EU was taking the adaptation
of a climate change policy more seriously than the US and attribute the un-
willingness of the US government to aim for substantial and binding emission
reductions in a political economy approach to the attitude of the median US
voter. For this voter climate change was of low priority from the 90’s to the
new millennium and his willingness to pay eco-taxes was low. More recent
Gallup pools, the Eurobarometer and the World Value Surveys indicate that
European citizens are generally more concerned with climate change than
American citizens (Ziegler et al., 2011). Also the management of a firm and
potential investors are affected by these differences in politics and general at-
titudes. The environmental management practices and purchasing decisions
of environmental technology is generally determined by the headquarters of
a firm (Cole et al., 2013). The headquarters opinions and assessments hence
have consequences for the entire firm. The pressure exerted by investors on
companies also varies due to investors home bias (French and Poterba, 1991;
Karolyi and Stulz, 2003).
Gans and Hintermann (2013) and Mollet and Ilic (2013) find evidence
that the unexpected passing of the Waxman-Markey bill, suddenly raising
the likelihood of federal legislation targeting carbon emissions, produces pos-
itive abnormal returns for firms with a membership in the Chicago Climate
9Examples are
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Exchange. Similarly Kim and Lyon (2011) find abnormal returns for mem-
bers in the Carbon Disclosure Project upon the sudden Russian ratification
of the Kyoto-Protocol. Studies covering the EU ETS area such as Veith et al.
(2009), Oberndorfer (2009), Bushnell et al. (2011) and Schmidt and Werner
(2012) present evidence that the price of carbon permits does affect stock
market performance. This illustrates that substantial expected regulatory
costs might indeed exist for carbon emissions. As discussed, eco-efficiency
studies find a positive or no relation between environmental and financial
performance. Therefore I expect generally a negative or neutral relationship
between corporate carbon intensity and financial performance. Because the
expected regulatory costs are more tangible in the UK than the US, the re-
lationship should be more pronounced in the UK, say more negative, than in
the US.
2.4 Model and data
The unbalanced firm panels with annual data begins in 2003. Because of the
onset of the financial crisis in 2008 I restrict the analyzed time period from
2003 to 2007. In all scenarios analyzed I find clear evidence for firm fixed-
effects. Due to autocorrelation in the residuals for fixed-firm effect models,
the following model specification is preferred:
Qit = αQit−1 + β
′
CIit−1 + γ
′
Xit + it (2.1)
it = µi + θt + ηit
In equation 2.1 Tobin’s Q is explained by a lag of the dependent variable
Q, a vector of control variables Xit and the lagged carbon intensity variable
CIit−1. CI is lagged by one year because it takes longer for environmental
information to become public information than for the well established finan-
cial reporting measures. Lagging a firms carbon-intensity should also help to
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address simultaneity and reverse causality problems. The financial data used
in X and Q are from Thomson Reuters Datastream. As left hand side (LHS)
variable I opt for Q because it is in contrast to criticized accounting based
performance measures a forward looking measure (McFarland, 1987) based on
the expectations of investors. Tobin (1969) proposed Q as performance mea-
sure defined as the market valuation of a firm in relation to the replacement
value of its tangible assets. The total market value of a firm equals the sum
of the tangible and the intangible assets of a firm, hence VT + VIT = TMV .
Q is obtained by dividing MV with the tangible asset value VT which leaves
us with Q = 1 + VIT/VT . Different approximations for Q exist in the lit-
erature (e.g. Lindenberg and Ross, 1981; Chung and Pruitt, 1994). Perfect
and Wiles (1994) empirically evaluate five alternative estimators of Q and
find that when changes in Q are used for regression purposes no significant
differences are revealed among the different measures. Due to the use of a
fixed effect estimator, captured by µi in the decomposition of the error term
, I opt for a relatively simple calculation of Q. Table A2.6 illustrates how Q
is calculated in studies with Q as the right hand variable (RHS). Following
Guenster et al. (2011); Bebchuk et al. (2008) I opt for calculation of Q as
shown in equation 2.2.
Q =
MVCS + (TA− EQ−BSDT )
TA
(2.2)
The market value of common stock (MVCS) is added to the book value of
a firms total assets (TA) and the sum of book value of common stock (EQ)
and balance sheet deferred taxes (BSDT) is subtracted. This approximation
of TMV is divided by the book value of total assets. Using MVCS instead
of the market value of equity MVEQ as declared in the annual report has the
advantage of being available continuously through time and not only once a
year. The book values used in equation 2.2 and in 2.1 are made public only
at the end of the fiscal year. But the month of the fiscal year end varies
across companies and countries. The default role for year assignment based
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on the fiscal year varies in Thomson Reuters Datastream across countries.
Furthermore, if the fiscal year is at the beginning of the calendar year τ + 1,
the market capitalization MVEQ is taken at the end of calendar year τ . This
results in time inconsistencies in the estimation of 2.1 resulting potentially in
a look-ahead bias. Therefore I prefer to use MVCS in equation 2.2 over using
MVEQ. I assign year τ to fiscal years from January 21 τ until January 20 of
year τ + 1. The market value of common equity MVCS is always extracted
at the end of June and following Fama and French (1992) I assume that it
takes at least 3 month for the public information of the annual report to be
priced in.
Following King and Lenox (2001) I control in equation 2.1 for firm size by
taking the logarithm of total assets, and control for capital intensity (capint),
leverage two year salesgrowth average (salesgra) and research and develop-
ment (R&D) expenditures scaled by sales (rdint). As Durnev and Kim (2005)
I set R&D expenditures to zero if they are missing in Thomson Reuters Datas-
tream. Table 2.1 shows that all variables measuring an intensity are either
scaled by sales or total assets. In accordance with prior Q regressions (Am-
mann et al., 2011; Aggarwal et al., 2009) I also include in the estimation cash
intensity (cashint), property-plants and equipment intensity (ppe),earnings
before interest and taxes to sales (ebit), American Depositary Receipt (ADR)
dummy and the percentage share of closely held shares(closely held). In line
with Bebchuk et al. (2008) and Guenster et al. (2011) firm age approximated
by the firms incorporation year. Following (Dowell et al., 2000) the percent-
age share of foreign sales is also a control variable (foreign sales). In the
eco-efficiency studies using fixed effects only Elsayed and Paton (2005) use
advertisement expenditures as a control variable. Because information on
advertisement is scarce, Elsayed and Paton (2005) proxy advertisement with
intangible assets. I intentionally do not follow this approach, because the
intangible assets VIT are exactly the part of Q I intent to explain (Angrist
and Pischke, 2008). Moreover, I do not include return on assets (ROA) as a
control variable becuase it is highly correlated with ebit. Konar and Cohen
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(2001) are the only ones to include market shares and industry concentration
in their cross-sectional estimations. Assuming that these datapoints do not
change over the period considered, I do not include them. The firms with
the industry classification ”Financials” are dropped from the dataset because
of their distinct business model relying on excessive use of leverage. This
industry is obviously also not relevant when looking at GHG emissions. Ad-
ditionally, only companies are included that report their financial data in local
currencies. Therefore the financial data are denominated for the UK sample
in pounds and for the US sample in US dollars. But the currency denomina-
tion remains only relevant for the carbon intensity and the size variable. To
address the problem of outliers and influential observations I winsorize the
variables Q, ebit and salesgra at the 2% and 98% percentiles.
Table 2.1: Variable overview
Variable list Description Main Worldscope mnemonic
Q Qmv MVCS+(TA−CS−BSDT )
TA
? MV+WC02999−WC03501−WC03263
WC02999
CI laglogemi log(lagged carbon emission intensity) scope1
WC01001
X
size log(total assets) WC02999
capint capital expenditures / total sales WC04601
leverage total dept / total assets WC03255
salesgra sales growth average over last 2 years WC01001
rdint R&D-expenses / sales WC01201
cashint cash / total assets WC02001
ppe property-plants-equipment / sales WC02501
ebit ebit / sales WC18191
foreign sales international sales / total sales WC08731
closely held percentage closely held shares WC08021
age company age based on incorporation year WC18273
adr ADR indicator WC11496
?
MV: Market value, BV: Book value, BSDT: Balance sheet deferred taxes, MVCS: Market value of common stocks
The carbon emission data are taken from the database Trucost and cover-
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age begins in the year 2002. This is an UK based environmental data provider
that collects a plethora of corporate environmental data and also estimates
datapoints based on an detailed input output model. Trucost applies a sin-
gle methodology to derive emission estimates, takes advise from an academic
panel and always contacts companies for feedback on the compiled data. Fol-
lowing the methodology described in the ”Greenhouse Gas Protocol” (GHG
Protocol), Trucost converts the six Kyoto gases10into GHG equivalents using
conversion factors. The GHG-Protocol was developed in 2001 by the World
Resource Institute (WRI) and the World Bussines Council for Sustainable
Development (WBCD). It constitutes a standard11 for companies on how to
calculate and report their carbon emissions in three categories: Scope 1 cov-
ers the direct emissions occurring from sources that are owned or controlled
by the company, scope 2 captures the indirect carbon emissions consisting
mainly of the purchase of electricity, and scope 3 covers other indirect GHG
emissions such as the emissions from the supply chain and the use of sold
products and services. A more detailed description of the different scope cat-
egories can be found in WBCD and WRI (2004) or in Table 1 of Hoffmann
and Busch 2008. I use scope 1 emissions and scale these direct emissions by
sales. I prefer to use this corporate carbon footprint only if datapoints are
not purely derived by Trucost’s estimation procedure but contain some addi-
tional information. The information may come from environmental reports,
corporate social responsibility reports, from the carbon disclosure project or
may also be derived from fuel consumption data or from data received in
personal communication with the firms . I require some additional informa-
tion for the sample firms because the specification of Trucost’s input-output
model is unknown. Additionally, the within firm carbon-intensity changes are
much lower for firms disclosing some information as compared to firms with
10carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbons and
perfluorocarbons
11The ”Carbon Disclosure Project” is referring to the GHG protocol and ISO 14064-1
as the global standards
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a change in the disclosure regime. As denominator for scaling the emission
data to carbon-intensity measures I use sales. Therefore, this study looks
at direct firm emissions from production and operations in relation to sales.
The resulting carbon intensity is determined by the industry or industries of
operation of a firm and by company-specific factors such as product portfo-
lio, environmental management and technological equipment. The studies of
King and Lenox (2001) and Telle (2006) rate facilities relative to their peers
and the industry they operate in. Due to the problem of benchmark identifi-
cation when looking at emissions at the overall firm level, a firm can operate
in different industries simultaneously and the higher aggregation produces
less observations, this study focuses on carbon-intensity changes within the
firm.
2.5 Empirical results
2.5.1 Descriptive statistics
The unbalanced panel data used to estimate equation 2.1 cover the period
from 2003 to 2007. Table A2.7 shows how the number of firms in the two
country samples evolve. For each sample firm the explained and all explana-
tory variables as listed in Table 2.1 must be non-missing. Different sectors
are not equally represented in the two samples as illustrated in Table A2.8.
According to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), industrials have
with 28% the highest share in the UK sample while the highest share is held
in the US sample by utilities with 30% . As mentioned, the month of the fiscal
year differs across firms and countries. In the UK sample approximately 60%
of the firm observations have the fiscal year in December and in the US data
this respective share is 80%.
Table A2.9 and A2.10 show pooled firm-years summary statistics for the
UK and the US sample. Comparing the two samples we find that the log-
arithmized Q (logQmv) is slightly higher in the UK and in both countries
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sales are growing by 10% on average. On average lower in the UK are the
logarithmized emission intensity (laglogemi), firm size, property-plants and
equipment intensity and the logarithm of the approximated company age.
Some of these differences might be due to not identical sector representation
in the two samples. The percentage of closely held shares is higher for the
UK sample and almost half of the UK firm-year observations are cross-listed
in the US with an ADR (indicator adr). The pairwise correlations for the
two samples in Table A2.11 paint a consistent picture. All financial variables
have the same expected correlation with the dependent variable logQmv. The
only exception is capint with a positive correlation in the UK and a slightly
negative one in the US. A different relationship can also be found in the
logarithmized firm age which is virtually zero in the UK and positive in the
US. The lag of the logarithmized carbon intensity laglogemi correlates in both
countries negatively with the performance measure logQmv, but this relation-
ship is more than three times stronger in the US. The pairwise correlations
depict that higher carbon intensity is associated with lower values of Tobin’s
Q for both samples. But these correlations also establish a much stronger
negative association in the US.
2.5.2 Regression results
I begin the analysis by exploring if a random effects (RE) or fixed effects (FE)
model fits better the firm samples without considering the dynamic structer
(laglogemi) yeat. The reported FE and RE models in Table 2.2 include both
year and and sector dummies. Because sector affiliation and the ADR dummy
variable (indicator adr) are fixed characteristics over time, these variables
disappear with the within transformation of a FE model. All test statistics
clearly indicate for both country samples that unobserved firm heterogeneity
is important. This suggests to use a FE model. The F test that all firm
specific effects are zero in the FE model is overwhelmingly rejected. The
Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) and also the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian
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multiplier test for random effects are unambiguously rejected. Moreover,
Guggenberger (2010) shows that due to power distortions of the Hausman
test it is always more conservative to estimate a FE model. Therefore, I
clearly favor the FE model. The FE point estimates in Table 2.2 for the
lagged emission-intensity variable are in both samples significantly negative.
But the observed negative effect is about twice as large in the UK as in the
US. Also the RE estimation results show a significantly negative laglogemi
coefficient for the UK sample. The null hypothesis of the Wooldridge test for
no first-order serial autocorrelation in panel-data models (Wooldridge, 2002)
is overwhelmingly rejected for both panels and also for all other scenarios
tried as robustness checks.12
This results suggests to use a lagged dependent variable on the right hand
side. I proceed by estimating a fixed effects model with the lagged Q variable
as explanatory variable as noted in equation 2.1. The presence of a lagged
dependent variable induces a bias in pooled OLS as well as in within group
estimations (see e.g. Bond, 2002). The FE estimation of equation 2.1 triggers
the Nickell (1981) bias. However, if all control variables in X are strictly
exogenous, only the lagged dependent variable is affected by this bias. Gen-
erally, consistent estimates can be retrieved using GMM. Arellano and Bond
(1991) have proposed within that framework to use a full set of valid lags as
instruments. This method requires T > 3 and therefore reduces the unbal-
anced firm panels somewhat.
Table 2.3 and 2.4 present different dynamic panel estimation results for
the UK and the US market. Differently estimated dynamic panel models
as specified in equation 2.1, accounting for fixed firm effects and a lagged
dependent variable, are shown in the four columns. The first two columns
are fixed effects estimators, extending the fixed effect estimator of Table 2.2 by
including the lagged dependent variable as explanatory variable. Compared to
column (1), column (2) uses a FE estimator with intra-firm clustered standard
12As a cross check I Iooked at longer time series, different time periods and samples and
found this test usually rejected.
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Table 2.2: Random- & fixed effects for UK and USA
UK USA
Random effects Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects
laglogemi −0.054 ∗ ∗∗ −0.126 ∗ ∗∗ −0.022 −0.065 ∗ ∗∗
[−3.11] [−4.62] [−1.38] [−2.64]
size −0.059 ∗ ∗ −0.195 ∗ ∗∗ −0.107 ∗ ∗∗ −0.459 ∗ ∗∗
[−2.12] [−2.80] [−5.36] [−8.51]
capint 1.380 ∗ ∗ 0.702 1.640 ∗ ∗∗ 0.877 ∗ ∗
[2.25] [0.98] [3.68] [2.01]
leverage −0.254∗ −0.351∗ −0.445 ∗ ∗∗ −0.437 ∗ ∗∗
[−1.71] [−1.83] [−3.15] [−2.66]
salesgra −0.001 −0.001 0.000 0.001
[−0.61] [−0.43] [0.23] [1.17]
rdint −0.342 −1.529 0.158 −0.659
[−0.57] [−1.06] [0.24] [−0.62]
cashint 0.104 0.092 0.575 ∗ ∗∗ 0.555 ∗ ∗∗
[0.49] [0.41] [3.30] [3.07]
ppe −0.142 ∗ ∗∗ −0.245 ∗ ∗∗ −0.115 ∗ ∗∗ −0.052
[−2.97] [−3.18] [−2.67] [−0.82]
ebit 0.625 ∗ ∗∗ −0.043 0.837 ∗ ∗∗ 0.389 ∗ ∗∗
[3.06] [−0.18] [5.68] [2.63]
foreign sales 0.001 0.003 ∗ ∗∗ 0.002 ∗ ∗ −0.000
[1.28] [2.69] [2.37] [−0.21]
closely held −0.001 −0.002∗ 0.000 0.000
[−1.04] [−1.75] [0.05] [0.04]
logage −0.019 0.061 ∗ ∗
[−0.63] [2.45]
indicator adr 0.082
[0.86]
constant 1.317 ∗ ∗∗ 3.189 ∗ ∗∗ 1.941 ∗ ∗∗ 8.066 ∗ ∗∗
[3.17] [3.19] [5.59] [9.02]
year dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es
Sector dummies Y es No Y es No
Observations 302 302 416 422
Nr. of firms 106 106 147 148
t statistics shown in brackets. Significance levels: * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
The Breusch-Pagan lagrangian multiplier test for random effects is clearly rejected. The rejection of both
the F test that all firm specific effects are zero and of the Hausman test indicate that a fixed effects model
should be favored. In the fixed firm effect model however, the Wooldridge-Drukker test for no first-order
autocorrelation is clearly rejected.
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errors. These two estimators are considered because the Arellano and Bond
(1991) GMM estimator is asymptotic efficient on N but the analyzed samples
are finite. The robust Arellano-Bond one step estimator is shown in column
(3) and the two step estimators corrected for Windmeijer’s (2005) sample
correction in column (4). For both FE estimators in column (1) and (2), the
coefficient of the lagged Q is high and significant in the UK and the US. In
these estimations also the coefficient of laglogemi, the variable measuring the
emission intensity, remains for both country samples negative and significant
at the 1% level. But the negative effect in the UK has almost twice the
magnitude than in the US. While the coefficient βCIit−1 is -0.11 in the UK,
βCIit−1=-0.062 holds for the US. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.3 and 2.4
show the results of GMM estimations. For the assumptions in equation 2.1
to perfectly hold, we should observe first order autocorrelation AR(1) but
no second order autocorrelation AR(2) after having transformed the data by
first-difference. Moreover, the Sargan test with the null hypothesis of valid
moment conditions has to be considered. Across the estimations, the pair
of AR tests with the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, is only for the
one-step US estimation ideal with rejection for AR(1) and non-rejection for
AR(2). But only in this unique estimation the Sargan test is rejected. This
indicated either that the instruments are not orthogonal to the error term,
or the test based on asymptotic properties is not be well specified for the
analyzed finite samples.
Across all other GMM estimations, the hypothesis of no AR(1) process
can not be rejected at conventional significance levels and the absence of
an AR(2) process is never rejected wither. With these caveats in mind, it
is nevertheless assuring that the coefficient of the carbon intensity variable
varies only little across the 4 dynamic estimations from Table 2.3 and 2.4
. The results are even in line with the static fixed effect estimation of Table
2.2. Therefore, the results across the different estimation methods provide
evidence for the conclusion that a reduction in corporate carbon-intesitity is
associated with an increase in Tobin’s Q. This relationship is about twice as
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Table 2.3: Dynamic estimations, UK
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed effects Fixed effects, clustered by firm Arellano Bond, one-step Arellano Bond, two-step
L.logQmv 0.267 ∗ ∗∗ 0.267 ∗ ∗∗ 0.203 0.122
[4.11] [4.54] [1.50] [0.70]
laglogemi −0.114 ∗ ∗∗ −0.114 ∗ ∗∗ −0.110 ∗ ∗∗ −0.087 ∗ ∗∗
[−4.31] [−4.15] [−4.30] [−3.37]
size −0.168 ∗ ∗ −0.168∗ −0.356 ∗ ∗∗ −0.397 ∗ ∗∗
[−2.51] [−1.98] [−3.63] [−3.72]
capint 1.117 1.117 0.201 −0.278
[1.60] [1.33] [0.23] [−0.31]
leverage −0.321∗ −0.321∗ −0.117 0.000
[−1.74] [−1.76] [−0.76] [0.00]
salesgra −0.002 −0.002 −0.002∗ −0.001
[−1.35] [−1.44] [−1.71] [−0.62]
rdint −2.938∗ −2.938 ∗ ∗∗ −3.681 ∗ ∗ −2.694
[−1.94] [−2.81] [−2.44] [−1.62]
cashint −0.078 −0.078 −0.081 −0.072
[−0.36] [−0.30] [−0.36] [−0.31]
ppe −0.313 ∗ ∗∗ −0.313 ∗ ∗∗ −0.298 ∗ ∗∗ −0.235 ∗ ∗
[−4.14] [−5.34] [−3.31] [−2.12]
ebit −0.183 −0.183 −0.515∗ −0.447
[−0.77] [−0.71] [−1.91] [−1.29]
foreign sales 0.003 ∗ ∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.003 ∗ ∗ 0.003
[2.80] [1.92] [2.13] [1.47]
closely held −0.001 −0.001 −0.002∗ −0.002
[−1.22] [−1.32] [−1.68] [−1.54]
constant 2.699 ∗ ∗∗ 2.699 ∗ ∗ 5.656 ∗ ∗∗ 6.258 ∗ ∗∗
[2.79] [2.16] [4.08] [4.16]
year dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 300 300 189 189
Nr. of firms 106 106 76 76
Nr. of instruments 26 26
AR1 test p-value 0.27 0.50
AR2 test p-value 0.702 0.433
Sargan test p-value 0.242 0.544
t statistics shown in brackets. Significance levels: * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
The columns (1) to (6) show the results of different dynamic panel models with a lagged dependent variable
as explanatory variable. In (1) and (2) show fixed effects results with clustered standard errors by firm in
(2). The robust Arellano-Bond one and two step estimators are presented in columns (3) and (4).
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Table 2.4: Dynamic estimations, USA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed effects Fixed effects, clustered by firm Arellano Bond, one-step Arellano Bond, two-step
L.logQmv 0.335 ∗ ∗∗ 0.335 ∗ ∗∗ 0.047 −0.187
[5.82] [4.73] [0.32] [−1.14]
laglogemi −0.063 ∗ ∗∗ −0.063 ∗ ∗∗ −0.058 ∗ ∗ −0.060 ∗ ∗
[−2.73] [−3.02] [−2.54] [−2.09]
size −0.391 ∗ ∗∗ −0.391 ∗ ∗∗ −0.471 ∗ ∗∗ −0.520 ∗ ∗∗
[−7.42] [−4.76] [−4.48] [−4.36]
capint 0.812∗ 0.812∗ 0.551 0.612
[1.95] [1.67] [1.06] [0.89]
leverage −0.365 ∗ ∗ −0.365 −0.173 0.057
[−2.31] [−1.61] [−0.74] [0.22]
salesgra −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
[−0.11] [−0.12] [−0.32] [−0.06]
rdint 0.670 0.670 0.098 −0.381
[0.65] [0.63] [0.07] [−0.17]
cashint 0.514 ∗ ∗∗ 0.514 ∗ ∗ 0.271 0.426
[2.98] [2.19] [1.04] [0.98]
ppe −0.028 −0.028 −0.083 −0.097
[−0.45] [−0.33] [−1.12] [−1.16]
ebit 0.210 0.210 0.297 0.353
[1.46] [1.02] [1.53] [1.57]
foreign sales 0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.003
[0.36] [0.30] [−0.48] [−1.12]
closely held −0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000
[−0.07] [−0.08] [0.18] [0.21]
constant 6.720 ∗ ∗∗ 6.720 ∗ ∗∗ 8.220 ∗ ∗∗ 9.133 ∗ ∗∗
[7.62] [4.94] [4.87] [4.70]
year dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 417 417 262 262
Nr. of firms 148 148 108 108
Nr. of instruments 26 26
AR1 test p-value 0.12 0.80
AR2 test p-value 0.575 0.917
Sargan test p-value 0.014 0.033
t statistics shown in brackets. Significance levels: * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
The columns (1) to (6) show the results of different dynamic panel models with a lagged dependent variable as explanatory variable. In (1) and (2) show fixed
effects results with clustered standard errors by firm in (2). The robust Arellano-Bond one and two step estimators are presented in columns (3) and (4).
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large in the UK as compared to the US.
In the following I illustrate that the results are not a mere artifact of the
chosen specification and data selection. To start with, the same result are
obtained if the financial data are not at all winsorized as described in Section
2.4. Some of the authors discussed in Table A2.5 limit their analysis to
certain sectors. Hart (1995) drops the Standard Industry Classification (SIC)
codes above 5000 in order to focus on firms in manufacturing, mining or with
production of some kind. Russo and Fouts (1997) drop utilities arguing that
their returns are subject to statutory limits.
Regression Tables A2.12 and A2.13 demonstrate the results obtained when
I limit the analysis to four digit SIC codes bellow 5000 and additionally delete
observations with SICs between 4931- 4999, the energy utilities (Busch and
Hoffmann, 2011). With this sector selection the coefficients of laglogemi are
slightly reduced and the significance level drops marginally in the US sample.
Alternatively, I dropped observation with two digit SIC code 49 (Electric, Gas
and Sanitary Services) instead of the four digit SIC codes between 4931- 4999.
The results virtually remain unchanged. As explained in section 2.4, the pre-
sented results are based on samples with not purely estimated emission data.
One might worry that this induces some kind of endogeneity because only
firms are considered that communicate some kind of emission information. I
prefer this data restriction because firm’s carbon-intensities jump sometimes
substantially when they reveal for the first time some GHG related informa-
tion. In an attempt to use all available emission data in Trucost’s database,
including pure estimates, I address this outlier issue by winsorizing the 2%
and 98% percentiles of the first-differenced carbon-intensities. The estimated
dynamic panel results support the conclusion, that the negative relationship
between carbon intensity and Q is substantially more pronounced and robust
for the UK.13 Additionally, I analyze whether the mere disclosure of corporate
emission information results in a higher firm valuation. But the coefficient
13These results available from the author upon request.
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of the dummy variable for information disclosure of public information (this
excludes personal communication) is never significant.
Overall, the results provide evidence that firms managing to lower their
carbon-intensities experience an increase in Q. This rise in Q can be inter-
preted as better future growth opportunities. The pairwise correlations in
Table A2.11 grossly overstate the magnitude of the negative relationship in
light of the results from Table 2.3 and 2.4. These results suggest, that low-
ering emission-intensity by 1% is associated with and increase in Q of about
0.11% in the UK and of approximately 0.06% in the US.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper assesses the relationship between corporate GHG-intensity and a
firm’s valuation as measured by Q. I motivate this relationship by making
the distinction between inherent and regulatory expected costs for carbon
emitters. Based on the literature discussion I identify revenue increasing and
cost decreasing factors that apply to carbon emissions. I identify cost reducing
opportunities related to risk management as the main upside opportunity.
The empirical results of this study provide evidence for a negative relationship
between carbon intensity and Q in the UK and the US. I do not claim that
regulatory pressure is completely neglectable in the US during the analyzed
time period from 2003 to 2007. For this reason, the negative effect in the US
should not exclusively be attributed to expected inherent costs. Nevertheless,
it is somewhat promising that lower carbon intensities are associated with
better future prospects in the US market. The tripling of the crude oil price
during the analyzed period might have contributed substantially to this result.
The difference in the relationship between the US and UK market illus-
trates the role of regulatory pressure, for expected inherent costs are roughly
equal in both countries. The negative link between corporate GHG-intensity
and Q is about twice as large in the UK as in the US, so it is fair to assume
that expected regulatory costs weigh heavier in the UK.
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My findings are in line with the view that some under-investing in green
technologies are might be present. In Section 2.1 I argue that due to asym-
metric information, over-investing in green-technologies is less likely to oc-
cur systematically compared to optimal investing or under-investing. Firms
evaluating investment opportunities mainly consider the potential financial
benefit. But in imperfect markets, not all investment opportunities might be
on the radar. In turn, not all investment opportunities are evaluated. There
is, however, a caveat to this finding. Firms self-select into the analyzed sam-
ples because they have to communicate some emission relevant information.
Because various types of disclosures are taken into account, this self-selection
issue is attenuated somewhat. By the same token, similar relationships be-
tween carbon intensity and Q are obtained if also purely estimated emission
data are used.
I use fixed effects and GMM to analyze the link between carbon intensity
and Q but refrain from any unambiguous causality claims. Still, the evidence
is consistent with the view that lowering corporate carbon intensity brings
about higher firm valuation. Further research could address the driving forces
for changes in carbon intensities. Promising candidates seem investments in
green technologies, management and environmental management practices,
or changes in product-portfolio. These factors are likely to play a central
role within the new strand of literature on the role of management practices
for productivity and Q (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom and Reenen,
2010).
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Table A2.5: Literature overview on eco-efficiency
Publication & journal Short summary LHS∗ Main RHS
Busch and Hoffmann (2011)
Business and Society
investigate whether corporate carbon intensity and management are linked to the financial perfor-
mance of a firm. They find for a worldwide cross-sectional sample with data obtained through
questionnaire in 2006 for 174 firms that lower carbon intensity pays off whereas only management
measures have a detrimental effect for financial performance.
Q,
ROA,
ROE
GHG scope1 and 2 emissions according to the
GHG protocol divided by sales in USD.
Guenster et al. (2011)
European Financial Management
analyze with Innovest data for an US sample the link between eco-efficiency and financial performance
between 1997 and 2004 based on quarterly data. They find with Fama-McBeth like cross sectional
regressions that the market values environmental performance and that the valuation differential
increased over time.
Qia,
ROAia
Eco-efficiency score from Innovest Strategic Value
Advisors
Telle (2006)
Environmental and Resource Eco-
nomics
finds in a pooled regression with Norwegian plant level data (with four manufacturing industries)
between 1990 and 2001 a positive relationship between environmental and economic performance.
But this effect is generally no longer significant when plant fixed-effects are taken into account.
ROS Relative and industry environmental performance
measures constructed with data from the Norwe-
gian Pollution Control Authority (NPCA)
Elsayed and Paton (2005)
Structural Change and Economic
Dynamics
look at the relationship between environmental and financial performance for an UK firm panel
containing 227 firms from 1994 to 2000. They find a neutral relationship when controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity (fixed effects) and dynamic effects. The authors argue that many studies
suffer from misspecification.
Q,
ROA,
ROS
Community and environmental responsibility
scores of the Management Today Survey of
Britain’s Most Admired Companies (BMAC)
King and Lenox (2002)
Management Science
find that waste prevention leads to financial gains in a panel of US firms from 1991 to 1996 when
applying firm fixed or random- effects. But firms do not profit from other forms of reducing pollution.
The authors argue that waste prevention is underexploited and often provides unexpected innovation
offsets.
Q,
ROA
Construct with Toxic Release Inventory (TRI)
data: total emissions, waste generation, waste pre-
vention, waste prevention, waste transfer.
King and Lenox (2001)
Journal of Industrial Ecology
find for US manufacturing firms from 1987 to 1996 evidence for an association between lower pollution
and higher financial valuation. But conclude based on firm fixed-effects results, that firm’s fixed
characteristics and strategic position might cause this association.
Q Construct with Toxic Release Inventory (TRI)
data: total emissions, relative emissions, industry
emissions
Konar and Cohen (2001)
The Review of Economics and
Statistics
investigate for a cross-section of S&P500 firms in 1989 if environmental performance affects market
value. Find a significant positive relationship between environmental performance and the intangible
asset value of a firm.
Q Toxic chemicals (from TRI) emitted per dollar rev-
enue and the number of environmental law suits
pending.
Dowell et al. (2000)
Management Science
investigate the relationship between firm environmental standards and market value of multi national
enterprises using pooled and random-effects regressions. Find for their S&P 500 sample from 1994
to 1997 that a stringent global environmental standard is related to a higher firm value.
Q,
ROA,
ROS
Environmental standard (local, US, stringent
global) from Investor Responsibility Research Cen-
ter’s (IRRC) Corporate Environmental Profile.
Russo and Fouts (1997)
Academy of Management
investigate the relationship between an environmental rating and ROA for 2 cross-sections of 243
firms for the years 1991 and 1992. Conclude that it pays to be green and that the relationship
strengthens with industry growth.
ROA Environmental ratings from the Franklin Research
and Development Corporation
Hart (1995)
Business Strategy and the Environ-
ment
investigate cross-sectionally whether a percentage change in emission reduction from 1988 to 1989
has an impact on economic performance. Find for a sample of 127 manufacturing and mining firms
of the S&P 500 a positive relationship within 1 to 2 years.
ROS,
ROE,
ROA
Environmental performance and emission reduc-
tion measures from Investor Responsibility Re-
search Center’s (IRRC) Corporate Environmental
Profile.
∗ Q: Tobin’s Q, ROA: Return on assets, Qia/ROAia: Industry adjusted Q/ROA, ROS: Return on sales
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Table A2.6: Literature on Tobin’s Q, including 2 governance studies
Publication & journal LHS∗ RHS Method Industry analyzed Q calculation?
Ammann et al. (2011)
Journal of Empirical Finance
Q governance indices, total assets, sales growth, R&D intensity, cash
intensity, capital intensity, property-plant-equipment intensity, ebit
on sales, leverage, adr dummy, closely held in %
firm, country and industry
fixed-effects models, also us-
ing GMM
all MVEQ+(TA−EQ)
TA
1
Bebchuk et al. (2008)
Review of Financial Studies
Qia,
α
governance index, total assets, ROA, capital expenditure on assets,
R&D expenditures, leverage, industry dummies, approximated firm
age, dummy for delaware incorporated, inside ownership
pooled- and fixed firm ef-
fects regressions
all, robustness check with-
out financial firms
MVCS+(TA−CS−BSDT )
TA
2
Busch and Hoffmann
(2011)
Business & Sociey
Q,
ROE,
ROA
GHG-intensity, market value, leverage, four regional dummy vari-
ables, 9 industry dummy variables.
cross-sectional regressions 9 industries: manufactur-
ing, transport and energy
utilities
MVEQ+(LTD+CL)
TA
3
Guenster et al. (2011)
European Financial Manage-
ment
Qia,
ROAia
eco-efficiency score, sales growth, firm age truncated, total assets,
ROA
inference over results from
cross-sectional estimations
all MVCS+(TA−CS−BSDT )
TA
2
Elsayed and Paton (2005)
Structural Change and Eco-
nomic Dynamics
Q,
ROA,
ROS
community & environmental responsibility scores, total assets,
R&D intensity, advertisement intensity proxied by intangible as-
sets to sales, leverage, capital intensity, industry dummies
random- and fixed firm ef-
fects, also using GMM
all MVCS+(PS+LTD+INV+CL−CA)
TA
4
King and Lenox (2002)
Management Science
Q,
ROA
waste & emission measures from TRI, total assets, sales growth,
capital intensity, leverage, R&D intensity, regulatory stringency of
the states, firm environmental permits
random- and fixed firm ef-
fects, the later also with an
instrument variable
TRI sample (manufacturing
firms)
MVEQ+(LTD+CL)
TA
3
King and Lenox (2001)
Journal of Industrial Ecology
Q emission measures from TRI, total assets, sales growth, capital in-
tensity, leverage, R&D intensity, regulatory stringency of the states,
firm environmental permits
random and fixed firm ef-
fects
TRI sample (manufacturing
firms)
MVEQ+(LTD+CL)
TA
3
Konar and Cohen (2001)
The Review of Economics and
Statistics
Q Toxic chemicals (from TRI) intensity &environmental lawsuits,
market share, industry concentration ratio, sales growth, adver-
tisement intensity, R&D intensity, total assets, import intensity
cross-sectional regressions eliminate nonpolluting in-
dustries (banking and insur-
ance) from S&P 500 sample
MVCS+(LTD+STD+PS)
(PPE+CH+STI+RV+INV )
4
Dowell et al. (2000)
Management Science
Q,
ROA,
ROS
scope of environmental standards, total assets, R&D intensity, ad-
vertisement intensity, leverage, % foreign sales, industry dummies
group mean- and random
firm effects regressions
S&P 500 screened for man-
ufacturing and mining firms
MVEQ+(LTD+CL)
(INV+PPE)
∗ Q: Tobin’s Q, ROA: Return on assets, Qia/ROAia: Industry adjusted Q/ROA, ROS: Return on sales, α: Alpha from a portfolio approach
? MVEQ: Market value of equity, MVCS: Market value of common stock, BSDT: Balance sheet deferred taxes, CA: Current assets, CL: Current liabilities, INV: Inventory, LTD:
Long-term debt, PPE: Property-plant-equipment, PS: Preferred stock, RV: Receivables, STD: Short term debt, STI: Short term investments
1,2,3,4 1Same as La Porta et al. (2000); Doidge et al. (2004). 2 Same as Gompers et al. (2003); Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 3 Same nominator as Dowell et al. 2000 Dowell et al. (2000). 4
Similar to Chung and Pruitt (1994)
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Table A2.7: Company-years
UK USA
Nr. of firms Nr. of firms
2003 30 35
2004 45 60
2005 60 80
2006 72 109
2007 95 132
Total 302 416
Table A2.8: Firms per ICB-sector
UK USA
Nr. of firms % share Nr. of firms % share
Basic Materials 39 13 44 11
Consumer Goods 51 17 55 13
Consumer Services 55 18 20 5
Healthcare 18 6 39 9
Industrials 85 28 51 12
Oil & Gas 18 6 40 10
Technology 7 2 38 9
Telecommunications 6 2 5 1
Utilities 23 8 124 30
Total 302 100 416 100
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Table A2.9: Summary statistics, UK
Nr. firm-years Median Mean Std Min Max
logQmv 302 0.52 0.57 0.39 -0.32 1.72
laglogemi 302 -2.57 -2.27 1.98 -8.16 3.80
size 302 14.63 14.80 1.60 11.16 18.66
capint 302 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.21
leverage 302 0.25 0.25 0.15 0.00 0.65
salesgra 302 6.81 10.05 15.00 -17.97 81.79
rdint 302 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.48
cashint 302 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.53
ppe 302 0.25 0.52 0.71 0.01 4.54
ebit 302 0.12 0.15 0.11 -0.15 0.52
foreign sales 302 53.30 48.82 32.03 0.00 100.00
closely held 302 11.43 13.88 15.65 0.00 81.24
logage 302 3.51 3.34 1.13 0.00 4.78
indicator adr 302 0.00 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
TABLES 51
Table A2.10: Summary statistics, USA
Nr. firm-years Median Mean Std Min Max
logQmv 416 0.42 0.53 0.43 -0.16 1.90
laglogemi 416 -1.31 -1.59 2.59 -7.97 2.82
size 416 16.59 16.67 1.19 12.36 20.49
capint 416 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.21
leverage 416 0.28 0.28 0.14 0.00 0.67
salesgra 416 8.45 9.85 11.64 -18.93 67.83
rdint 416 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.29
cashint 416 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.56
ppe 416 0.43 0.78 0.71 0.01 4.64
ebit 416 0.14 0.15 0.09 -0.17 0.47
foreign sales 416 35.66 33.09 27.76 0.00 100.00
closely held 416 0.51 7.63 14.36 0.00 80.16
logage 416 3.62 3.50 1.02 0.00 4.83
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Table A2.11: Pairwise correlation tables for UK and USA
logQmv laglogemi size capint leverage salesgra rdint cashint ppe ebit foreign sales closely held logage indicator adr
UK
logQmv 1.000
laglogemi −0.159 ∗ ∗∗ 1.000
size −0.096∗ 0.261 ∗ ∗∗ 1.000
capint 0.148 ∗ ∗∗ 0.258 ∗ ∗∗ 0.013 1.000
leverage −0.228 ∗ ∗∗ 0.160 ∗ ∗∗ 0.221 ∗ ∗∗ 0.026 1.000
salesgra 0.084 0.191 ∗ ∗∗ −0.013 0.143 ∗ ∗ −0.116 ∗ ∗ 1.000
rdint 0.159 ∗ ∗∗ −0.232 ∗ ∗∗ 0.001 −0.215 ∗ ∗∗ −0.202 ∗ ∗∗ 0.009 1.000
cashint 0.257 ∗ ∗∗ −0.071 −0.075 −0.141 ∗ ∗ −0.159 ∗ ∗∗ −0.102∗ 0.150 ∗ ∗∗ 1.000
ppe −0.148 ∗ ∗ 0.468 ∗ ∗∗ 0.211 ∗ ∗∗ 0.407 ∗ ∗∗ 0.320 ∗ ∗∗ 0.189 ∗ ∗∗ −0.158 ∗ ∗∗ −0.120 ∗ ∗ 1.000
ebit 0.346 ∗ ∗∗ 0.317 ∗ ∗∗ 0.316 ∗ ∗∗ 0.266 ∗ ∗∗ 0.053 0.289 ∗ ∗∗ −0.019 0.058 0.459 ∗ ∗∗ 1.000
foreign sales 0.147 ∗ ∗ 0.168 ∗ ∗∗ 0.275 ∗ ∗∗ 0.027 −0.128 ∗ ∗ −0.015 0.138 ∗ ∗ −0.002 −0.013 0.228 ∗ ∗∗ 1.000
closely held 0.037 0.067 −0.095 0.052 −0.126 ∗ ∗ 0.115 ∗ ∗ −0.044 0.055 −0.009 0.053 0.005 1.000
logage −0.051 −0.270 ∗ ∗∗ −0.175 ∗ ∗∗ −0.118 ∗ ∗ −0.068 −0.200 ∗ ∗∗ −0.207 ∗ ∗∗ −0.128 ∗ ∗ −0.185 ∗ ∗∗ −0.234 ∗ ∗∗ 0.085 −0.226 ∗ ∗∗ 1.000
indicator adr 0.107∗ 0.071 0.660 ∗ ∗∗ 0.119 ∗ ∗ 0.020 −0.065 0.109∗ 0.024 0.093 0.308 ∗ ∗∗ 0.362 ∗ ∗∗ −0.149 ∗ ∗∗ −0.035 1.000
USA
logQmv 1.000
laglogemi −0.526 ∗ ∗∗ 1.000
size −0.146 ∗ ∗∗ −0.038 1.000
capint −0.029 0.217 ∗ ∗∗ −0.139 ∗ ∗∗ 1.000
leverage −0.436 ∗ ∗∗ 0.408 ∗ ∗∗ 0.009 −0.084∗ 1.000
salesgra 0.132 ∗ ∗∗ −0.014 −0.091∗ 0.181 ∗ ∗∗ −0.089∗ 1.000
rdint 0.446 ∗ ∗∗ −0.524 ∗ ∗∗ −0.007 −0.180 ∗ ∗∗ −0.374 ∗ ∗∗ −0.029 1.000
cashint 0.485 ∗ ∗∗ −0.543 ∗ ∗∗ −0.021 −0.192 ∗ ∗∗ −0.467 ∗ ∗∗ −0.028 0.543 ∗ ∗∗ 1.000
ppe −0.510 ∗ ∗∗ 0.742 ∗ ∗∗ −0.020 0.229 ∗ ∗∗ 0.427 ∗ ∗∗ −0.092∗ −0.370 ∗ ∗∗ −0.424 ∗ ∗∗ 1.000
ebit 0.284 ∗ ∗∗ 0.095∗ 0.145 ∗ ∗∗ 0.041 0.009 0.048 0.104 ∗ ∗ 0.128 ∗ ∗∗ 0.314 ∗ ∗∗ 1.000
foreign sales 0.528 ∗ ∗∗ −0.497 ∗ ∗∗ 0.079 −0.219 ∗ ∗∗ −0.296 ∗ ∗∗ −0.026 0.439 ∗ ∗∗ 0.442 ∗ ∗∗ −0.554 ∗ ∗∗ 0.031 1.000
closely held 0.032 −0.156 ∗ ∗∗ −0.263 ∗ ∗∗ 0.012 0.023 −0.009 −0.039 0.172 ∗ ∗∗ −0.105 ∗ ∗ −0.125 ∗ ∗ 0.101 ∗ ∗ 1.000
logage 0.276 ∗ ∗∗ −0.231 ∗ ∗∗ 0.186 ∗ ∗∗ −0.069 −0.127 ∗ ∗∗ −0.105 ∗ ∗ 0.147 ∗ ∗∗ 0.145 ∗ ∗∗ −0.214 ∗ ∗∗ 0.056 0.294 ∗ ∗∗ −0.126 ∗ ∗ 1.000
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. Variable indicator adr is for USA obviously always equal to 0 and therefore not considered.
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Table A2.12: Dynamic estimations with selected industries, UK
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed effects Fixed effects, clustered by firm Arellano Bond, one-step Arellano Bond, two-step
L.logQmv 0.220 ∗ ∗∗ 0.220 ∗ ∗∗ 0.194 0.130
[3.23] [4.17] [1.26] [0.55]
laglogemi −0.113 ∗ ∗∗ −0.113 ∗ ∗∗ −0.108 ∗ ∗∗ −0.083 ∗ ∗∗
[−4.34] [−4.08] [−4.17] [−2.86]
size −0.124∗ −0.124 −0.321 ∗ ∗∗ −0.371 ∗ ∗∗
[−1.81] [−1.50] [−3.10] [−3.31]
capint 1.536 ∗ ∗ 1.536 0.915 0.032
[2.08] [1.65] [0.93] [0.03]
leverage −0.208 −0.208 −0.011 0.079
[−1.10] [−1.04] [−0.07] [0.43]
salesgra −0.002 −0.002 −0.002∗ −0.001
[−1.52] [−1.63] [−1.83] [−0.63]
rdint −3.280 ∗ ∗ −3.280 ∗ ∗∗ −4.171 ∗ ∗∗ −3.222∗
[−2.18] [−3.16] [−2.69] [−1.69]
cashint −0.135 −0.135 −0.102 −0.047
[−0.62] [−0.52] [−0.45] [−0.18]
ppe −0.322 ∗ ∗∗ −0.322 ∗ ∗∗ −0.314 ∗ ∗∗ −0.226 ∗ ∗
[−4.32] [−5.81] [−3.39] [−1.99]
ebit −0.152 −0.152 −0.519 ∗ ∗ −0.411
[−0.65] [−0.61] [−1.98] [−1.26]
foreign sales 0.003 ∗ ∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.003 ∗ ∗ 0.002
[2.62] [1.79] [2.20] [1.21]
closely held −0.002 −0.002 −0.002∗ −0.002∗
[−1.48] [−1.51] [−1.85] [−1.77]
constant 2.123 ∗ ∗ 2.123∗ 5.223 ∗ ∗∗ 5.953 ∗ ∗∗
[2.13] [1.71] [3.51] [3.70]
year dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 257 257 170 170
Nr. of firms 84 84 63 63
Nr. of instruments 26 26
AR1 test p-value 0.38 0.49
AR2 test p-value 0.837 0.792
Sargan test p-value 0.331 0.537
t statistics shown in brackets. Significance levels: * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
Only four digit SIC codes bellow 5000 are used and observation deleted with codes between 4931 - 4999 (Energy Utilities). The scenario with SIC codes bellow
5000 and dropping the two digit SIC code 49 (Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services) gives very similar results.
The columns (1) to (6) show the results of different dynamic panel models with a lagged dependent variable as explanatory variable. In (1) and (2) show fixed
effects results with clustered standard errors by firm in (2). The robust Arellano-Bond one and two step estimators are presented in (3) and (4).
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Table A2.13: Dynamic estimations with selected industries, USA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed effects Fixed effects, clustered by firm Arellano Bond, one-step Arellano Bond, two-step
L.logQmv 0.312 ∗ ∗∗ 0.312 ∗ ∗∗ 0.029 −0.207
[5.31] [4.22] [0.20] [−1.29]
laglogemi −0.051 ∗ ∗ −0.051 ∗ ∗ −0.046∗ −0.042
[−2.13] [−2.21] [−1.84] [−1.33]
size −0.375 ∗ ∗∗ −0.375 ∗ ∗∗ −0.474 ∗ ∗∗ −0.526 ∗ ∗∗
[−7.02] [−4.37] [−4.49] [−4.57]
capint 1.122 ∗ ∗∗ 1.122 ∗ ∗ 0.634 0.770
[2.66] [2.49] [1.22] [1.09]
leverage −0.269 −0.269 −0.214 0.010
[−1.64] [−1.24] [−0.91] [0.04]
salesgra −0.000 −0.000 −0.001 −0.000
[−0.37] [−0.41] [−0.52] [−0.19]
rdint 0.717 0.717 0.278 −0.102
[0.69] [0.64] [0.19] [−0.05]
cashint 0.487 ∗ ∗∗ 0.487∗ 0.265 0.413
[2.73] [1.90] [0.97] [0.94]
ppe −0.040 −0.040 −0.083 −0.100
[−0.64] [−0.45] [−1.10] [−1.19]
ebit 0.202 0.202 0.298 0.374∗
[1.41] [0.99] [1.55] [1.76]
foreign sales 0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.003
[0.32] [0.26] [−0.64] [−1.29]
closely held −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
[−0.16] [−0.16] [−0.27] [−0.35]
constant 6.447 ∗ ∗∗ 6.447 ∗ ∗∗ 8.347 ∗ ∗∗ 9.326 ∗ ∗∗
[7.20] [4.56] [4.91] [4.96]
year dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 396 396 251 251
Nr. of firms 139 139 103 103
Nr. of instruments 26 26
AR1 test p-value 0.14 0.81
AR2 test p-value 0.535 0.927
Sargan test p-value 0.024 0.057
t statistics shown in brackets. Significance levels: * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
Only four digit SIC codes bellow 5000 are used and observation deleted with codes between 4931 - 4999 (Energy Utilities). The scenario with SIC codes bellow
5000 and dropping the two digit SIC code 49 (Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services) gives very similar results.
The columns (1) to (6) show the results of different dynamic panel models with a lagged dependent variable as explanatory variable. In (1) and (2) show fixed
effects results with clustered standard errors by firm in (2). The robust Arellano-Bond one and two step estimators are presented in (3) and (4).
Chapter 3
Voluntary corporate climate
initiatives and regulatory loom:
Batten down the hatches ∗
Abstract
King and Lenox (2001) argued that “when does it pay to be green” might be a
more important question for firms than whether it pays at all. We present an
event study that suggests that it pays in the tangible presence of regulatory
pressure, depending on how well the chosen scheme to become green fits with
the threatened regulatory design. To this end, we exploit the unexpected
passage of the Waxman-Markey Bill in 2009. This bill came as a surprise and
brought the US economy on the brink of a nationwide CO2 emission trading
system. We use this event to study whether firms with memberships in two
well-known voluntary environmental programs to curb carbon emission, the
Chicago Climate Exchange and the Climate Leaders, were rewarded by the
stock market when the likelihood of federal legislation targeting carbon emis-
sions suddenly increased. To complement the picture, we examine the prior
market response to membership announcements. As yet, empirical evidence
on both issues does not present a coherent picture. We unravel the intrica-
∗This paper is joint work with Dragan Ilic´
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cies by standardizing the statistical methods and integrating the datasets.
Our results suggest that only membership in tailored programs is considered
beneficial. Crucially, a substantial part of the market reaction consists of
industry-wide effects. In contrast to previous findings, we find no evidence
that mere membership announcements triggers a market reaction. Our find-
ings shed light on investors’ expectations of climate change policies and their
value perception of voluntary carbon reduction programs.
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3.1 Introduction
The latest assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change once again stresses the critical impact of CO2 emissions on the envi-
ronment. Still, it does not seem likely that an agreement on a global frame-
work to tackle climate change is achieved anytime soon. Notably the United
States as the leading nation in greenhouse gas emissions lacks federal legis-
lation that address carbon emissions on firm level. 1 Neither did any signs
credibly point into that direction until 26 June 2009, when the US House of
Representatives narrowly passed H.R. 2454: The “American Clean Energy
and Security Act of 2009”. Dubbed the Waxman-Markey Bill, this act aimed
to cap CO2 emissions in the US by means of an emission trading system.
The passage of this bill caught the public off guard. Even though the Senate
eventually defeated the bill later on, its success in the House of Representa-
tives unexpectedly and substantially increased the likelihood of federal carbon
legislation in the US.
Some firms seemed prepared in light of this looming change in legislation.
Apart from signaling credibility and commitment, voluntary (but nevertheless
binding) environmental initiatives provide a learning environment to improve
one’s corporate footprint. With the goal to curb CO2 emissions in the US,
two initiatives launched in the early 2000s stand out. The Climate Leaders
(CL) program was an industry-government partnership to help firms reduce
emissions of six major greenhouse gases. Participating members pledged to
a realistic reduction goal within a five to ten year timeframe. The second
initiative could be considered a direct predecessor of the government-based
emission trading system intended by the Waxman-Markey Bill. The so-called
1There are regional efforts, e.g.: California has recently introduced a cap-and-trade
program. However, the large number of allocated pollution permits weigh heavy on their
price. Other initiatives encompass several states. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
aims to reduce greenhouse gases in nine US states in the northeast and is limited to large
fossil fuel power plants.
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Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) was a trade platform for CO2 certificates.
Its members agreed to a reduction goal and independent verification of their
efforts.
Against this background, this paper addresses two questions. First, it asks
whether being prepared for CO2 regulation pays off for firms. More precisely,
we employ an event study to analyze whether corporate membership in the
CCX or CL initiative was immediately rewarded by the financial markets
in view of the unanticipated rise of likelihood of federal legislation. If this
is the case, one motivation for firms to join such voluntary programs might
be preparation for regulation. On that note, Bruce Braine, vice president of
strategic policy analysis for American Electric Power described the motivation
to participate in the CCX as follows: “Many of us were doing this not only to
make voluntary commitments, but as a way that we could get prepared for a
mandatory future. [. . . ] We were learning the ropes, learning about trading
and trying to become more proficient in reducing our carbon footprint over
time.” We are not the first to exploit this event. A similar study by Gans
and Hintermann (2013) comes to the conclusion that, evaluated on a monthly
basis, the passage of the Waxman-Markey Bill was associated with positive
returns for CCX firms. 2
The second question this paper tackles is how, if at all, the mere an-
nouncement to join a voluntary environmental initiative is gaged by the stock
market. Existing empirical evidence is ambiguous. Fisher-Vanden and Thor-
burn’s (2011) event study analyzes the immediate stock market reactions for
firms announncing their membership to the CL program. In the seeming ab-
sence of regulatory pressure, these firms were vigorously penalized in terms
of falling stock prices. These results give reason to believe that engagement
in voluntary programs are perceived as detrimental from an investor’s point
of view. On the other hand, investors might perceive voluntary carbon reduc-
tion programs as a fitting training ground for an expected mandatory carbon
2National Geographic, daily news, November 3 2010
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market. In this case, stock market reactions in light of an abrupt increase
in the likelihood of legislation should be favorable. Other empirical evidence
is consistent with this view. In their study, Gans and Hintermann (2013)
come to the conclusion that the stock market reacted favorably towards firms
announcing membership to the CCX.
At first glance, this contradicting evidence seems puzzling. We argue that
the ambiguity hinges on two issues. For one, test statistics of short-horizon
event studies (like the one in Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn) are better spec-
ified than those of long-horizon event studies because they are less sensi-
tive to the benchmark model of normal returns and issues of cross-sectional
or time-series dependence of abnormal returns (Kothari and Warner, 2007).
Gans and Hintermann (2013) employ a difference-in-differences framework on
a monthly basis when evaluating the effects of membership announcements
and the Waxman-Markey Bill on CCX firms. Their results are highly in-
structive, but the approach is rather unusual in the context of unexpected
events. The large time window associated with monthly data and particu-
larly the lack of consideration for confounding events gives pause. Brown and
Warner (1980), for instance, document the problem of using monthly data by
illustrating that the degree of misspecification in event tests can be severe.
And in a well-known replication study, McWilliams and Siegel (1997) high-
light the importance of accounting for such confoundings. In other words, it
is not clear to what extent the identified positive return effect for the CCX
firms in Gans and Hintermann is attributable to the two events in question,
the membership announcements and the Waxman-Markey Bill. By the same
token, it would be illuminating to know how CL firms, in addition to their
negative reaction upon membership announcement, fared during the passing
of the Waxman-Markey Bill. The structure of the CCX program differs sub-
stantially from the CL initiative and relies heavily on a market mechanism to
curb CO2 emissions. Does the conflicting evidence on membership announce-
ments for the CCX and the CL initiative translate to the Waxman-Markey
Bill? A comparison of the two programs in light of the Bill would yield com-
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plementary evidence about the value perception of voluntary initiatives in
critical times.
This paper reconciles the existing findings and contributes to a more com-
prehensive picture. We fill two explanatory gaps and highlight the role of
industry-wide effects . First, we add to the conclusiveness of the statistical
inference on the effects of both membership announcement and the Waxman-
Markey Bill on CCX members. The surprising nature of these events lends
itself exceptionally well to conducting an event study. Our second contri-
bution consists in the direct comparison of two distinct initiatives for both
events. To this end, we extend the analysis of the impact of the Waxman-
Markey Bill to CL firms. This extension yields complementary evidence to
the preparation argument. Since the market deemed the value of becoming
a member in these two programs differently, we might also observe disparate
market reactions in light of the Waxman-Markey Bill. In particular, an envi-
ronmental program that is tailored to the specific threat of future regulation
by means of a cap-and-trade system is likely to be a more effective tool to
mediate the effect of an according shock. Put differently, we would expect
the CCX cap-and-trade program to receive more goodwill from the market
during the passage of the Bill.
Our results are in line with this argument. Conservative estimates suggest
that stock prices of CCX members experienced on average positive abnormal
returns of 0.7 percent during the passage of the Waxman-Markey Bill. CL
members, on the other hand, hardly provoked any significant market reaction.
Our analysis suggests that industry-wide market reactions play an important
role when evaluating suddenly looming environmental costs. When analyzing
the impact of the bill, it turns out that these industry effects explain a sub-
stantial part of the observed reaction for the CCX firms and fully absorb the
effect that is otherwise attributable to CL membership. Finally, our event
study finds no measurable market reaction for firms announcing membership
to the CCX. This qualifies previous findings.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides
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background information on the Waxman-Markey Bill, the two voluntary en-
vironmental programs in our sample, and the related literature. Section 3
lays out the event study methodology, followed by the description of our data
in Section 4. The results of the two event studies are presented in Section 5,
and the last section concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Waxman-Markey
H.R. 2454, the ”American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009” was a bill
to propose, among other things, the introduction of a cap and trade system.
The bill, also known as the Waxman-Markey Bill, was to regulate the emis-
sion of greenhouse gases in the United States, in particular CO2. Remaining
the last industrialized country solely oriented towards voluntary programs,
the bill was to replace existing voluntary action with mandatory legislation.
Under the new legislation, over the next 40 years carbon emissions would be
increasingly capped up to 83% of 2005 levels. Allocated with certain CO2
allowances, the regulated firms would be free to trade their pollution rights
at market prices. Although constituting the most prominent element of the
legislation, the contents of the bill extend beyond the cap-and-trade system.
It was a comprehensive policy to address climate change. As such, it included
requirements of ”creating a combined energy efficiency and renewable elec-
tricity standard and requiring retail electricity suppliers to meet 20% of their
demand through renewable electricity and electricity savings by 2020” and
”setting a goal of, and requiring a strategic plan for, improving overall U.S.
energy productivity by at least 2.5% per year by 2012 and maintaining that
improvement rate through 2030”.3
After months of negotiations, on Friday June 26 2009 at 7:17 p.m. the
House of Representatives passed the bill by a vote of 219 to 212. The outcome
3http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr2454, visited on October 9 2012
62 VOLUNTARY CORPORATE CLIMATE INITIATIVES
remained uncertain to the end and stirred up subsequent emotions, pointing
towards a controversial and unforeseen decision. The media response pro-
claimed the legislation as historic for the United States and a victory for the
Obama administration. Although it remained to be seen whether the Senate
would approve the bill as well, the decision in the House of Representatives
left the country stunned and raised questions about the immediate impact
on the economy. For some time, there was good reason to believe that firms
would face substantial costs in terms of CO2 reduction efforts in the near
future.
3.2.2 Chicago Climate Exchange and Climate Leaders
Two major initiatives to curb greenhouse gas emissions in the US were launched
roughly ten years ago. In 2003, the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) started
trading operations of the first cap-and-trade system in North America with
13 charter members that made voluntary but legally binding commitments
to reduce six different types of greenhouse gas emissions.4 By definition, the
exchange was characterized by a market mechanism, a platform where prices
were considered and allowances exchanged, and where strategic interaction
took place. As part of its cap-and-trade scheme the CCX relied on a carbon
offset program with its own standards for allowances and offset credits, called
“Carbon Financial Instrument” contracts. Established emission baselines and
emission reports were verified independently. The CCX was characterized by
two distinct phases. From 2003 to 2006 members had to cut their emissions
annually by 1% bellow their baseline average defined as from 1998 to 2001. In
the second phase from 2007 to 2010, existing members had to cut emissions
annually by 0.5% while new members had to cut emissions by 1.5%.
The CCX was characterized by a comprehensive market structure with
different participants. Apart from the direct emitters, the CCX members,
4CCX Fact Sheet, December 2011. https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/ccx/CCX_
Fact_Sheet.pdf, visited on January 14 2013
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there were associate members, offset providers, liquidity providers and ex-
change participants. Overall, the exchange had around 400 members with
annual membership fees ranging from 1,000-60,000 USD5, depending on firm
size and membership type. In November 2010, the CCX announced that it
would cease its operation, arguing that firms were no longer interested in
trading emission credits in the absence of government legislation (Financial
Times). The low price of CO2 emission allowances indicates that the firms’
emission reduction targets were not very stringent and that therefore firms
expected and indeed did over comply with their commitments. A further
source of the cheap emission allowances might also be the criticized weak
additionality requirement of CCX (Kollmuss et al., 2008).
The Climate Leaders Greenhouse Gas Inventory Protocol (CL) is the sec-
ond voluntary initiative we study. Formed in 2002, the initiative was based
on the Greenhouse Gas Protocol developed by the World Resources Insti-
tute and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. The CL
covered six major greenhouse gas emissions categorized into direct emissions
(known as Scope 1), indirect emissions (known as Scope 2), and offered the
reduction of optional emissions (known as Scope 3). Climate Leaders was an
industry-government partnership initiated by the US Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) that worked with companies to develop comprehensive
climate change strategies. Upon becoming a partner, the EPA assisted the
company in developing inventory and inventory management plans. Partners
then set a corporate-wide domestic or global five to ten year greenhouse gas
reduction goal and reported annual inventory data to EPA. In addition, part-
ners were to document their progress towards the goal (Tonkonogy and Oliva,
2007). Members did not only profit form EPA’s technical assistance but EPA
guaranteed also publicity for the members.
Four types of reduction goals were eligible for CL members: absolute,
normalized, indexed, or carbon neutrality. Upon engagement, the EPA eval-
5http://co2offsetresearch.org/policy/CCX.html, visited on December 20 2012
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uated the proposed reduction goals from all partners, requiring an aggres-
sive reduction compared to the projected GHG performance of the sector.
Partners were also allowed to develop their own mitigation offset projects or
purchase certified mandatory or voluntary GHG reductions, provided that
the projects adhered to approved EPA methodologies. In contrast to the
CCX, there were no explicit market mechanisms at work. Upon joining, it
was not rational decision-making based on market prices that influenced the
daily carbon business. According to the EPA, partners were sure to receive
high level recognition via participating in meetings, public outreach, or press
events (Tonkonogy and Oliva, 2007). On September 15 2010, the EPA an-
nounced their decision to shut down the program in light of new developments
in regulatory and voluntary initiatives.
3.2.3 Related literature
To an economist, voluntary participation in these two initiatives may seem
puzzling at first glance. Traditional economic analysis assumes that firms
already behave optimally, with pollution being an inevitable side product
of production (Cropper and Oates, 1992). Reducing production voluntarily
thus moves in lockstep with lower use of input, pushing the firm away from
optimal production. Some critics, however, counter that it is questionable
whether firms make optimal use of inputs in the first place and see room for
improvement. This discussion has become popular as the ”engergy efficiency
gap”. Allcott and Greenstone (2012) suggest that the paradigm of efficient
energy consumption does not seem too far-fetched, but their conclusion does
not seem final (Nadel and Therese, 2012). In this sense, membership in
voluntary initiatives might be helpful for optimal input allocation.
It turns out that one can explain voluntary participation in a number
of other ways. The literature identifies a variety of rational motives, some
of which are based on some sort of imperfect markets (for an overview, see
Khanna, 2002). The motives can be roughly divided into market motives and
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political motives (Fleckinger and Glachant, 2011). Let us first discuss market
motives.
Consumers with preferences for environmental friendly products may en-
courage product differentiation (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Baron, 2001;
Besley and Ghatak, 2007). A firm can convey its inclination towards green
consumers more credibly if it joins an initiative that verifies the according
pledges independently. To this end, membership in voluntary initiatives could
serve as a signaling device. The financial market could harbor another cata-
lyst for green behavior. If there is pressure (or better yet, incentive) for green
engagement from investors, some firms could be at an advantage. Acclaimed
green firms in the limelight of green investors might benefit from lower capi-
tal costs caused by sub-optimal diversification (Merton, 1987; Heinkel et al.,
2001). In turn, this benefit creates an incentive for polluting firms to go green
(Baron, 2008). Disentangling the entity of the firm opens up the door to a
different kind of benefit from membership in voluntary initiatives. From a
corporate governance perspective, a firm might not seek to cater exclusively
to its principals, the shareholders. Instead of acting in the interest of the
principal, the firm’s manager as the agent aims to maximize his or her own
utility function. Tirole (2001) highlights this crucial relationship between
shareholder interest and managerial incentive. These mismatched interests
can explain green ventures if the manager draws particular utility from doing
so, say, by improving his personal status. Yet other market motives include
cost-cutting (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Bloom et al., 2010) or attracting
particularly apt employees (Brekke and Nyborg, 2008).
Political motives constitute the second branch of reasons to go green.
Lyon and Maxwell (2003) purport that that by participating in voluntary en-
vironmental initiatives, firms seek to pre-empt or shape future public policies.
On this note, perhaps the most pertinent argument that rationalizes volun-
tary participation in our analysis is preparation for some expected legislation.
There might be reason to believe that with a non-negligible probability, fu-
ture environmental legislation will impose costly regulation upon firms. If so,
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it is reasonable to dampen the impact of such a future shock by adjusting
the behavior today and prepare voluntarily. For a smooth path towards the
expected extent of the regulation entails lower overall costs than a sudden ad-
justment. In contrast, then, to the corporate governance argument, voluntary
green engagement is consistent with shareholder value maximization. Unex-
pected changes in legislation open up a possibility to test this hypothesis. If
the markets correctly interprets the impact of suddenly looming legislation,
we should observe immediate changes in certain stock prices, plausibly with
some firms being affected more than others.
There is empirical evidence that supports the view that a sudden increase
in the likelihood of future regulation is taken into account by the market. For
instance, Bowen et al. (1983) and Hill and Schneeweis (1983) suggest that the
nuclear incident at the Three Mile Island facility in 1979 affected the investors’
perception of future regulation by resulting in a sudden drop in share prices
for electric utility firms, in particular those who were invested in nuclear
power. The chemical disaster in Bhopal in 1984 had a similar effect. Once the
extent of the tragedy became clear, the market seemingly anticipated tighter
regulation for the entire chemical industry (Blacconiere and Patten, 1994).
Unexpected policy changes are likely to affect shareholder value as well. The
sudden proposal by President George Bush in 1989 to revise the Clean Air
Act triggered a drop in share prices for notoriously polluting firms (Freedman
and Patten, 2004). And very recently, the unexpected reaction of the German
government to the Fukushima incident affected energy companies’ shareholder
wealth (Betzer et al., 2013).
By and large, it is fair to assume that anticipated regulation is consid-
ered an impending threat by the market. Yet some firms seem to fare better
in harsh times. There is reason to believe that voluntary engagement and
subsequent verified disclosure is rewarded by the market because of the in-
formational value it delivers when actually facing external shocks. For ex-
ample, (more extensively) disclosing firms were at an advantage after the
chemical leak in Bhopal (Blacconiere and Patten, 1994). The same held true
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after the sudden legislation in the US in 1986 to handle contaminated sites
(Blacconiere and Northcut, 1997). And firms that were part of the Carbon
Disclosure Project experienced an increase in shareholder value when Rus-
sia unexpectedly ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2004 (Kim and Lyon, 2011).
Much like the Waxman-Markey Bill, these events qualify as external shocks
which increased the likelihood for environmental regulation.
There are two studies that address the value of membership in volun-
tary environmental initiatives and which are directly related to our paper.
The event study by Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011) investigates the an-
nouncement effects for firms joining the Climate Leaders program as well as
the more vaguely defined Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies
(CERES). While Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn do not discover any significant
market reaction for joining CERES, they find negative abnormal returns for
announcing membership in the CL program. On the day of the announce-
ment, stock market returns of respective firms performed one percent worse
than expected. Moreover, announcing a binding CO2 target incurred an ad-
ditional penalty of 1.1 percent. One characteristic among the CL firms is
consistent with the mentioned corporate government argument to go green.
The data show that firms are more likely to join the CL program if they ex-
hibit hostile shareholder governance. It therefore seems likely that the market
associated the announcements with the managers’ discretionary leeway, which
was not in the firms’ interests.
The second paper that directly relates to our work is the aforementioned
study by Gans and Hintermann (2013). Gans and Hintermann investigate
stock returns of member firms of the Chicago Climate Exchange on a monthly
basis. Contrary to the CL firms in Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, they find
significant positive abnormal returns for firms announcing their membership
to the CCX. In addition, Gans and Hintermann take a look at the financial
impact of the Waxman-Markey Bill on CCX firms and find a positive market
reaction. There are methodological drawbacks, however. The large time
frame makes it difficult to isolate the effect of the Waxman-Markey Bill.
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This issue is exacerbated by the fact that the impact of the Waxman-Markey
Bill was not screened for confounding events at the firm level during the
same time frame. We address these issues and extend their analysis. Our
paper follows the event study methodology applied in Fisher-Vanden and
Thorburn and provides comprehensive results of the impacts of membership
announcement for CCX firms on the one hand and the Waxman-Markey Bill
for both CCX and CL firms on the other hand. In doing so, the results benefit
from higher explanatory power. The next section briefly exposits the event
study methodology and highlights its advantage for causal inference.
3.3 Methodology
Event studies have become an indispensable tool in econometrics. MacKinlay
(1997) gives a comprehensive overview of the history, theory, and application
of event studies in economics. Event studies use financial market information
(often stock prices) to deduce the effect of a specific event on the value of a
firm. This approach has the advantage that the causal chain is isolated. The
event has a direct impact on the stock price, similar to a treatment effect. The
statistical inference in an event study relies on three assumptions (McWilliams
and Siegel, 1997): Market efficiency, a lack of confounding effects during the
event window, and underestimation or no anticipation of the event. Indeed, if
the event in question was already anticipated and provided, investors would
have already had priced in its predicted impact on firm value. While the
passage of the Waxman-Markey Bill was not out of the question, there is
empirical evidence that it was indeed largely unexpected and provided the
market with new information (Meng, 2013).
The measurement of the impact is carried out by calculating the so-called
abnormal stock return. The abnormal return (AR) is the observed return
minus the normal return during a specified event window, where the normal
return is the return that one would expect to occur if the event had not taken
place. The abnormal return ARiτ is given by equation 3.1, where E(Riτ |Xτ )
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is the expectation of return Riτ given Xτ .
ARiτ = Riτ − E(Riτ |Xτ ) (3.1)
In financial economics, the normal return is often modeled via the market
model, which relates the return of interest Riτ to the market return Rmτ .
In a nutshell, the market model isolates the fraction of the return that is
associated with the market return, rendering the return of interest more in-
formative. The parameter estimates of the market model are calculated in
an Ordinary Least Square framework on the basis of a preceding estimation
window. In addition to the market return, our specification additionally em-
ploys the Fama-French’s ”small minus big” (SMB) and ”high minus low”
(HML) factors on a daily basis as explanatory variables (Fama and French,
1992, 1993). Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) illustrate that this specification
achieves the highest reduction of residual cross-correlation. Taken together,
we estimate the following model specifications:
Riτ = αi + βi1 ·Rmτ + βi1 · SMBτ + βi2 ·HMLτ + iτ (3.2)
Riτ = αi + β1i ·Rmτ + β2i · SMBt + β3i ·HML+ β4i · ESretjt + iτ (3.3)
Riτ = αi + β1i ·Rmτ + β2i · SMBt + β3i ·HML+ β4i ·BSretγt + iτ (3.4)
SMB In equation 3.2 denotes the daily difference of a portfolio of small
and big firms, and HML indicates the daily difference of a portfolio of low
and high book to market value firms. 6 iτ is the remaining error term after
estimating E(Riτ |Xτ ) and follows from iτ = ARiτ = Riτ − E(Riτ |Xτ ) via
equation 3.1. We call the model specified in equation 3.2 the 3 factor model
or the baseline specification. We extend this specification by adding industry
return factors ESretjt and BSretγt in equation 3.3 and 3.4 respectively
6Downloaded from Kenneth French’s website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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to control for industry effects. In ESretjt, j denotes one of 10 economic
sectors and in BUSretγt, γ denotes one of 25 business sectors according to
the Thomson Reuters Business Classification.
The event takes place after the estimation window and is usually placed
inside the so-called event window, during which the observed returns are com-
pared to the expected ones. Because some events cannot be unambiguously
dated, for example due to gradual information leakage or potential insider
information, researchers often include several days around the official date
τ = 0. However, this comes at a cost. A longer time series of ARiτ dimin-
ishes the power of the test statistics and tends to increase the number of
confounding events. Not to mention that a longer event window is difficult
to reconcile with the notion of market efficiency. Contrary to long-horizon
event studies, the test statistics of short-horizon event studies are generally
less sensitive to the benchmark model of normal returns and issues of both
cross-sectional and time-series dependence of abnormal returns (Kothari and
Warner, 2007).
In our data, Riτ is the total return index based on closing prices. The
closing price of day τ − 1 is the opening price of day τ . In the event win-
dow notation [T2, T3], T2 referres to the opening price on day τo and T3 to
the closing price on day τ . The event window [1, 1] therefore captures the
return on the day after the event day τ = 0. We are interested in two
events, membership announcements and the Waxman-Markey Bill. We de-
fine the Waxman-Markey event day, Friday 26 June 2009, as τ = 0 and set
the estimation window to 60 trading days from T0 = −59 to T1 = 0. The
event day τ = 0 is included in this estimation window because of two rea-
sons: First, the vote took place at 7pm and therefore after the closing of
the stock exchanges. Second, the issue of potential information leakage can
be excluded because the outcome of the vote was extremely narrow and the
public outcry thereafter was substantial. The event window [1, 1] is set nar-
rowly after the event and captures the abnormal returns on day one after
the event with T2 = 1 and T3 = 1. A second, longer windows estimates the
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returns over [1, 2] until τ = 2. We do not consider longer event windows be-
cause the event precedes the weekend, which should provide enough time for
the news to spread. For the second event in question, the CCX membership
announcments, we extend these narrow windows. It is arguable that the an-
nouncements have experienced prior information leakage. To ease the direct
comparison with Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011) we choose the following
event windows: [0, 1], [−1, 1], and [−2, 2]. Setting the estimation window to
60 days sets a span from T0 = −62 to T1 = −3. In turn, the cross-sectional
abnormal returns ARiτ in the event window are cumulated from T2 until T3.
This yields the cumulative abnormal returns CARi[T2,T3] =
∑T3
τ=T2
ARiτ . By
averaging the CARs across the observations, n average CARs are obtained:
ACAR[T2,T3] =
1
n
∑n
i=1CARi[T2,T3].
The raw returns are useful for economic interpretations. Standardized
returns, however, have been proven to exhibit better statistical properties
(Patell, 1976). The scaled abnormal returns are equal to SARiτ =
ARiτ
S(ARi)
,
where S(ARi) =
√
σ2i ∗ [1 + x′t(X ′X)−1xt] denotes the sampling error cor-
rection. The SARs can be cumulated over time as well: CSARi[T2,T3] =∑T3
τ=T2
SARiτ . The cross secional means of these cumulated standardized
abnormal returs are equal to ASCAR[T2,T3] =
1
n
∑n
i=1CSARi[T2,T3].
In comparison to a conventional t-test or Patell’s test, the test proposed by
Boehmer et al. (1991) given in equation 3.5 is robust towards event induced
variance inflation. Harrington and Shrider (2013) show that the presence of
heterogeneous effects induces event variance and robust tests against cross-
sectional variation in the true abnormal return should therefore be preferred.
tBMP =
ACSAR · √n
1
n−1
∑n
i=1(CSARi − ACSAR)2
(3.5)
An issue for the Waxman-Markey sample is clustering since the event
affects all sample firms simultaneously in time. One might therefore question
that iτ is independent and identically distributed. MacKinlay (1997) suggests
that clustering can be accommodated in two ways. Either by a portfolio
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approach which allows for cross correlation of the abnormal returns, or by
analyzing the abnormal returns without aggregation, e.g. by including a
dummy for the event day. The latter approach has two drawbacks. The test
will generally suffer from poor finite sample properties and has little power
against reasonable alternatives. As a remedy, Kolari and Pynnonen (2010)
propose a modification of the test statistic developed by Boehmer et al. (1991)
that is not affected by clustering. Kolari and Pynnonen’s statistic increases
the cross sectional variance used by Boehmer et al. (1991) by adjusting for
the average covariance of the error terms ρ¯ during the estimation window:
tKP = tBMP
√
1− ρ¯
1 + (n− 1)ρ¯ (3.6)
We consider the Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) test statistic to be the most
appropriate for our samples. In addition, we make use of the non-parametric
generalized rank test proposed in Kolari et al. (2010) to check the robustness
of our parametric tests. We choose the generalized rank test because it has
better properties for testing CARs than the conventional rank test and is
equally well suited for testing single day abnormal returns.
3.4 Data
In this section, we analyze the announcement effect of the Waxman-Markey
bill on both CCX and CL members. In addition, we investigate whether
firms announcing CCX membership experience positive abnormal returns in
an event study. Gans and Hintermann have kindly provided us with their
CCX database and data on their selection process. 7 Their final sample for
the Waxman-Markey event consists of 32 firms. We have compiled roughly
7Their CCX sample is from 2010, but we found a document form February 2009 that
lists the same CCX members: http://www.epa.gov/agstar/documents/workshop09/
mccomb.pdf, visited on December 10 2012.
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the same number. We start with the same database with 109 members.
Of these, 20 are government-affiliated and are cities, states, or universities.
From the remaining 89 observations, we find listings for 57 firms in the US.
From these listings we drop seven firms with discontinuous price indices, a
sign of illiquid securities. From the remaining 53 firms, seven are American
Depositary Receipts and three are not major listings or have their book values
not denominated in USD. This leaves us with 40 identified CCX member
firms.
We complement our database for the Waxman-Markey event with CL
firms and their partnership status. Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn identify the
announcement effect of firms joining CL (and CERES). In contrast, we iden-
tify the effect of the Waxman-Markey Bill on existing CL members. Our
database starts with the listed CL members retrieved from the US Environ-
mental Protection Agency as of 8 May 2009.8Of the 264 members at this
point in time, we focus on the 19 achiever and 87 setter firms. The other
158 so-called developer firms are by definition at a very early stage of their
membership. We question their status being an advantage in light of the
Waxman-Markey Bill. Indeed, the majority of the developer firms later on
opted out of the program, questioning their motivation and commitment in
the first place. We exclude these developer firms from our analysis because
they presumably just started to consider the impact of their environmental
footprint. What is more, this mitigates the concern that these firms might
have joined CL in order to free-ride on the program’s credibility (Darnall
and Carmin, 2005).9 Although we lack detailed membership status for the
day of the passage of the Waxman-Markey Bill, Table A3.5 illustrates the
development of the CL program over time. Note in particular the change in
the number of firms across all membership categories from 8 May 2009 to 1
8Obtained through www.archive.org on November 6 2012 via web.archive.org/web/
20090508120744/http://epa.gov/climateleaders/partners/index.html
9urlhttp://www.epa.gov/climateleadership/documents/partners letter 15sep2010.pdf,
visited on December 9 2012
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August 2010.
Of the 106 Climate Leaders with setter and achiever status, we identify
65 as being listed on a US stock market. Among these stocks, there are five
illiquid equity return indices and three ADR listings. This yields an identified
sample of 57 CL firms.
The first row of Table A3.6 in the appendix lists the identified firms for
both programs. For the Waxman-Markey event samples we conducted a
comprehensive analysis of confounding events for an event window from 26
June 2009 (Friday) through 30 June 2009 (Tuesday). For each firm in our
database, we searched LexisNexis for unexpected announcements that were
published in major US news outlets and which were likely to affect market
value during the event window. The second row in Table A3.6 lists the number
of confounding events for each program. For the 57 CL firms, we identify 16
confounding events, leaving us with a final CL sample of 41 firms. For the 40
firms in the CCX sample we identify confounding events for nine firms, leaving
us with a final CCX sample of 31 firms. An overview of our final samples for
the Waxman-Markey event are given in Tables A3.8 and A3.7. Table A3.8
lists the final CL sample with the according membership status and whether
the respective firms were charter partners. In addition, the geographic reach
of the emission reductions are shown. Table A3.7 lists our final CCX sample
and indicates charter member status where applicable. The tables also show
that six firms were members in both programs.
In addition to the Waxman-Markey event samples, we are interested in
the announcement effect for CCX member firms. To determine this sam-
ple we start with the same CCX database and apply the same filters. For
the identified firms we search both Google and LexisNexis for membership
announcements, resulting in the sample of 26 firms shown in Table A3.6. In
contrast to the Waxman-Markey Bill we cumulate abnormal returns for larger
event windows due to potential information leakage. Accordingly, we search
for confounding events up to two days prior and two days after each mem-
bership announcement. We find six confounding events and end up with a
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sample of 20 firms.
3.5 Results
This section presents the results of two distinct events. First, we investigate
the market reaction to the Waxman-Markey Bill for our three firm samples
described in the last section: A CCX sample, a CL sample, and a pooled
sample of all firms combined. Second, we take a look at the market reaction
to membership announcement for CCX firms, offering a direct comparison to
the same reaction towards CL firms in Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011).
Taken together, these two events paint a coherent picture of the stock market
assessment of the value of membership in voluntary initiatives, both in critical
and less critical times.
3.5.1 Event returns: Waxman-Markey Bill
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the three samples. The pooled
sample comprises 61 firms. On their own, the CCX sample consists of 31
firms and the CL sample 41 contains firms, meaning that six firms are mem-
bers in both programs. The distribution of the market capitalization is pos-
itively skewed for the CCX and the CL samples, with CL members being
substantially bigger. The two samples differ in the distribution of their sale
volumes as well. Although CL firms have, on average, the same turnover as
CCX firms, their median is higher. A similar skew is visible in market-to-
book numbers. While the average of market-to book equity is the same in
both samples, the medians indicate a proclivity for value firms in the CCX
sample and for growth firms in the CL sample. The two samples differ in the
industry exposure as well. Two economic sectors as classified by the Thomson
Reuters Industry Classification are absent from our samples: Telecommuni-
cations and Energy. The other economic sectors are not equally distributed,
neither across the CL nor the CCX sample. For example, the CCX sam-
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
CL & CCX CCX CL
Number of firms 60 31 41
Market value (MV, billion USD)
Mean MV 18.1 17.7 24.1
Median MV 6.7 4.8 11.1
Total sales (billion USD)
Mean sales 20.8 23.2 23.1
Median sales 10.3 9.3 14.4
Market-to-book equity (MEBE)
Mean MEBE 1.9 2.1 2.0
Median MEBE 2.0 1.3 2.3
Fraction of sample firms in TRBC* sector:
Basic Materials 0.18 0.32 0.07
Consumer Cyclicals 0.15 0.06 0.20
Consumer Non-Cyclicals 0.05 0.00 0.07
Financials 0.02 0.03 0.02
Healthcare 0.05 0.03 0.07
Industrials 0.15 0.13 0.17
Technology 0.22 0.13 0.29
Utilities 0.18 0.29 0.10
*TRBC: Thomson Reuters Business Classification.
Market value (MV) of equity 7 trading days before June 29 2009.
The mnemonic of sales is WC01001 and of book equity WC03501
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ple harbors a larger fraction of basic materials and utilities, whereas the CL
sample shows a tilt towards technology firms.
We conduct estimates of abnormal returns for all three samples. To allow
for value-relevant information to distribute and sink in, we conduct analyses
for two event windows after the passage of the bill. Based on the market
model given by equation 3.2 we calculate the cumulated abnormal returns
CAR[1,1] for Monday 30 June only and CAR[1,2] for the two trading days
after the event.
Table 3.2 presents the abnormal returns and their derivatives according
to the 3 factor model, our baseline specification. The results for the event
windows [1,1] and [1,2] are depicted in panels A and B, respectively. Across all
samples, the average cumulated abnormal returns (ACAR) for the short event
window are close to 0.5%. The median of the CAR is larger throughout, most
notably for the CCX sample. In contrast, their standardized counterparts
(CSAR) are substantially lower with means close to the medians. Of the
three samples, the CCX firms exhibit the highest standardized returns. The
two-sided test statistic by BMP Boehmer et al. (1991) is highly significant
across the board. The null hypothesis of normal returns is well rejected at the
0.1% significance level for the CCX firms and only slighty more so for the CL
firms. As expected, the more conservative KP p-values according to Kolari
and Pynnonen (2010) are higher (roughly 3% for the CCX firms and 7.6%
for CL firms). Finally, the nonparametric generalized rank test supports the
rejection of the null hypothesis of normal returns for the short event window.
The cumulated abnormal returns over two days in panel B indicate a
negative skew for CL and the pooled sample, whereas the mean and median
CARs of the CCX sample are robust and over 0.7%. This suggests that
the market incorporated additional price information on the second day after
the event. The BMP statistic remains significant across the samples for this
longer event window, for the CCX firms once again at the 0.1% level and
less so for the CL firms at the 10% level. The KP p-values, however, only
remain significant for the CCX and the pooled sample. Put differently, a
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conservative estimation suggests that the CL firms do not seem to exhibit
abnormal returns when cumulated over two days. Again, the generalized
rank test dovetails with the KP test.
Taken together, these results are consistent with the idea that financial
markets believe that firms engaging in voluntary measures of carbon emission
reduction get a head start in preparing for imminent federal carbon emission
legislation. But not all programs encounter equal praise. Based on the results
of the market model, membership in the CCX is considered more beneficial
in light of the Waxman-Markey Bill compared to membership in the CL
program.
All the same, the heterogeneous sector distributions for the CCX and CL
firms give pause. The empirical evidence listed in Section 2 suggests that some
sectors might experience specific shocks when faced with a carbon cap-and-
trade system, depending on their cost exposure. Indeed, the CL and CCX
firms are not readily comparable in terms of sector distribution. The results
in Table 3.2 are based on the 3 factor model, which benchmarks a firm’s
returns against the market return and the two Fama-French risk factors SMB
and HML. As such, the results are prone to industry-specific effects.
It seems plausible that the Waxman-Markey Bill had distinct effects in
different industries. In order to isolate the CCX and CL membership effect, we
proceed with controlling for industry-specific confoundings by extending the
market model with both economic and, to reach an even deeper level, business
sector returns. . In a first step, we incorporate industry return factors from
10 economic sectors. More precisely, for each security i in sector j we add
to the market model the economic sector return j as defined in equation
3.3. Table A3.9 in the appendix summarizes the results of this extension.
It turns out that economic sector returns explain a substantial part of the
observed positive effects. By any measure of statistical significance and for
both event windows, the abnormal returns of the pooled sample are no longer
different from zero. The two samples on their own present a more nuanced
picture. In the previous analysis, the CL sample only showed significant
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Table 3.2: 3 factor model
CL&CCX CCX CL
Panel A: event window[1,1]
ACAR 0.450 0.437 0.476
CAR Median 0.534 0.740 0.490
ACSAR 0.264 0.324 0.230
CSAR Median 0.241 0.303 0.220
BMP t-statistic 3.403 2.960 2.533
BMP p-val 0.001 0.006 0.015
KP t-statistic 2.298 2.280 1.820
KP p-val 0.025 0.030 0.076
GRank Test 2.745 2.605 2.248
GRank p-val 0.008 0.012 0.028
Nr. of Observations 60 31 41
Panel B: event window[1,2]
ACAR 0.310 0.789 0.347
CAR Median 0.734 0.766 0.723
ACSAR 0.375 0.540 0.275
CSAR Median 0.393 0.503 0.503
BMP t-statistic 2.937 3.087 1.924
BMP p-val 0.005 0.004 0.061
KP t-statistic 1.983 2.378 1.383
KP p-val 0.052 0.024 0.174
GRank Test 2.105 2.354 1.619
GRank p-val 0.040 0.022 0.111
Nr. of Observations 60 31 41
CAR & CSAR in %. 60 days estimation window from 02apr2009 to 26jun2009. Event
window[1,1] captures the abnormal returns on day 26jun2009 and event window[1,2] on
26jun2009 and 30jun2009. The BMP test (Boehmer et al. 1991) is an extension of Patell
(1976) and robust to event induced variance. The KP test (Kolary & Pynno¨nen, 2010)
is adjusting the BMP test for cross sectional correlation. In our samples the average
correlation of abnormal returns ρ¯ is: ρ¯cl&ccx = 0.020, ρ¯ccx = 0.022 , ρ¯cl = 0.023 . The
non-parametric GRank test is the generalized rank test for cumulated returns from Kolari
and Pynno¨nen (2010a.)
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returns for the short event window. This significance disappears with the
inclusion of industry-specific effects. The CCX sample, on the other hand,
keeps showing (slightly less) significant abnormal returns, in particular for
the longer event window. In this window, the CARs and CSARS for the
CCX firms are somewhat reduced by introducing industry-specific controls.
In sum, the new results indicate that positive sectoral effects have been at
work, much more so for the CL than for the CCX sample. The effect for the
CCX firms dilutes in the pooled sample.
To further check the robustness of these results, we extend the market
model by adding to each security i in business sector γ the business sector
return γ. In contrast to 10 economic sectors, we are thus now able to differ-
entiate more subtly by controlling for 25 business sectors. The results for our
third and most strict specification, which is formally given by equation 3.4,
are presented in Table 3.3. The results reinforce the trend set by the previous
specification with 10 economic sectors. In addition to the CL sample, the
CCX sample starts losing some of its verve. While there remains evidence
of abnormal returns for the longer event window in panel B, controlling for
business sectors renders the statistical significance of abnormal returns in the
short event window non-significant.
Let us take a closer look at the longer event window for the CCX sam-
ple in Table 3. The CARs are positively skewed, with a substantially higher
mean than median value. This holds true for the standardized CARs as well.
The previous specifications have shown consistently lower p-values for the
BMP test in comparison to the KP test. This order has now switched. While
the BMP test statistic implies a p-value above the 10% level, the stricter
KP p-value retains statistical significance at this level. This switch can be
explained by the average correlation of the abnormal returns ρ¯, which has
become slightly negative. The significance of the KP p-value is supported
by the generalized rank test. The analysis suggests that business sector ef-
fects explain an additional part of the positive abnormal returns. Further
indication that controlling for sectoral effects has increased the explanatory
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power is reflected by the changes in correlation of the abnormal returns ρ¯
(see the footnotes in the according tables). This value decreases steadily with
increasingly detailed model specification and tends to converge towards zero.
In sum, CCX firms seem to have profited from the threat of regulation in
addition to being overrepresented in favorable sectors.
3.5.2 Event returns: CCX membership announcement
As the second event, we investigate the market reaction to CCX membership
announcements. The sample consists of 20 firms announcing their engage-
ment, ranging from the founding members in 2003 up to the last announce-
ments in 2008. Industry-specific effects are less of a concern in this setting.
While the Waxman-Markey Bill has shown to have had a sudden and highly
focused impact on entire industry sectors at one point in time, mere member-
ship announcements should hardly be confounded by industry-wide effects.
Moreover, they are scattered over several years. In contrast to the Waxman-
Markey Bill, however, information leakage poses a potential problem. To
address the possibility that insider information affected the stock price be-
fore the firms’ public statements, we extend the event window symmetrically
around the announcement dates. In addition to calculating the cumulated
abnormal returns over the short window [0,1], we add two longer windows,
[-1,1] and [-2,2] to ease the comparison with Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn.
Table 3.4 presents the abnormal return estimates for CCX membership
announcement. Over the short window, both the ACAR and the ACSAR are
slightly positive. This changes when expanding the event windows, with the
longest window exhibiting negative returns across the board. However, none
of the results show a statistically significant pattern. All test statistics are
well below significance levels and cannot reject the null hypothesis of normal
returns in light of the membership announcements. In yet other words, the
market was seemingly indifferent to the firms’ sudden voluntary engagement
in the CCX. Our results qualify the findings in Gans and Hintermann, where
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Table 3.3: 4 factor business sector model
CL&CCX CCX CL
Panel A: event window[1,1]
ACAR -0.196 -0.260 -0.063
CAR Median -0.109 -0.042 -0.071
ACSAR 0.029 0.082 0.021
CSAR Median -0.069 -0.036 -0.039
BMP t-statistic 0.345 0.694 0.213
BMP p-val 0.731 0.493 0.832
KP t-statistic 0.345 0.712 0.199
KP p-val 0.731 0.482 0.844
GRank Test 0.516 0.644 0.577
GRank p-val 0.608 0.522 0.566
Nr. of Observations 60 31 41
Panel B: event window[1,2]
ACAR 0.259 0.684 0.270
CAR Median -0.055 0.170 0.096
ACSAR 0.127 0.303 0.074
CSAR Median -0.016 0.063 0.046
BMP t-statistic 0.962 1.679 0.507
BMP p-val 0.340 0.103 0.615
KP t-statistic 0.964 1.722 0.472
KP p-val 0.339 0.095 0.639
GRank Test 1.005 1.674 0.815
GRank p-val 0.319 0.100 0.419
Nr. of Observations 60 31 41
CAR & CSAR in %. 60 days estimation window from 02apr2009 to 26jun2009. Event
window[1,1] captures the abnormal returns on day 26jun2009 and event window[1,2] on
26jun2009 and 30jun2009. The BMP test (Boehmer et al. 1991) is an extension of Patell
(1976) and robust to event induced variance. The KP test (Kolary & Pynno¨nen, 2010)
is adjusting the BMP test for cross sectional correlation. In our samples the average
correlation of abnormal returns ρ¯ is: ρ¯cl&ccx = -0.000, ρ¯ccx = -0.002 , ρ¯cl = 0.004 . The
non-parametric GRank test is the generalized rank test for cumulated returns from Kolari
and Pynno¨nen (2010a.)
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Table 3.4: 3 event windows based on the 3 factor model
[0,1] [-1,1] [-2,2]
ACAR 0.150 -0.213 -0.513
CAR Median 0.210 -0.001 -0.310
ACSAR 0.185 0.168 -0.024
CSAR Median 0.135 -0.013 -0.117
Patell t-statistic 0.813 0.738 -0.107
Patell p-val 0.420 0.464 0.915
BMP t-statistic 0.517 0.319 -0.043
BMP p-val 0.607 0.751 0.966
KP t-statistic 0.455 0.281 -0.038
KP p-val 0.651 0.780 0.970
GRank Test 0.897 0.454 0.011
GRank p-val 0.374 0.651 0.991
Nr. of Observations 20 20 20
CAR & CSAR in %. The 3 factor model parameters are estimated during 59. The BMP test
(Boehmer et al. 1991) is an extension of Patell (1976), robust to event induced variance. Kolary
& Pyo¨nnen (2010) (KP) extend the BMP test, adjusting for cross sectional correlation. The
average correlation of abnormal returns ρ¯ in our sample is ρ¯ = 0.015 The GRank test is the
generalized rank test for cumulated abnormal returns from Kolari and Pyonnen (2010a)
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a positive market reaction was concluded. Nevertheless, CCX firms seem to
provoke a different market reaction upon membership announcement than
CL firms do. In Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, newly announced member-
ship engagement in the CL initiative was vigorously punished with negative
abnormal returns.
3.6 Conclusion
When does it pay to be green? This paper studies two events to answer this
question. First, we examine the immediate effect of the Waxman-Markey Bill
on stock prices for members of two voluntary but binding US environmental
initiatives, Climate Leaders (CL) and the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX).
This bill intended to establish a mandated carbon market in the US and
unexpectedly passed the vote in the House of Representatives in June 2009,
temporarily inducing a credible economic threat in the form of unforeseen
costs in the short run. In the second event study, we investigate the market
reaction to membership announcements to the CCX.
Our event studies employ the market model augmented by the Fama-
French factors (Fama and French, 1992, 1993). In our baseline specification,
the reaction to the Waxman-Markey Bill indicates positive abnormal returns
for both the CL and the CCX firm samples. However, the existing litera-
ture stresses that industry effects may play a role in the attributed impact
on firm level. With respect to the Waxman-Markey event in particular, the
implementation of the bill would likely have had specific impacts on different
industries. For this reason, we isolate the membership effect in a voluntary
climate initiative by extending the basic model specification by economic and,
on a deeper level, business sector returns. Doing so puts the positive effects
into perspective. By and large, members of the Chicago Climate Exchange
seemed to profit from the Waxman-Markey Bill despite the confounding in-
dustry effects. This finding is in line with Gans and Hintermann (2013), but
the observed industry effects dampen the attributed market reaction to CCX
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membership. On the other hand, the industry effects fully account for the
positive returns for the Climate Leaders.
In a second event study, we investigate the market reaction towards mem-
bership announcement. In their event study, Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn
found significant negative effects when new CL member announced their en-
gagement. In direct comparison to the immediate negative reaction towards
the CL announcements in Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn’s event study, how
do new CCX members fare? Our results for CCX membership announcement
cannot reject a neutral market reaction and qualifies the conclusions of pre-
vious findings, where Gans and Hintermann concluded a positve reaction for
CCX announcements. We attribute the distinct results in spite of the same
event to the methodological differences. Our observed market reaction sug-
gests that the market does not regard the CCX engagement as a detrimental
venture. One could argue that the engagement was in line with the mar-
ket’s expectation of the firms’ strategies. Obviously, both initiatives entail
considerable costs for the firms in the short run. The reaction to the mem-
bership announcements suggest that the perceived advantages of membership
only outweigh these costs in case of the engagement in the CCX. There only
seemed good reason to join the CCX, not the CL initiative.
Taken together, the market reaction in light of the two events paint a
consistent picture of the perceived value of membership in the two initiatives.
The significant abnormal returns for the Chicago Climate Exchange members
during the passage of the Waxman-Markey Bill are likely to be explained by
the fact that this program effectively mirrored the workings of a regulatory
cap-and-trade system as intended by the bill. Indeed, the CCX can plau-
sibly be considered a blueprint for the emission trading system proposed in
the bill. The positive reaction distinguishes the Chicago Climate Exchange
from the Climate Leaders, who acquired firm internal knowledge about how
to implement an emission management system and how to identify and pur-
sue emission reduction opportunities. Crucially, the Climate Leaders did not
profit from participating in an active carbon market, gaining trading experi-
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ence and knowledge directly applicable in the foreseen cap-and-trade system.
The indifferent market reaction for the Climate Leaders during the passage
of the bill is in line with the preparation argument. These results are also
consistent with the view that firms do not only join to signal a credible com-
mitment to go green, but gain actual experience which is helpful in light of
looming regulation.
We caution to claim external validity for our results. Membership in these
initiatives is voluntary and therefore endogenous. Even though we control for
firm characteristics in our estimations, we can not control for variables like
firm strategy or product differentiation. We would expect firms with higher
membership payoffs to be more likely to join. By the same token, it seems
reasonable that the observed market reaction for members establishes a upper
bound when thinking about a contractual membership of non-member firms.
On the other hand, one might argue that the Waxman-Markey event was
a regulatory event and therefore less dichotomous as other events. On this
note, the observed market reaction rather establishes a lower bound effect.
Based on our results of the two examined events we contend that volun-
tary initiative alone are clearly not enough to move the whole economy to
a lower carbon intensity. But they might complement regulatory regimes.
The results of this paper inform about the interaction of voluntary program
design and regulation. Interestingly enough, even the Bush administration
itself, under which the Climate Leaders program was initiated, did not really
believe in the effectiveness of purely voluntary efforts. On this note, The New
York Times (2003) wrote that administration officials were collecting written
promises from industries to curb greenhouse gas emissions. “White House
officials, insisting on concrete commitments measured in tons of gases, have
rejected written offers from some industry groups to take nonspecific actions,
several industry officials said.... Opponents of regulation have criticized the
administration’s effort as a mandatory program disguised as a voluntary one.”
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3.7 Tables
Table A3.5: Climate Leader membership development
Date # Firms Achievers Setters Developers
28.03.2008 162 11 69 82
21.05.2008 172 11 69 92
03.01.2009 249 18 85 146
08.05.2009 264 19 87 158
01.08.2010 * 191 26 93 72
13.02.2011 183 32 100 51
* Retrieved on September 20 2012 from:
http://www.epa.gov/climateleadership/documents/directory.pdf
All other dates are from lists as retrieved from www.archive.org
Table A3.6: Nr. of firms in samples
Waxman-Marekey event Membership announcement
CL&CCX
CCX CL CCX
Identified∗ 84 40 57 26
Confounding events 24 9 16 6
Resulting sample 60 31 41 20
∗ Identified firms without illiquid firms and ADRs.
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Table A3.7: Chicago Climate Exchange firms (CCX) and event samples
Firm name Sample membership* Charter member
Abbott Laboratories MA
Agrium U.S. Inc. W&M
Alliant Energy Corporate Services Inc. W&M
American Electric Power MA W&M charter member
Avista Corporation MA W&M
Bank of America Corporation W&M
Baxter International Inc. MA W&M charter member
Boise Paper Holdings, LLC MA W&M
CLECO Corporation W&M
Central Vermont Public Service MA W&M
Dow Corning W&M
DTE Energy Inc MA W&M
DuPont W&M charter member
Eastman Kodak Company W&M
FMC Corporation W&M
Ford Motor Company W&M charter member
Genon Energy Inco. MA
Green Mnt.Power Corp. MA
Intel Corporation MA W&M
Interface, Inc. MA W&M
IBM MA W&M
International Paper W&M charter member
Knoll, Inc. MA W&M
MeadWestvaco Corp. MA W&M charter member
Mirant Corporation W&M
Motorola, Inc. W&M charter member
Neenah Paper Incorporated MA W&M
Nrg Energy Inco. MA
Plum Creek Timber Company, Inc. W&M
PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC W&M
Puget Energy Inco. MA
Safeway Incorporated MA
Steelcase Inc. W&M
TECO Energy, Inc. W&M
Temple-Inland Inc MA W&M charter member
United Technologies Corporation W&M
Waste Management, Inc. MA W&M charter member
Sample membership*: - W&M; Waxman-Markey event sample
- MA; Membership Announcement sample.
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Table A3.8: Sample of Climate Leader firms (CL) for Waxman-Markey event
Firm name CL status* Charter partner Reduction region
3M achievers U.S. GHG
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. achievers charter partner global GHG
Agilent Technologies setters global GHG
American Electric Power achievers U.S. GHG
Applied Materials, Inc. setters global GHG
Bank of America Corporation setters U.S. GHG
Baxter International Inc. achievers charter partner U.S. GHG
Best Buy Co., Inc. setters U.S. GHG
Calpine setters U.S. GHG
Campbell Soup Company setters U.S. GHG
Caterpillar Inc. achievers global GHG
Cisco Systems, Inc. setters global GHG
Cummins Inc. setters global GHG
Dell Inc. setters global GHG
DuPont Company setters global GHG
Eastman Kodak Company setters charter partner global GHG
Ecolab, Inc. setters U.S. GHG
EMC Corporation setters U.S. GHG
Fairchild Semiconductor setters U.S. GHG
Hasbro, Inc. achievers charter partner U.S. GHG
Intel Corporation setters global GHG
Interface, Inc. setters charter partner U.S. GHG
IBM Corporation achievers charter partner global GHG
International Paper setters charter partner U.S. GHG
Johnson Controls, Inc. setters U.S. GHG
LSI Corporation setters U.S. GHG
Marriott International, Inc. setters U.S. GHG
Merck & Co., Inc. setters global GHG
Millipore Corporation setters global GHG
Coors Brewing Company setters U.S. GHG
FPL Group, Inc. achievers charter partner U.S. GHG
NVIDIA Corporation setters U.S. GHG
Owens Corning setters U.S. GHG
PepsiCo setters U.S. GHG
PPG Industries, Inc. setters global GHG
PSEG setters charter partner U.S. GHG
Staples, Inc. setters charter partner U.S. GHG
Steelcase Inc. setters U.S. GHG
Gap, Inc. setters U.S. GHG
United Technologies Corporation achievers global GHG
Xerox Corporation achievers global GHG
CL status*: Status of Climate Leader member with regard to emission reduction pledge.
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Table A3.9: 4 factor economic sector model
CL&CCX CCX CL
Panel A: event window[1,1]
ACAR -0.047 0.102 -0.082
CAR Median 0.027 0.181 -0.004
ACSAR 0.073 0.204 0.011
CSAR Median 0.018 0.114 -0.002
BMP t-statistic 0.896 1.829 0.118
BMP p-val 0.374 0.077 0.907
KP t-statistic 0.808 1.796 0.100
KP p-val 0.422 0.082 0.920
GRank Test 1.173 1.903 0.513
GRank p-val 0.245 0.062 0.610
Nr. of Observations 60 31 41
Panel B: event window[1,2]
ACAR 0.276 0.717 0.294
CAR Median 0.465 0.804 0.380
ACSAR 0.185 0.436 0.063
CSAR Median 0.197 0.403 0.160
BMP t-statistic 1.423 2.479 0.432
BMP p-val 0.160 0.019 0.668
KP t-statistic 1.283 2.435 0.367
KP p-val 0.204 0.021 0.715
GRank Test 1.442 2.247 0.664
GRank p-val 0.155 0.028 0.509
Nr. of Observations 60 31 41
CAR & CSAR in %. 60 days estimation window from 02apr2009 to 26jun2009. Event
window[1,1] captures the abnormal returns on day 26jun2009 and event window[1,2] on
26jun2009 and 30jun2009. The BMP test (Boehmer et al. 1991) is an extension of Patell
(1976) and robust to event induced variance. The KP test (Kolary & Pynno¨nen, 2010)
is adjusting the BMP test for cross sectional correlation. In our samples the average
correlation of abnormal returns ρ¯ is: ρ¯cl&ccx = 0.004, ρ¯ccx = 0.001 , ρ¯cl = 0.009 . The
non-parametric GRank test is the generalized rank test for cumulated returns from Kolari
and Pynno¨nen (2010a.)
Chapter 4
Is socially responsible investing
really beneficial?
New empirical evidence for the
US and European stock
markets ∗
Abstract
This paper empirically examines the theoretically ambivalent relationship be-
tween socially responsible investing (SRI) and stock performance. It extends
the existing literature by considering both the US and the entire European
stock markets and by using consistent world-wide corporate sustainability
performance data after a screening process including broad negative screens.
Our portfolio analysis from 1998 to 2009 applies the factors from a recently
constructed financial databank comprising the common market return, size,
value, and momentum factors according to Carhart (1997). These risk factors
from the corresponding four-factor model allow us to estimate more reliable
risk-adjusted returns than in the restrictive one-factor model based on the
∗This paper is joint work with Andreas Ziegler
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Capital Asset Pricing Model. In both the US and European stock markets
we find that SRI is associated with large-sized firms. However, this investment
strategy generally leads to insignificant abnormal returns when all four risk
factors are considered so that we find no evidence that SRI is either penalized
or rewarded by the stock markets. These results indicate that the penalty
imposed through the lack of portfolio diversification due to the application
of broad negative screens might have been compensated by a value relevant
positive-screening process.
4.1 Introduction
Growing individual awareness of environmental, social, and ethical issues is
strongly affecting purchase decisions of market participants, for example, with
respect to certified green or fair-trade products (Kitzmueller and Shimshack,
2012). This development is fueling private and institutional investment de-
cisions towards socially responsible investing (SRI), also labeled ethical or
sustainable investing (e.g. Renneboog et al., 2008). This investment strategy
consists of choosing stocks on the basis of environmental, social, and ethical
screens (e.g Barnett and Salomon, 2006). SRI has experienced strong growth
around the world. For example, Table A4.3 in the appendix reports that
according to Eurosif (2010, 2008), core SRI in Europe grew from 34 billion e
in 2002 to 1200 billion e in 2009. This corresponds to an annual growth rate
of 66%. For the US, the Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment
reports that one out of eight invested US dollars (USD) follows SRI guide-
lines. According to Table A4.4, the assets under management following SRI
screening more than quadrupled from 529 billion USD in 1997 to 2512 billion
USD in 2010 (see US-Sif, 2010). While these data for the US and Europe
should not be compared directly due to different SRI categorization schemes,
they reveal the increasing popularity of SRI. This development has attracted
academic interest so that several empirical studies examine whether environ-
mental, social, or ethical investments are penalized or rewarded by the stock
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markets. Methodologically, these studies use common micro-econometric ap-
proaches (e.g Filbeck and Gorman, 2004; Ziegler et al., 2007b), the short-term
event study approach (e.g. Teoh et al., 1999; Can˜o´n-de Francia and Garce´s-
Ayerbe, 2009; Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 2010; Fisher-Vanden and Thor-
burn, 2011; Oberndorfer et al., 2013), or portfolio analyses (Derwall et al.,
2011; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). Most studies in this field are based on
the third approach by directly considering the investor perspective, i.e. by
comparing the stock performance of SRI funds and portfolios with the stock
performance of conventional funds and portfolios.
One direction of such portfolio analyses examines the performance of sus-
tainability stock indexes (e.g. Sauer, 1997; Bauer et al., 2005; Schro¨der, 2007),
such as the Domini 400 Social Index. These stock indexes like the Dow Jones
Sustainability Index family (e.g. Ziegler and Schro¨der, 2010; Ziegler, 2012)
constitute the basis for some socially responsible mutual funds. A second
group of portfolio analyses compares the risk-adjusted stock returns of so-
cially responsible funds with the corresponding risk-adjusted stock returns
of conventional mutual funds (e.g. Bauer et al., 2005, 2007; Capelle-Blancard
and Monjon, 2013). However, studies on actively managed mutual funds have
the drawback that the SRI impact on financial performance cannot be dis-
entangled from the effects of the ability of asset managers. This problem is
addressed by a third group of portfolio analyses, building on synthetic portfo-
lios based on corporate sustainability performance assessments, for example,
provided by Innovest (e.g. Derwall et al., 2005) or KLD Research & Analytics
(e.g. Kempf and Osthoff, 2007a). Some of these assessments are the basis for
popular sustainability stock indexes, such as the Domini 400 Social Index that
is constructed with KLD ratings. Theoretically, the stock performance effect
of SRI is ambivalent. The following three hypotheses are discussed in the lit-
erature (e.g Hamilton et al., 1993; Bauer et al., 2005): First, if SRI increases
the value of socially responsible firms by decreasing the expected returns and
the cost of capital of these firms, SRI portfolios deliver lower stock returns
than conventional portfolios. The second hypothesis is that the stock returns
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of SRI portfolios are higher than those of their conventional counterparts if
SRI characteristics are not correctly priced by stock markets. Finally, the
third hypothesis is that SRI is neither penalized nor rewarded by stock mar-
kets if corporate sustainability performance or corporate social responsibility
(CSR), referring to corresponding corporate environmental, social, and eth-
ical activities, is not priced. This argument represents the common finance
view because in the presence of efficient capital markets and elastic demand
curves, SRI can not influence a firm’s cost of capital (Wall, 1995). According
to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the optimal risk-return portfolio
for mean-variance investors is the market portfolio. Portfolios deviating from
the market portfolio are not optimally diversified. Merton (1987) extended
the CAPM by asymmetric information. This causes segmented markets and
asset prices are affected by the combination of different investor bases of assets
and imperfect diversification. In line with this model Hong and Kacperczyk
(2009) find that sin stocks, companies involved in producing alcohol, tobacco
or gambling, are shunned by many investors and have higher expected returns
than comparable stocks. The small investor base of these stocks depresses
their price and hence raises the expected returns.
We examine SRI portfolios produced by a rating process combining broad
negative screens with a positive screening process. A rigorous negative screen-
ing process is rare in the SRI industry because the exclusion of many in-
dustries might result in poorly diversified portfolios suffering from subpar
performance. Whether the positive screening process has identified widely
held stocks with an inflated price and depressed expected returns, or value
relevant SRI characteristics that compensate or even overcompensate for the
poor diversification, can only be examined empirically.
Our portfolio analysis is in line with the aforementioned third direction
of studies, i.e. we use raw corporate sustainability performance assessments.
The main contribution of this study to the corresponding empirical literature
is two-fold: First, in contrast to most former studies, we do not only consider
the US stock market, but also analyze the entire European stock market based
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on consistent world-wide corporate sustainability performance data from the
Swiss bank ZKB (Zurich Cantonal Bank). This allows a comparative analysis
for these two world-wide leading stock markets. Second, our portfolio anal-
ysis reveals the appeal of a new financial databank that has recently been
constructed at the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich (see Schmidt et al.,
2011), comprising the common market return, size, value, and momentum
factors according to Carhart (1997). These risk factors from the correspond-
ing four-factor model are necessary to estimate risk-adjusted returns that are
more reliable than corresponding return estimates in a restrictive one-factor
model based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The risk factors
from this flexible multifactor model are publicly available for the US and some
other stock markets and have already been applied in former SRI portfolio
analyses. However, only our newly elaborated (Pan-)European size, value,
and momentum factors allow an analysis for the entire European stock mar-
ket. In the meantime, Fama and French (2012) have also constructed such
factors. But compared to our databank, they are based on a smaller number
of European countries and rely on a different financial data provider, namely
Bloomberg.
Our portfolio analysis has two dimensions: In a first step, we only examine
firms that are included in the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI)
World Index. Based on the corporate sustainability performance assessments
by ZKB, we construct US and European portfolios comprising firms that are
sector leaders in terms of sustainability performance and corresponding port-
folios comprising firms that are not sector leaders. These stock portfolios
are then used to estimate average monthly risk-adjusted or abnormal re-
turns. Furthermore, we consider a trading strategy of buying stocks of MSCI
firms that are sector leaders in terms of sustainability performance and selling
stocks of MSCI firms that are not sector leaders. In a second step, we addi-
tionally include firms from the US and European stock markets that are not
part of the MSCI, but are identified as leaders in terms of sustainability per-
formance by ZKB. We estimate again average monthly risk-adjusted returns
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for the corresponding slightly more diversified portfolios. The remainder of
the paper is structured as follows:
In section 4.2 we present our portfolio analysis approach and section 4.3
examines the data. The section 4.4 discusses the empirical results and the
final section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Methodological approach
In order to examine whether SRI is penalized or rewarded by the stock mar-
kets, our portfolio analysis compares the average stock performance of port-
folios comprising firms that differ with respect to their sustainability perfor-
mance. In line with recent studies (e.g. Derwall et al., 2005; Bauer et al.,
2005, 2007; Kempf and Osthoff, 2007a; Ziegler et al., 2011) we consider the
risk-adjusted returns of different stock portfolios that are estimated on the
basis of asset pricing models. So far, the traditional and most fundamental
asset pricing model is the one-factor model based on the market model (e.g.
Sharpe, 1963) and the CAPM (e.g. Lintner, 1965; Fama and French, 2004;
Perold, 2004). This model can be formulated for a portfolio i in month t
(i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1, . . . , T ) as in equation 4.1:
rit − rft = αi + βi(rmt − rft) + it (4.1)
In this approach rit and rmt are the (continuous) stock returns of portfolio
i and the market at the end of month t, rf t is the risk-free interest rate at
the beginning of month t, and it is the disturbance term with expectation
E(it) = 0 and (unknown) variance V ar(it) = σ
2
 . The one-factor alpha
αi (i.e. Jensen’s alpha) and βi are further unknown parameters, which are
estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). This model assumes that βi cap-
tures the non-diversifiable risk of each stock portfolio in the explanation of
the excess returns rit − rft.
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Based on the ”anomalies” discussion questioning the validity of the CAPM
(e.g. Banz, 1981; DeBondt and Thaler, 1985; Fama and French, 1992), Fama
and French (1993) have developed a three-factor model, which includes - in
addition to the excess returns rmt− rft of the stock market - two factors with
respect to size and value to explain the excess portfolio returns rit−rft. Many
empirical studies show that this three-factor model has more explanatory
power than the one-factor model based on the CAPM, for example, Fama and
French (1993, 1996) for the US, Berkowitz and Qiu (2001) for the Canadian,
Hussain et al. (2002) for the British, and Schrimpf et al. (2007) or Ziegler
et al. (2007a) for the German stock market. With the emergence of this three-
factor model the discussion about an additional factor, namely the momentum
factor, began (e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, 2001; Rouwenhorst, 1998)
and resulted in the following four-factor model of Carhart (1997), which is
currently the most common asset pricing model for general applications in
financial economics (e.g. L’Her et al., 2004; Bollen and Busse, 2005) including
SRI portfolio analyses:
rit − rft = αi + βi1(rmt − rft) + βi2SMBt + βi3HMLt + βi4WMLt + it (4.2)
In this model 4.2 the Fama-French size factor SMBt is the difference be-
tween the returns of portfolios comprising stocks of ”small” firms and portfo-
lios comprising stocks of ”big” firms at the end of month t. The Fama-French
value factor HMLt is the difference between the returns of portfolios compris-
ing stocks of firms with a ”high” book-to-market equity ratio and portfolios
comprising stocks of firms with a ”low” book-to-market equity ratio at the
end of month t. Finally, the Carhart momentum factor WMLt is the differ-
ence between the returns of portfolios comprising stocks of recent ”winners”
and portfolios comprising stocks of recent ”losers” at the end of month t. The
unknown parameters are now the four-factor alpha αi as well as βi1, βi2, βi3
and βi4 in addition to V ar(it) = σ
2
 and are again estimated by OLS.
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The parameter of principal interest is αi and is interpreted as the average
monthly risk-adjusted or abnormal return of stock portfolio i not explained
by the single risk factor in the one-factor model based on the CAPM or by
the four risk factors in the Carhart multifactor model. In the following, the
alphas thus measure the stock return out- or underperformance of portfolios
comprising firms that are or are not sector leaders in terms of sustainability
performance compared with the stock market. Furthermore, we consider for
the group of MSCI firms a trading strategy of buying stocks of firms that are
sector leaders and selling stocks of firms that are not sector leaders in terms of
sustainability performance. For this long-short strategy we examine returns
of stock portfolios that are calculated by the difference between the returns
of portfolios. The corresponding alphas can be calculated by the difference
between the two separated one- or four-factor model alphas.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 Corporate sustainability performance data
In our study we use corporate sustainability performance data from ZKB,
the biggest cantonal bank in Switzerland and one of the leading suppliers of
SRI products on the Swiss financial market. ZKB employs a team of analysts
with the mandate to identify firms that can be considered as sustainabil-
ity leaders. Compared with other suppliers of SRI products, the screening
process of ZKB is rigorous since a positive screening is preceded by a broad
negative screening process. Firm preclusion criteria of the negative screening
process comprise main business operations centered around: Production of
fossil energies, operation of energy plants based on fossil energies or nuclear
energy, production of cars or planes, airlines, production of ozone depleting
substances, production of harmful substances according to the Stockholm
agreement, not sustainable fishery or forestry, production of nuclear reactors,
operations related to genetically modified organisms, production of weapons
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or military machines, as well as production of tobacco and cigarettes.
During the assessment process the analyst team of ZKB consults firm doc-
uments such as annual reports and CSR reports as well as various environ-
mental and social governance databases. The negative screening is followed
by a consultation of important media to ensure that the firms are not in-
volved in any problematic controversies as well as a best-in-class approach.
The resulting assessment from this annual process is dichotomous and iden-
tifies firms leading their sector in terms of sustainability performance. Such
firms are not said to have no improvement potential, but have a more in-depth
approach to environmental, social, and corporate governance issues than their
competitors. It should be noted that ZKB - in line with other suppliers of
SRI products - focuses on firms with higher market values (including all MSCI
firms) compared with the entire stock market universes. This size difference
has to be considered when the results of our portfolio analysis are interpreted.
An analysis with a rather small group of small- to medium-sized firms based
on an alternative assessment concept of ZKB can be found in Mollet et al.
(2013).
Based on these corporate sustainability performance assessments, we con-
sider three portfolios on the US and European stock markets. The portfolio
’sustainability leaders’ comprises in each year firms that are general sector
leaders in terms of sustainability performance. The portfolio ’MSCI sus-
tainability leaders’ comprises in each year the group of sustainability leaders
among all MSCI firms over time, and the portfolio ’other MSCI firms’ com-
prises in each year the group of MSCI firms that are not sustainability leaders.
The portfolio ’MSCI sustainability leaders’ is thus a sub-group of the portfo-
lio ’sustainability leaders’ since the latter comprises both the sector leaders
in terms of sustainability performance among all firms in the MSCI as well
as some sustainability leaders that are not part of the MSCI. Additionally,
we also analyze long-short portfolios on the basis of a trading strategy of
buying stocks of sustainability leaders in the MSCI and selling stocks of the
other firms in the MSCI that are not sector leaders in terms of sustainability
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performance.
4.3.2 Financial data: A new databank
Our financial data, particularly for the factors in the four-factor model ac-
cording to Carhart (1997), stem from a new databank that has recently been
constructed at the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich (for details of the
following discussion, see Schmidt et al., 2011). In line with Ince and Porter
(2006), the starting point of the construction of the databank is the Thomson
Reuters Datastream constituent lists. Besides research lists, we use additional
lists from Thomson Reuters Worldscope and Thomson Reuters Datastream
to control for survivorship bias and to get a population as large as possible.
After some static screens to firm characteristics we extract time series data
for these firms. The time series draws have a yearly frequency for Thom-
son Reuters Worldscope data and a monthly frequency for Thomson Reuters
Datastream data. In order to correct the monthly data, we apply dynamic
screens as suggested by Ince and Porter (2006) as well as additional filters.
Overall, for the whole time series we use 13343 US firms and 11054 European
firms to construct the stock market return factor, and slightly less firms to
construct the SMB, HML and WML factors.
Using only US firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ at the end
of the sample period would result in a sample suffering from survivorship bias.
Therefore, we choose to use all firms that are available on Thomson Reuters
Datastream and Thomson Reuters Worldscope. This implies that our US
sample is drawn from a different population compared with the population
described by Fama and French (1993). Data of European firms that are
traded after January 2002 are denominated in Euros, whereas data of firms
that are delisted before January 2002 are denominated in the old currency of
the respective country. This can be fixed by using the fixed Euro conversion
rate and expressing all cash values (like size) in Euro values. Furthermore, for
some European countries dividend data are obviously erroneous. We correct
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this issue by applying the following procedure: If a dividend payment is higher
than 50% of the adjusted price, we divide the Thomson Reuters Datastream
dividend by a certain value. We apply this screen also for the US stock
market, although this issue is not of practical relevance there.
The book-to-market equity ratio for the sorting month June is calculated
as book equity divided by size (i.e. the market value) of the preceding Decem-
ber. To be included in the June sort of year τ , a firm must have a positive
book value and size available in December of the previous year τ − 1. In
order to construct the SMB and HML factors for the US and European stock
markets, all remaining stocks are sorted each December into three book-to-
market equity ratio groups. Furthermore, we sort these stocks each June
into two size groups. From the intersection of the two size groups ”small”
(S) and ”big” (B), and the three book-to-market equity ratio groups ”low”
(L), ”medium” (M), and ”high” (H), we form six portfolios, which are held
for one year. The six portfolios contain stocks of firms with small size and
low book-to-market equity ratio (S/L), with small size and medium book-to-
market equity ratio (S/M), with small size and high book-to-market equity
ratio (S/H), with big size and low book-to-market equity ratio (B/L), with
big size and medium book-to-market equity ratio (B/M), as well as with big
size and high book-to-market equity ratio (B/H). From the monthly value
weighted returns of these six portfolios we construct the SMB and HML
factors for month t as follows:
SMBt =
r
S/L
t + r
S/M
t + r
S/H
t
3
− r
B/L
t + r
B/M
t + r
B/H
t
3
(4.3)
HMLt =
r
S/H
t + r
B/H
t
2
− r
S/L
t + r
B/L
t
2
(4.4)
r
X/Y
t denotes the returns of a stock portfolio belonging to size class X
(S or B) and book-to-market equity ratio class Y (H, M , or L) in month
t based on the portfolio formation in last June. In order to construct the
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WML factor, we calculate for each portfolio formation month t − 1 and for
each stock the mean return from month t − 12 to month t− and use this
mean return to compile three momentum groups. This sorting takes place
every month. We also construct two size groups each month. To be included
in the sort, the stock return has to be available in every month from t − 12
to t − 2 and size must be available in month t − 1. From the intersection of
the two size groups S and B and the three momentum groups ”losers” (L),
”medium” (M), and ”winners” (W ), we form six portfolios. The six portfolios
contain stocks of firms with small size and loser momentum (S/L), with small
size and medium momentum (S/M), with small size and winner momentum
(S/W ), with big size and loser momentum (B/L), with big size and medium
momentum (B/M), as well as with big size and winner momentum (B/W ).
We construct the WML factor for month t as the difference between the
mean returns of the two winner portfolios and the mean returns of the two
losers portfolios:
WMLt =
r
S/W
t + r
B/W
t
2
− r
S/L
t + r
B/L
t
2
(4.5)
r
X/Z
t denotes the returns of a stock portfolio belonging to size class X (S
or B) and momentum class Z (W , M , or L) in month t based on the portfolio
formation in month t − 1. In each of the above sorts, we need to choose
breakpoints to divide portfolios. In order to mirror the Fama and French
(1993) NYSE breakpoints, we choose to use in our analysis of a broader
sample the 0.80 quantile as a breakpoint for the separation of stocks of firms
with small and big size as well as the 0.30 and the 0.70 quantiles to separate
among the three book-to-market equity ratio groups and the three momentum
groups.
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4.3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table A4.5 reports the number of sample firms in the three portfolios ’sus-
tainability leaders’, ’MSCI sustainability leaders’, and ’other MSCI firms’
across industries according to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB),
separately on the US and European stock markets. Table A4.6 shows the
number of sample firms across the European countries as classified by Thom-
son Reuters Datastream according to the home or listing country of a stock.
For reasons of brevity we only report the cross-sectional distributions for the
last year with full coverage, i.e. 2008, in Table A4.5 and A4.6 . In this
year the US portfolios comprise 591 firms and the European portfolios 575
firms. In the US most firms stem from the financial sector (110), followed by
firms from the industrials industry (89). This pattern is similar for Europe
with 129 industrial and 127 financial firms, although the order is narrowly
reversed. With respect to the US sustainability leaders, the highest number
of firms is from the technology sector. In contrast, the highest numbers of
European sustainability leaders are in the industrials, financials, consumer
services, and consumer goods sectors. Overall, the European stock market
contains a substantially higher number of sustainability leaders than the US
stock market in 2008. Table 4.1 reports the numbers of sample firms and
average market values from 1998 to 2009 for the three portfolios ’sustainabil-
ity leaders’, ’MSCI sustainability leaders’, and ’other MSCI firms’. While the
upper part of the table refers to the US, the lower part refers to the European
stock market. The table shows that the number of European sustainability
leaders is not only in 2008 but in each year higher than the number of US
sustainability leaders. This result is not implying that European firms are
more sustainable than US firms because this disparity could also be driven
by a higher focus of ZKB on the European stock market.
Table 4.1 also reports that the number of sustainability leaders strongly
increases over time in both regions. Moreover, the table points to a further
size tilt in the US: Not only the average size of the assessed firms is higher
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Table 4.1: Number of firms and average market value in portfolios over time
US
Year
Sustainability MSCI sustain- Other MSCI
leaders ability leaders firms
No. of φ market No. of φ market No. of φ market
firms value? firms value? firms value?
1998 11 46.47 8 62.57 282 23.68
1999 16 59.18 9 98.29 286 29.43
2000 24 44.70 14 68.66 289 28.72
2001 25 43.71 14 71.30 252 28.22
2002 23 32.96 17 41.33 356 19.91
2003 26 41.19 20 50.04 348 22.96
2004 35 54.19 27 67.00 400 21.23
2005 42 53.85 37 59.26 447 20.78
2006 41 53.09 36 58.56 497 21.50
2007 42 53.02 37 58.24 501 21.96
2008 42 30.71 38 32.73 549 11.53
2009 37 32.46 33 32.39 449 13.44
Europe
Year
Sustainability MSCI sustain- Other MSCI
leaders ability leaders firms
No. of φ market No. of φ market No. of φ market
firms value? firms value? firms value?
1998 29 24.95 24 27.03 367 9.10
1999 45 20.15 24 32.49 384 11.85
2000 56 17.25 29 27.07 389 12.28
2001 62 14.81 32 24.03 387 10.06
2002 64 11.09 38 17.86 435 8.59
2003 61 14.11 40 20.47 416 11.18
2004 71 16.83 54 21.27 416 14.31
2005 105 16.62 81 20.72 424 14.06
2006 113 21.66 89 26.40 434 16.76
2007 113 24.46 93 28.34 445 19.87
2008 120 9.61 95 11.16 455 9.80
2009 124 11.42 98 13.84 441 9.12
? Mean market value of portfolio in billion USD
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compared with the entire stock market universes, but also the average mar-
ket values of sustainability leaders and particularly of MSCI sustainability
leaders are in each year distinctly higher than the average market values of
other MSCI firms that are not sustainability leaders. A similar but less pro-
nounced size difference between sustainability leaders and MSCI firms that
are not sustainability leaders can be observed on the European stock market.
But the size differences between the three portfolios ’sustainability leaders’,
’MSCI sustainability leaders’, and ’other MSCI firms’ on the European stock
market decrease over time, whereas they remain stable on the US stock mar-
ket. Table A4.7 reports average monthly returns across the full time period of
our analysis from 01/1998 to 04/2009 on the US (upper part) and European
(lower part) stock markets. Additionally, the table reports the returns for the
three sub-periods 01/1998-08/2001, 09/2001-08/2005, and 09/2005-04/2009.
While the first and last sub-periods comprise 44 months, the sub-period from
09/2001 to 08/2005 spans 48 months in order to include the 2001 terrorist
attack on the world trade centre in New York and its financial markets im-
plications. The average monthly returns (in %) are reported for the entire
stock markets, the risk-free interests, the SMB, HML, and WML factors as
well as for the portfolios ’sustainability leaders’, ’MSCI sustainability leaders’,
and ’other MSCI firms’. The monthly risk-free interest rates rft for Europe
is proxied by the Fibor for the year 1998 and by the Euribor from 1999 to
2009. For the US the monthly interbank offered rate is used. Since all our
financial data are finally denominated in USD, the returns are also calcu-
lated on this basis. The average monthly risk-free interest rate amounts to
0.31% (annually 3.8%) over the full time period for both regions. The aver-
age monthly return on the European stock market amounts to 0.29% and is
substantially higher than the 0.08% on the US stock markets. In both regions
the strongly negative returns in the last sub-period are striking. Out of the
three risk factors, the WML factor delivers the highest average returns over
the full time period on the US and European stock markets. Furthermore,
this risk factor has positive average returns in all sub-periods. In contrast,
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the average returns of the SMB factor are in both regions negative in the
first sub-period, substantially positive in the second sub-period and in the
last sub-period negative in the US and slightly positive in Europe. The focal
point in Table A4.7 are the average monthly stock returns for the three port-
folios. While the returns across the full time period are positive for the MSCI
firms that are not sustainability leaders, the corresponding average returns
for the portfolios ’sustainability leaders’ and ’MSCI sustainability leaders’
are negative in both regions. In line with the average monthly returns on
the stock markets, the returns for all three portfolios continuously decrease
over time in the US so that they are even negative in the last sub-period.
While the average returns in Europe are also negative for all three portfo-
lios in the last sub-period, the portfolio ’other MSCI firms’ has the highest
positive average return in the sub-period from 09/2001 to 08/2005 in this
region. However, the average monthly stock returns for the portfolio ’other
MSCI firms’ are in all sub-periods and in both regions more positive than
the returns of the sustainability leaders. A naive interpretation of this result
not taking heterogeneity into account would consider this as evidence for a
negative relationship between corporate sustainability performance and stock
performance. However, Table 4.1 already shows an important driver of het-
erogeneity, namely a size tilt of the sustainability leaders. By conducting a
more reliable portfolio analysis as discussed in the second section, the results
from the univariate descriptive statistics are scrutinized in the following.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Aggregated results
Table 4.2 reports the estimation results in one- and four-factor models across
the full time period from 01/1998 to 04/2009 for the portfolios ’sustainability
leaders’, ’MSCI sustainability leaders’, ’other MSCI firms’, as well as for the
long-short portfolio as discussed above. The upper part of this table refers to
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the US stock market, while the lower part refers to the European stock mar-
ket. For each portfolio the first row reports the results in the one-factor model
based on the CAPM, while the second row reports the respective results in
the Carhart four-factor model. In order to control for possible distortions
due to heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation in the disturbance term, only the
robust heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent z-statistics accord-
ing to Newey and West (1987) are reported besides the parameter estimates.
In line with common practice (e.g. Greene, 2002), we assume a possibly au-
tocorrelated error structure up to three lags. The estimation results point
to the high practical relevance of the application of the four-factor model
compared with the restrictive one-factor model and thus of our new finan-
cial databank. The results in the four-factor model reveal in both regions
a significantly negative loading of the SMB factor. This finding is not sur-
prising since the average monthly returns of the SMB factor are according
to Table A4.7 positive on the US and European stock markets across the
full time period from 01/1998 to 04/2009 (which illustrates that small-sized
firms outperformed large-sized firms during this time period) and since the
three portfolios comprise firms with a higher average market value than the
entire stock market universes. Furthermore, the WML factor has a signifi-
cantly negative loading for all three portfolios in Europe. As a consequence,
the significantly negative alphas for the portfolio ’sustainability leaders’ and
particularly for the long-short portfolio on the European stock market seem
to be misleading since they only refer to the application of the one-factor
model and become insignificant on the basis of the four-factor model. The
main result of Table 4.2 are therefore the insignificant alphas in both regions
for all portfolios in the four-factor model with the exception of a significantly
positive abnormal return for the portfolio ’other MSCI firms’ in the US.
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Table 4.2: Parameter estimates in one- and four-factor models for different
portfolio returns, full time period: 01/1998-04/2009
US
Alpha rmt − rit SMBt HMLt WMLt R2
−0.26 0.94 ∗ ∗∗ − − − 0.77
Sustainability (−1.18) (22.88) − − −
leaders −0.16 0.93 ∗ ∗∗ −0.15∗ −0.05 −0.06
(−0.69) (16.64) (−1.92) (−0.67) (−1.11) 0.79
−0.28 0.96 ∗ ∗∗ − − − 0.77
MSCI sustain- (−1.15) (20.98) − − −
ability leaders −0.18 0.96 ∗ ∗∗ −0.18 ∗ ∗ −0.02 −0.05 0.78
(−0.74) (16.77) (−2.34) (−0.29) (−0.91)
0.02 0.96 ∗ ∗∗ − − − 0.97
Other MSCI (0.33) (70.38) − − −
firms 0.10 ∗ ∗ 0.99 ∗ ∗∗ −0.21 ∗ ∗∗ −0.02 −0.01 0.99
(2.01) (54.91) (−8.81) (−1.48) (−0.57)
−0.31 0.00 − − − −0.01
Long-short: (−1.22) (0.07) − − −
MSCI firms −0.28 −0.03 0.02 0.00 −0.05 −0.02
(−1.09) (−0.42) (0.29) (0.03) (−0.79)
Europe
Alpha rmt − rit SMBt HMLt WMLt R2
−0.46∗ 0.92 ∗ ∗∗ − − − 0.70
Sustainability (−1.77) (11.08) − − −
leaders −0.11 0.81 ∗ ∗∗ −0.52 ∗ ∗∗ 0.01 −0.20 ∗ ∗ 0.77
(−0.36) (9.43) (−3.59) (0.06) (−2.31)
−0.38 0.92 ∗ ∗∗ − − − 0.71
MSCI sustain- (−1.51) (11.49) − − −
ability leaders −0.04 0.81 ∗ ∗∗ −0.50 ∗ ∗∗ −0.05 −0.17∗ 0.77
(−0.13) (9.68) (−3.40) (−0.38) (−1.93)
0.02 0.93 ∗ ∗∗ − − − 0.8
Other MSCI (0.11) (13.82) − − −
firms 0.23 0.85 ∗ ∗∗ −0.44 ∗ ∗∗ 0.05 −0.11∗ 0.84
(0.93) (13.14) (−3.66) (0.51) (−1.66)
−0.40 ∗ ∗∗ −0.00 − − − −0.01
Long-short: (−2.72) (−0.14) − − −
MSCI firms −0.26 −0.04 −0.07 −0.10 −0.06 0.00
(−1.61) (−1.15) (−0.84) (−1.10) (−1.01)
* (**, ***) means that the appropriate parameter is different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) significance level, respectively.
Values in () are the robust z-statistic.
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4.4.2 Results for different time periods and sectors
However, it could be argued that these aggregated estimation results are not
able to disclose possible abnormal returns in some sub-populations. In or-
der to examine whether the estimation results differ over time (e.g. due to
changing expectations or risk-premia) or between several sectors, we consider
disaggregated estimations. In a first step we examine different time periods
and in a second step we exclude financial firms. Table A4.8 and Table A4.9
report besides the full time period 01/1998-04/2009 the estimation results
for the three sub-periods 01/1998-08/2001, 09/2001-08/2005, and 09/2005-
04/2009. Due to the superiority of the Carhart four-factor model as discussed
above, we omit the estimation results in the restrictive one-factor model based
on the CAPM. Table A4.8 therefore reports the estimation results in the four-
factor model on the US, while Table A4.9 refers to the corresponding results
on the European stock market. Table A4.8 reveals that the significantly pos-
itive abnormal return across the full time period from 01/1998 to 04/2009
for the US portfolio ’other MSCI firms’ is strongly affected by the alpha esti-
mate of 0.36 in the first sub-period from 01/1998 to 08/2001. This significant
abnormal return becomes insignificant in the second and third sub-periods.
In line with the aggregated estimation results in Table 4.2, we find neither
on the US stock market (see Table A4.8) nor on the European stock mar-
ket (see Table A4.9) significant abnormal returns in any sub-period for the
portfolios ’sustainability leaders’ ’MSCI sustainability leaders’, and the long-
short portfolio. This time disaggregated analysis therefore confirms the main
result in Table 4.2. The insignificant abnormal returns are also confirmed
when firms from the financial sector are excluded. The comparison between
financial firms and firms from other sectors is generally of interest due to their
strong differences in their valuation by the markets and their accounting rules
(e.g. Ziegler et al., 2011; Ziegler, 2012), which could influence the estimation
results in our portfolio analysis. In addition, the separation of commercial
and investment banking was suspended in 1999 in the US by the repeal of the
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Glass-Steagall Act and financial firms were strongly affected by the stock mar-
ket turbulences during the considered time period. Therefore, Table A4.10
(for the US stock market) and Table A4.11 (for the European stock market)
report the corresponding estimation results in the four-factor model for the
sub-group of non-financial firms and for all sub-periods besides the full time
period. Overall, the tables reveal qualitatively identical estimation results as
Table A4.8 and Table A4.9. In line with Table A4.8, Table A4.10 reports for
the US stock market a significantly positive abnormal return for the portfo-
lio ’other MSCI firms’ in the first sub-period from 01/1998 to 08/2001 and
- as a consequence - across the full time period from 01/1998 to 04/2009.
The higher magnitude of the estimated alphas for non-financial MSCI firms
that are not sustainability leaders compared with all MSCI firms that are
not sector leaders in terms of sustainability performance suggests that the
financial firms negatively affect the significantly positive abnormal return for
this portfolio. However, the main result in Table A4.10 and Table A4.11 are
again the insignificant alphas in all sub-periods for the portfolios ’sustainabil-
ity leaders’, ’MSCI sustainability leaders’, and the long-short portfolio in the
US as well as in all sub-periods and for all portfolios in Europe.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper empirically analyzes the theoretically ambivalent effects of SRI
on stock performance on the US and the European stock markets. The basis
of our identification of SRI are consistent world-wide corporate sustainability
performance data from ZKB. Methodologically, we examine in our portfolio
analysis the risk-adjusted returns of different stock portfolios that are esti-
mated on the basis of asset pricing models. Our study underlines the superi-
ority of the application of the Carhart four-factor model compared with the
restrictive one-factor model based on the CAPM. We show that the estimation
results in the one-factor model are misleading and that the size factor is of
particular importance in the four-factor model. Our study thereby illustrates
CONCLUSION 111
the high relevance of a recently developed financial databank, comprising -
to the best of our knowledge - as a novelty the Carhart risk factors for the
entire European stock market. This new databank certainly provides a rich
basis for future analyses of the relationship between corporate sustainability
performance and stock performance such as portfolio analyses or long-term
event studies (e.g. Barber and Lyon, 1997) as well as for studies in financial
economics in general.
Another main result of our paper are the generally insignificant abnormal
returns for SRI on both stock markets. As a single exception, we find some
positive abnormal returns for firms in the MSCI that are not sector leaders
in terms of sustainability performance. But these abnormal returns arise
only on the US stock market and only in the first sub-period from 01/1998
to 08/2001 becoming insignificant over time. While the general result of
insignificant abnormal returns could be disappointing for the appeal of SRI,
our results do not suggest that this investment strategy is penalized either on
the US or on the European stock market. Given the rigorous application of
negative screens during the selection process, this result suggests that the lack
of diversification might have been compensated by a value-relevant positive
screening-process.
With respect to the investor perspective, our portfolio analysis with corpo-
rate sustainability performance data from ZKB additionally reveals that SRI
is often exposed to a size tilt. We show that not only the primarily assessed
firms are on average larger than the entire stock market universes, but also
that the average market values of the sustainability leaders within this popu-
lation are distinctly higher than the average market values of less sustainable
firms. It should be noted that the identification of sustainability leaders by
ZKB within a population of firms with high market values as basis for SRI
is not an exemption. For example, the assessments for the construction of
the Dow Jones Sustainability Index family are similarly based on large-sized
firms (e.g. Ziegler and Schro¨der, 2010). These assessment processes therefore
strengthen the relevance of the application of multifactor models for analyses
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of the effects of SRI on stock performance.
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4.6 Tables
Table A4.3: Core SRI assets under management in Europe
Year 2002 2005 2007 2009
Billion e 34 105 511.7 1200
Source: Eurosif (2008, 2010)
Table A4.4: Assets under management following SRI screening in the US
Year 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2010
Billion USD 162 529 1497 2010 2143 1685 2098 2512
Source: US Sif (2010)
Table A4.5: Number of firms in portfolios across industries in 2008
Sustaintainability MSCI sustain- Other MSCI
leaders ability leaders firms
US Europe US Europe US Europe
Basic Material 3 5 3 5 23 35
Consumer Good 8 17 6 15 56 49
Consumer Service 6 19 5 18 77 62
Financial 3 25 3 17 107 102
Healthcare 7 7 7 6 53 21
Industrial 3 26 2 16 86 103
Oil & Gas 1 5 1 5 45 27
Technology 10 6 10 6 56 19
Telecommunication 1 4 1 3 10 14
Utility - 6 - 4 36 23
Overall 42 120 38 95 549 455
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Table A4.6: Country of origin of European firms in portfolios in 2008
Country
Sustainability MSCI sustain- Other MSCI
leaders ability leaders firms
Austria 2 1 13
Belgium 3 3 18
Denmark 5 5 17
Finnland 6 5 17
France 8 7 62
Germany 14 10 36
Greece - - 15
Hungary 1 - -
Ireland 1 - 10
Italy 3 1 32
Netherlands 4 4 18
Norway 3 3 17
Portugal - - 9
Spain 5 4 27
Sweden 11 11 30
Switzerland 20 9 26
United Kingdom 34 32 108
Overall 120 95 455
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Table A4.7: Average monthly returns (in %) for different portfolios and time
periods
US
Time period rmt rft SMBt HMLt WMLt
Sustainability MSCI sustain- other MSCI
leaders ability leaders firms
01/1998-04/2009 0.08 0.31 0.21 0.23 0.62 −0.20 −0.23 0.11
01/1998-08/2001 0.56 0.45 −0.14 0.40 1.01 0.33 0.40 0.81
09/2001-08/2005 0.36 0.15 0.83 0.77 0.34 −0.05 −0.11 0.22
09/2005-04/2009 −0.71 0.33 −0.11 −0.52 0.53 −0.91 −0.99 −0.71
Europe
Time period rmt rft SMBt HMLt WMLt
Sustainability MSCI sustain- other MSCI
leaders ability leaders firms
01/1998-04/2009 0.29 0.31 0.19 0.48 0.99 −0.22 −0.14 0.29
01/1998-08/2001 0.38 0.30 −0.33 0.36 0.84 0.18 0.45 0.47
09/2001-08/2005 1.18 0.23 0.81 0.99 0.97 0.11 0.12 0.86
09/2005-04/2009 −0.78 0.39 0.03 0.05 1.16 −0.98 −1.00 −0.53
rmt: Stock market return
rft: Risk-free interest
SMBt: Size factor
HMLt: Value factor
WMLt: Momentum factor
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Table A4.8: Parameter estimates for the US stock market in four-factor mod-
els for different portfolios and time periods
Time period Alpha rmt − rit SMBt HMLt WMLt R2
01/1998-04/2009
−0.16 0.93 ∗ ∗∗ −0.15∗ −0.05 −0.06 0.79
(−0.69) (16.64) (−1.92) (−0.67) (−1.11)
01/1998-08/2001
−0.10 1.05 ∗ ∗∗ −0.05 0.06 −0.07 0.68
Sustainability (−0.17) (6.71) (−0.38) (0.35) (−1.01)
leaders
09/2001-08/2005
0.33 1.04 ∗ ∗∗ −0.56 ∗ ∗∗ −0.38 ∗ ∗∗ 0.11 ∗ ∗ 0.87
(0.96) (16.98) (−4.63) (−3.35) (2.11)
09/2005-04/2009
−0.21 0.81 ∗ ∗∗ −0.02 0.10 −0.16∗ 0.90
(−0.76) (7.73) (−0.10) (0.59) (−1.88)
01/1998-04/2009
−0.18 0.96 ∗ ∗∗ −0.18 ∗ ∗ −0.02 −0.05 0.78
(−0.74) (16.77) (−2.34) (−0.29) (−0.91)
01/1998-08/2001
−0.06 1.07 ∗ ∗∗ −0.06 0.08 −0.07 0.67
MSCI sustain- (−0.09) (6.41) (−0.56) (0.45) (−1.00)
ability leaders
09/2001-08/2005
0.34 1.08 ∗ ∗∗ −0.64 ∗ ∗∗ −0.40 ∗ ∗∗ 0.13 ∗ ∗ 0.86
−0.94 (16.21) (−5.07) (−3.67) (2.11)
09/2005-04/2009
−0.24 0.85 ∗ ∗∗ −0.07 0.15 −0.14 0.9
(−0.78) (7.55) (−0.27) (0.92) (−1.67)
01/1998-04/2009
0.10 ∗ ∗ 0.99 ∗ ∗∗ −0.21 ∗ ∗∗ −0.02 −0.01 0.99
(2.01) (54.91) (−8.81) (−1.48) (−0.57)
01/1998-08/2001
0.36 ∗ ∗∗ 0.89 ∗ ∗∗ −0.27 ∗ ∗∗ −0.13 ∗ ∗∗ −0.01 0.99
Other MSCI (3.89) (21.24) (−15.20) (−4.51) (−0.72)
firms
09/2001-08/2005
0.02 0.99 ∗ ∗∗ −0.14 ∗ ∗∗ −0.03∗ −0.01 0.99
(0.40) (80.04) (−4.52) (−1.73) (−1.12)
09/2005-04/2009
−0.04 1.00 ∗ ∗∗ −0.11 ∗ ∗ −0.01 0.02 ∗ ∗ 1.00
(−0.58) (41.50) (−2.47) (−0.28) (2.11)
01/1998-04/2009
−0.28 −0.03 0.02 0.00 −0.05 −0.02
(−1.09) (−0.42) (0.29) (0.03) (−0.79)
01/1998-08/2001
−0.42 0.18 0.21∗ 0.22 −0.06 −0.01
Long-short: (−0.65) (1.02) (1.99) (1.13) (−0.93)
MSCI firms
09/2001-08/2005
0.32 0.09 −0.50 ∗ ∗∗ −0.37 ∗ ∗∗ 0.14 ∗ ∗ 0.35
(0.81) (1.30) (−3.42) (−3.07) (2.25)
09/2005-04/2009
−0.20 −0.15 0.04 0.16 −0.16∗ 0.11
(−0.57) (−1.12) (0.15) (0.81) (−1.78)
* (**, ***) means that the appropriate parameter is different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) significance level, respectively.
Values in () are the robust z-statistic.
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Table A4.9: Parameter estimates for the European stock market in four-factor
models for different portfolios and time periods
Time period Alpha rmt − rit SMBt HMLt WMLt R2
01/1998-04/2009
−0.11 0.81 ∗ ∗∗ −0.52 ∗ ∗∗ 0.01 −0.20 ∗ ∗ 0.77
(−0.36) (9.43) (−3.59) (0.06) (−2.31)
01/1998-08/2001
−0.13 0.48 ∗ ∗∗ −0.79 ∗ ∗∗ −0.38 ∗ ∗ −0.03 0.64
Sustainability (−0.19) (6.84) (−3.85) (−2.17) (−0.30)
leaders
09/2001-08/2005
−0.15 0.82 ∗ ∗∗ −0.65 ∗ ∗∗ −0.03 −0.10 0.77
(−0.30) (8.38) (−5.19) (−0.13) (−0.62)
09/2005-04/2009
0.30 0.94 ∗ ∗∗ −0.40 ∗ ∗ 0.36 −0.36 ∗ ∗ 0.91
(0.84) (12.81) (−2.34) (1.00) (−2.48)
01/1998-04/2009
−0.04 0.81 ∗ ∗∗ −0.50 ∗ ∗∗ −0.05 −0.17∗ 0.77
(−0.13) (9.68) (−3.40) (−0.38) (−1.93)
01/1998-08/2001
0.10 0.50 ∗ ∗∗ −0.70 ∗ ∗∗ −0.39 ∗ ∗∗ 0.03 0.66
MSCI sustain- (0.17) (8.00) (−3.25) (−2.85) (0.28)
ability leaders’
09/2001-08/2005
−0.02 0.78 ∗ ∗∗ −0.69 ∗ ∗∗ −0.08 −0.10 0.76
(−0.05) (8.07) (−5.14) (−0.37) (−0.62)
09/2005-04/2009
0.28 0.94 ∗ ∗∗ −0.42 ∗ ∗ 0.25 −0.36 ∗ ∗ 0.91
(0.80) (13.47) (−2.54) (0.68) (−2.54)
01/1998-04/2009
0.23 0.85 ∗ ∗∗ −0.44 ∗ ∗∗ 0.05 −0.11∗ 0.84
(0.93) (13.14) (−3.66) (0.51) (−1.66)
01/1998-08/2001
0.20 0.66 ∗ ∗∗ −0.44 ∗ ∗ −0.22 ∗ ∗ −0.11 0.83
Other MSCI (0.45) (13.18) (−2.59) (−2.08) (−1.42)
firms
09/2001-08/2005
0.39 0.80 ∗ ∗∗ −0.55 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00 −0.03 0.79
(0.89) (10.20) (−3.82) (0.01) (−0.26)
09/2005-04/2009
0.46 0.99 ∗ ∗∗ −0.65 ∗ ∗∗ 0.31 −0.09 0.92
(1.26) (10.26) (−4.86) (0.85) (−0.69)
01/1998-04/2009
−0.26 −0.04 −0.07 −0.10 −0.06 0.00
(−1.61) (−1.15) (−0.84) (−1.10) (−1.01)
01/1998-08/2001
−0.10 −0.16 ∗ ∗∗ −0.26 ∗ ∗ −0.17 0.14 0.05
Long-short: (−0.27) (−2.71) (−2.10) (−1.32) (1.45)
MSCI firms
09/2001-08/2005
−0.41 −0.03 −0.14 −0.08 −0.08 0.01
(−1.46) (−0.39) (−0.92) (−0.62) (−0.95)
09/2005-04/2009
−0.18 −0.05 0.23 ∗ ∗ −0.06 −0.26 ∗ ∗ 0.12
(−0.63) (−0.95) (2.17) (−0.16) (−2.18)
* (**, ***) means that the appropriate parameter is different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) significance level, respectively.
Values in () are the robust z-statistic.
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Table A4.10: Parameter estimates for the US stock market in four-factor
models for different portfolios and time periods, no financial firms
Time period Alpha rmt − rit SMBt HMLt WMLt R2
01/1998-04/2009
0.00 0.86 ∗ ∗∗ −0.17∗ −0.21 ∗ ∗∗ −0.05 0.74
(0.00) (13.24) (−1.76) (−2.98) (−0.92)
01/1998-08/2001
0.09 0.92 ∗ ∗∗ −0.03 −0.08 −0.09 0.61
Sustainability (0.13) (4.72) (−0.22) (−0.38) (−1.36)
leaders
09/2001-08/2005
0.33 1.14 ∗ ∗∗ −0.61 ∗ ∗∗ −0.48 ∗ ∗∗ 0.15∗ 0.87
(0.92) (19.95) (−4.96) (−4.49) (1.86)
09/2005-04/2009
−0.05 0.79 ∗ ∗∗ 0.06 −0.19 ∗ ∗ −0.06 0.89
(−0.19) (8.22) (0.30) (−2.11) (−0.68)
01/1998-04/2009
−0.02 0.89 ∗ ∗∗ −0.20 ∗ ∗ −0.19 ∗ ∗ −0.04 0.73
(−0.07) (13.48) (−2.20) (−2.58) (−0.71)
01/1998-08/2001
0.15 0.94 ∗ ∗∗ −0.05 −0.06 −0.09 0.60
MSCI sustain- (0.22) (4.55) (−0.35) (−0.27) (−1.37)
ability leaders’
09/2001-08/2005
0.33 1.20 ∗ ∗∗ −0.70 ∗ ∗∗ −0.51 ∗ ∗∗ 0.17∗ 0.85
(0.89) (18.92) (−5.32) (−4.80) (1.87)
09/2005-04/2009
−0.07 0.83 ∗ ∗∗ 0.03 −0.14 −0.03 0.89
(−0.25) (8.04) (0.12) (−1.58) (−0.35)
01/1998-04/2009
0.18 ∗ ∗∗ 0.95 ∗ ∗∗ −0.19 ∗ ∗∗ −0.16 ∗ ∗∗ −0.01 0.97
(2.83) (40.36) (−6.84) (−9.85) (−0.35)
01/1998-08/2001
0.48 ∗ ∗∗ 0.81 ∗ ∗∗ −0.23 ∗ ∗∗ −0.28 ∗ ∗∗ −0.03 0.97
Other MSCI (4.34) (21.11) (−7.57) (−8.56) (−1.68)
firms
09/2001-08/2005
0.04 0.98 ∗ ∗∗ −0.17 ∗ ∗∗ −0.05 −0.02 0.98
(0.50) (43.06) (−4.37) (−1.59) (−1.23)
09/2005-04/2009
0.02 0.99 ∗ ∗∗ −0.05 −0.22 ∗ ∗∗ 0.05 ∗ ∗∗ 0.99
(0.27) (31.92) (−0.90) (−4.35) (2.80)
01/1998-04/2009
−0.19 −0.05 −0.01 −0.04 −0.04 −0.02
(−0.73) (−0.79) (−0.17) (−0.48) (−0.64)
01/1998-08/2001
−0.32 0.13 0.18 0.22 −0.06 −0.04
Long-short: (−0.47) (0.65) (1.50) (1.00) (−1.01)
MSCI firms
09/2001-08/2005
0.29 0.22 ∗ ∗∗ −0.53 ∗ ∗∗ −0.46 ∗ ∗∗ 0.20 ∗ ∗ 0.31
(0.68) (3.23) (−3.26) (−3.70) (2.07)
09/2005-04/2009
−0.10 −0.16 0.08 0.08 −0.08 0.03
(−0.29) (−1.22) (0.30) (0.59) (−0.93)
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Table A4.11: Parameter estimates for the European stock market in four-
factor models for different portfolios and time periods, no financial firms
Time period Alpha rmt − rit SMBt HMLt WMLt R2
01/1998-04/2009
0.05 0.69 ∗ ∗∗ −0.46 ∗ ∗∗ −0.34 ∗ ∗ −0.10 0.67
(0.16) (6.56) (−2.74) (−2.50) (−1.00)
01/1998-08/2001
−0.10 0.33 ∗ ∗ −0.73 ∗ ∗∗ −0.75 ∗ ∗∗ 0.02 0.54
Sustainability (−0.13) (2.61) (−3.15) (−3.46) (0.11)
leaders
09/2001-08/2005
0.29 0.71 ∗ ∗∗ −0.47 ∗ ∗∗ −0.62 ∗ ∗∗ 0.04 0.69
(0.61) (7.13) (−3.43) (−3.78) (0.25)
09/2005-04/2009
0.44 0.91 ∗ ∗∗ −0.50 ∗ ∗∗ −0.09 −0.17 0.89
(1.34) (11.65) (−2.85) (−0.25) (−1.24)
01/1998-04/2009
0.13 0.70 ∗ ∗∗ −0.42 ∗ ∗ −0.44 ∗ ∗∗ −0.06 0.67
(0.44) (6.46) (−2.33) (−3.62) (−0.55)
01/1998-08/2001
0.10 0.35 ∗ ∗∗ −0.58 ∗ ∗ −0.79 ∗ ∗∗ 0.15 0.56
MSCI sustain- (0.16) (2.92) (−2.42) (−5.43) (0.87)
ability leaders
09/2001-08/2005
0.38 0.68 ∗ ∗∗ −0.52 ∗ ∗∗ −0.68 ∗ ∗∗ 0.04 0.67
(0.81) (7.03) (−3.82) (−3.84) (0.25)
09/2005-04/2009
0.45 0.90 ∗ ∗∗ −0.53 ∗ ∗∗ −0.11 −0.16 0.88
(1.38) (11.92) (−3.02) (−0.30) (−1.22)
01/1998-04/2009
0.29 0.79 ∗ ∗∗ −0.36 ∗ ∗∗ −0.07 −0.07 0.80
(1.17) (10.97) (−2.76) (−0.83) (−0.90)
01/1998-08/2001
0.24 0.61 ∗ ∗∗ −0.33∗ −0.32 ∗ ∗ −0.10 0.78
Other MSCI (0.56) (7.66) (−1.84) (−2.68) (−0.93)
firms
09/2001-08/2005
0.43 0.77 ∗ ∗∗ −0.45 ∗ ∗∗ −0.17 0.02 0.78
(1.08) (10.55) (−3.41) (−0.92) (0.20)
09/2005-04/2009
0.51 0.97 ∗ ∗∗ −0.66 ∗ ∗∗ 0.05 0.05 0.87
(1.21) (8.34) (−4.21) (0.10) (0.37)
01/1998-04/2009
−0.16 −0.08∗ −0.06 −0.37 ∗ ∗∗ 0.01 0.08
(−0.90) (−1.82) (−0.63) (−3.73) (0.14)
01/1998-08/2001
−0.14 −0.26 ∗ ∗∗ −0.25∗ −0.47 ∗ ∗∗ 0.25 0.16
Long-short: (−0.34) (−3.84) (−1.90) (−3.93) (1.66)
MSCI firms
09/2001-08/2005
−0.05 −0.09 −0.07 −0.51 ∗ ∗∗ 0.02 0.09
(−0.15) (−1.31) (−0.44) (−2.99) (0.26)
09/2005-04/2009
−0.06 −0.07 0.13 −0.16 −0.22∗ 0.06
(−0.20) (−1.12) (1.24) (−0.36) (−1.88)

Chapter 5
Strategic sustainability and
financial performance:
Exploring abnormal returns∗
Abstract
The ongoing empirical debate about whether SRI is associated, if anything,
with subpar or surpassing financial performance is characterized by a some-
what indistinct focus and the infeasibility of tapping the full potential of
existing models. By indistinct focus we mean an analysis based on an ag-
gregation of a myriad of SRI factors that potentially affect a firm’s financial
performance. The inability of taking full advantage of existing models is
reflected by the fact that studies with European data have not been able
to comprehensively account for systematic risk tilts. This paper presents a
portfolio analysis that overcomes these issues by analyzing a distinct selection
of small and innovative firms. We argue that both their strategic implemen-
tation of Corporate Social Responsibility and the general growth in Socially
Responsible Investments (SRI) lend themselves to an explanation for positive
abnormal returns of this portfolio. We account for the idiosyncratic invest-
∗This paper is joint work with Urs von Arx and Dragan Ilic´. It was published in a
special issue on sustainable finance in Journal of Business Economics (2013) 83:577–604
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ment style of SRI by introducing a comprehensive pan-European risk-adjusted
portfolio analysis based on the Carhart four-factor model. A novel propen-
sity score matching method in conjunction with the estimation of structural
models completes the conventional robustness checks in the literature.
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5.1 Introduction
Despite the recent economic crises, socially responsible investing (SRI) has
been strikingly resilient and not merely a caprice of prosperous economic
times. SRI describes an investment strategy that accounts for environmental,
social, and governance factors (ESG). Particularly in Europe, its expansion in
the last decade has been impressive: Whereas in 2002, the European Sustain-
able Investment Forum reported 34 Bio e invested in so-called core SRI, for
2009 the same organization documented investments of 1’200 Bio e (Eurosif,
2010, 2003). This reflects an annual growth rate of more than 66%. The Sus-
tainable Investment Forum for Germany, Austria, and Switzerland estimates
that from 2005 to 2009, SRI assets in mutual funds, mandates, and other fi-
nancial products have increased by roughly 29 percent per year (FNG, 2011).
In comparison, for the mature US market, the Forum for Sustainable and
Responsible Investment points out a 2.5% increase in total assets managed
under policies that incorporate ESG criteria from 2001-2010, from 2’010 Bio
to 2’512 Bio US Dollars. This stands in contrast to US data from 1993-2001,
when the same growth rate amounted to 43% (US-Sif, 2010). Even discount-
ing the fact that a fair amount of the worldwide growth is attributable to
bond investments and increasing asset coverage, it is fair to assume that in
Europe, SRI in equities has grown substantially in the last decade, highlight-
ing the economic importance for a systematic understanding of the financial
ramifications that SRI entails.
But how might SRI affect the financial performance of a firm? Although
conventional economic theory would roughly point to a negative association
(Friedman, 1970), recent and more pertinent descriptions of the phenomena
give reason to believe that there is something to be gained by SRI. Due to
its roots in principal-agent-theory, corporate governance is likely the most
established theoretical branch in this regard. The significance of corporate
governance in the context of shareholder and stakeholder value is discussed
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thoroughly by Tirole (2001). Although the concept of stakeholder value - a
concept which incorporates many ESG factors - fares worse than shareholder
value on many levels (such as fuzzy tasking), it has conceptual advantages
as well. Biased decision-making in presence of negative externalities, for in-
stance, makes for one of the unintentional consequences of shareholder value.
From a more technical perspective, SRI has been associated with a lack of
optimal portfolio diversification for investors. Any restriction to the mar-
ket portfolio is said to edge away from the efficient frontier. Yet Moskowitz
(1972) counters that markets might fail to price value-relevant ESG factors,
leading to higher abnormal returns for corresponding firms. In a seminal
paper, Merton (1987) presents an asymmetric information model in which in-
vestors overlook certain stocks. The smaller investor base is associated with
suboptimal risk sharing, yielding positive abnormal returns for the stocks in
question. In the next section, we take up this theoretical discussion; but ul-
timately, the question of whether SRI affects firm performance negatively or
positively remains an empirical one.
There is an established literature examining the empirical effect of SRI
on financial performance. Three methodologically distinct branches have
evolved: Regression analyses, event studies, and portfolio analyses. Formerly
a frequently used approach, simple regression analyses examine long-term ef-
fects of ESG factors on financial performance. They are, however, prone to
omitted variable bias and reverse causality. Ambec and Lanoie (2007) sum-
marize the results of nine such studies and conclude that there is limited
evidence for a relationship.
In contrast, event studies mitigate the aforementioned caveats by focusing
on a narrow time frame around an unexpected incident, say, an oil spill or
employment layoffs. This firm-specific announcement is assumed to force a
sudden reassessment of the firm’s value on the part of its investors. In cal-
culating abnormal returns within the specified time frame, significant market
reactions to the announcement can be deduced. Many studies indicate sub-
stantial impacts on firm value from such incidents (Hamilton, 1995; Dasgupta
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et al., 2001; Karpoff et al., 2005; Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 2010; Linn,
2010). Although causally instructive, it remains unclear whether the observed
market reactions have a lasting effect on firm value and why positive incidents
often fail to show an impact.
Portfolio analyses, on the other hand, rely on a classic finance model in
order to calculate a fund’s long-term performance. Based on the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM), the approach compares the abnormal returns of SRI
funds with appropriate benchmarks. Of the three research branches, portfolio
analyses currently constitute the most active one. Most studies gather data
from actively managed SRI funds (see for a comprehensive overview Derwall
et al., 2011). So far, the empirical results are somewhat mixed, but, at least
for the US, lean towards one direction. Hardly any of the studies indicate
that SRI results in significant underperformance of the corresponding funds.
Most studies cannot reject the assumption of equal performance. Indeed,
some studies suggest that SRI funds fare better than the market.
Although increasingly sophisticated, the current batch of portfolio analy-
ses reveals some drawbacks of its own. By arbitrarily lumping together SRI
funds that cater to different ESG priorities, specific ESG factors that are
linked to financial performance are bound to drown in the aggregate of a
myriad of non-relevant factors. In addition, the analysis of actively managed
funds might distort the effect of the specific ESG factors by virtue of the port-
folio managers’ skills, transaction costs, or in- and outflows of assets. Most
importantly, many studies disregard the risk tilts that are associated with the
idiosyncratic investment style of SRI. It has been repeatedly shown that the
risk factors introduced by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) ex-
plain substantial amounts of abnormal SRI fund returns (Bauer et al., 2005;
Derwall et al., 2005; Bauer et al., 2007). Neglecting these factors bears the
risk of false conclusions with respect to the effect of ESG factors on financial
performance.
As yet, there have only been comprehensive data on US risk factors, which
partly explains the heavy US focus of the literature. However, there are good
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reasons to extend the field of research to Europe. Whereas in the US, the SRI
market has evolved and expanded in the past decades and has settled some-
what by now, Europe is currently catching up (Bauer et al., 2005). Striking
growth rates support this view. We argue that these demand shifts might be
key in explaining abnormal financial performance. Europe and the US differ
in other relevant aspects as well. Cortez et al. (2012) stress that there are
geographical differences in the investment style of socially responsible funds.
Data on market interest in nonfinancial information are consistent with such
distinct priorities. Eccles et al. (2011b) show that US investors reveal a
pronounced interest in governance data, while European investors are dispro-
portionately keen on environmental data. This seems partly explainable by
the fundamental differences in jurisdictions and political agendas. Lundgren
and Olsson (2010) provide an example for different market reactions between
the US and Europe using an event study: In Europe, environmental incidents
are associated with a loss of value for the firm in question, while results are
not statistically significant for US firms. Last but not least, extending the fo-
cus to European data meets the unanimous advice for out-of-sample evidence
(Bauer et al., 2007; Derwall et al., 2005, 2011).
This paper investigates how a distinct selection of small European growth
SRI firms fares in comparison to the market. In doing so, our portfolio anal-
ysis follows up the existing branch of studies and contributes to the literature
by addressing the aforementioned problems along four dimensions.
First, we circumvent the distortion of an active portfolio management and
the problem of an indistinct focus of aggregated funds by analyzing specialized
firms selected by the sustainability research of the Zurich Cantonal Bank
(ZKB). These firms, mainly small growth stocks with a focus on strategic
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) innovation, constitute a ZKB internal
universe from which the portfolio managers can pick. We treat this pool as a
synthetic portfolio and compare it to the market.
In our second contribution, we introduce an exhaustive risk-adjusted port-
folio analysis with European data. Comprehensive pan-European risk factors,
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constructed by Schmidt et al. (2011), have enabled this application study and
account for the risk tilts that are rooted in the specific investment style of
our SRI portfolio.
Third, in addition to the established errors-in-expectations argument for
the explanation of positive abnormal returns, we discuss an overlooked struc-
tural argument based on rising demand in the SRI market. Finally, our results
prompted us to go one step further and check the robustness of our estimates
in new ways. Using a propensity score matching method, we match our port-
folio annually to all the firms in the market and construct control portfolios
with highly similar characteristics in terms of size, book-to-market value, and
momentum; key figures upon which the risk factors are based. In addition,
we account for country of origin and industry. To our knowledge, this method
has never been applied in a portfolio study in combination with asset pricing
models, introducing a novel technique to the existing literature.
We find a robust financial outperformance for the analyzed portfolio across
different scenarios. In terms of the Carhart four-factor model, the monthly
outperformance amounts to 1.3%. Although there is reason to believe that
some model misspecification is present due to the portfolio’s tilt towards small
and medium sized growth firms, the outperformance is reduced at most to
1% when adjusting for this issue. The rest of this paper is structured as
follows. The next section (5.2) discusses our hypothesis that addresses the
relationship between SRI and financial performance. In Section 5.3, we lay
out the methodology of the asset pricing models and the data that are used
for the hypothesis tests in Section 5.4.1 Robustness of the analysis is dealt
with in Section 5.5 using the matching method. Section 5.6 concludes.
1Some preliminary results of this paper were published in a leaflet of the Zurich Cantonal
Bank (2011).
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5.2 SRI and financial performance
This section presents two distinct arguments that explain why our SRI portfo-
lio might exhibit abnormal returns. First, the small growth firms distinguish
themselves strategically based on their innovative approach in tackling sus-
tainable solutions to societal problems. In contrast to conventional, more
universal CSR classifications, we argue that our portfolio rather fits the no-
tion of so-called strategic CSR. The relationship between generic SRIs and
financial performance has been studied widely. Newer evidence indicates that
this attention might have dispelled any errors in expectations by the market
(Bebchuk et al., 2013; Derwall et al., 2011). We are thus more likely to find
these mispricings in the specialized strategic CSR niche of our portfolio. The
second argument relates to the influence of the rapidly rising market share of
SRI on stock prices. Positive screening could lead to market disequilibrium
accompanied by positive abnormal returns. Although both arguments can be
characterized by market imperfections, they tackle the issue from different
angles. The reasoning gives rise to our hypothesis and testable implications,
which are the subject of the next sections.
Economists have traditionally been wary about the proposition that so-
cially benevolent investments are financially beneficial for firms. A prevailing
objection is the incompatibility with the objective of profit maximization,
claiming that diverting resources from this goal for CSR reasons is bound
to make a firm worse off (Friedman, 1970). Even if CSR were to have any
value-relevance, firms would have adopted it long ago. The premise is that if
market participants could act more efficiently by adjusting their actions, they
would do so by assumption. But evidently, not all choices are optimal in the
first place, for we observe how companies keep finding new ways to raise their
competitiveness by lowering costs and expanding market shares in innovative
ways. Though often associated with a constraint, there is reason to believe
that CSR can be used strategically to such ends as well. Recent economic
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frameworks suggest that there does exist a financial case for so-called strategic
CSR.
The seminal publications of McWilliams and Siegel (2001) and Baron
(2001), both of whom originally coined the term strategic CSR, stress the
role of product differentiation in this context. In line with the predictions of
strategic CSR, Siegel and Vitaliano (2007) show that firms selling experience
goods are more likely to engage in CSR for strategic reasons. Bagnoli and
Watts (2003) define CSR as the private provision of a public good and present
a model in which firms compete for socially responsible consumers. Besley and
Ghatak (2007) pick up on this definition and discuss potential advantages of
CSR as a provision of public goods. A prominent summary of the theoretical
strategic CSR literature has been brought forward by Porter and Kramer
(2006, 2011). They subsume the concept of strategic CSR and dub it shared
value, ”policies and operating practices that enhance the competitiveness of a
company while simultaneously advancing the economic and social conditions
in the communities in which it operates” (Porter and Kramer, 2011, p.67).In a
nutshell, shared value or strategic CSR is both beneficial for the firm and the
community it operates in. Strategic CSR involves a break from the commonly
defensive and naive application of CSR. According to Porter and Kramer, by
and large companies have made use of CSR as a preemptive or a mitigating
shield that protects them from potential accusations concerning their business
practice when, in reality, they should focus on the interdependence of business
and society. To this end, it is proposed that companies incorporate aspects
of CSR in a non-fragmented, targeted way as to establish a business strategy.
So instead of addressing every possible justifiable CSR concern, a company
should analyze its competitive landscape and its strengths and weaknesses
that overlap with specific CSR aspects. On this basis, it should employ
its comparative advantage to create a unique position that distinguishes it
from the rest of the market. In this sense, strategic CSR is in line with the
traditional economic argument of profit maximization as the firm’s objective.
To the casual observer, strategic CSR can be mistaken for generic CSR
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as they share the same toolbox. But instead of applying these tools loosely
at different market frontiers, strategic CSR integrates them into a coherent
business strategy. In order to differentiate between the generic and strategic
CSR, one needs to be both knowledgeable about a firm’s strategy as a whole
and the economic advantages that strategic CSR entails in that case. This is
no easy task, in particular because the concept has merely begun to take root.
Unlike generic CSR, strategic CSR cannot (yet) easily be extracted from ESG
data but requires skilled expertise, entailing considerable costs. In turn, these
costs put into perspective any financial market advantage resulting from such
research.
The incorporation of potentially value-relevant information from strategic
CSR is thus likely to take some time. This argument is supported by the fact
that recently, some CSR studies have failed to find the superior risk-adjusted
returns they used to. For example, Derwall et al. (2011) show that in the
United States the positive abnormal returns of firms with a high score in
employee relations as measured by Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD)
diminish over time.2 Derwall et al. argue that any errors in investors’ expecta-
tions regarding value-relevant information of CSR are bound to be temporary
as the market moves along its learning curve. Indeed, incorporation of CSR
information, not only in form of KLD scores, has become ubiquitous among
investors (Eccles et al., 2011b). Consequently, any value-relevant information
that generic CSR potentially used to proxy for would likely have been arbi-
traged by now, accounting for the disappearance of positive abnormal returns.
By the same token, formerly positive abnormal returns from good corporate
governance seem to have vanished. The widely cited governance-based invest-
ment strategy put forth by Gompers et al. (2003) and modified by Bebchuk
and Hamdani (2009) show how the US market apparently failed to correctly
price so-called ”entrenching” governance provisions in the 1990s. However,
the superior returns from holding firms with few such provisions (and short-
2In the empirical SRI literature, the KLD rating is an established proxy for the mea-
surement of various dimensions of CSR for a selection of firms.
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ing the ones with many) have disappeared. In a follow-up paper, Bebchuk
et al. (2013) show that during the 2000s any abnormal returns ceased to exist
with respect to good governance. Like Derwall et al. (2011), Bebchuk et al.
(2013) attribute this disappearance to a mispricing that has disappeared once
markets have learned how to price these provisions correctly. Bebchuk et al.
underpin this argument by showing that during the 1990s corporate gover-
nance was associated with fundamental firm differences in drivers of corporate
performance: Until the 2000s (stock) market analysts were more positively
surprised by the earnings announcements of well governed firms than by those
of poorly governed ones, producing positive abnormal returns in the amount
of 69 basis points from 1990-1999. The disappearance of abnormal returns in
2000-2008 coincided with increased attention to corporate governance by the
media and market participants. In both Derwall et al. and Bebchuk et al.,
markets have eventually adjusted to a pricing equilibrium; not instantly but
gradually over time.
To sum up the errors-in-expectations argument, given the present state of
ESG data, strategic CSR seems more difficult to identify than generic CSR.
On the other hand, economic theory suggests that strategic CSR potentially
harbors value-relevant information, information that the market might have
yet to incorporate.
In addition to investors’ errors in expectations, there is a complemen-
tary argument that can explain positive abnormal returns. Given plausible
assumptions, it turns out that rising demand in SRI can affect abnormal re-
turns. In empirical studies based on stock market data, an outperformance
could stem from two sources. Better than expected fundamentals of compa-
nies (and the ensuing stronger stock demand of investors) on the one hand,
and rising stock demand without changes in the companies’ cash flows on the
other hand. Both effects lead to higher stock prices.
Relating to the latter effect, particularly in Europe managed assets fol-
lowing SRI strategies have grown considerably in the last decade. It can be
argued that this growth itself has affected stock prices positively.
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Like any active investment strategy, SRI assumes that rational asset pric-
ing models do not capture all relevant factors. After all, it is the aim of these
strategies to outperform the market. Under rational asset pricing models,
investors should simply buy stocks according to their current market weights.
Some SRI investors, however, will deviate from current market weights of
stocks for financial reasons. They will overweight certain stocks if they ob-
serve attractive SRI features that proxy for overlooked value-relevance and
conversely will underweight stocks that they deem to be too expensive in
this regard. As a consequence, SRI investment will have an impact on stock
prices and investments of firms if demand and supply curves are not fully
elastic (Wall, 1995). This could happen if rational pricing models have not
captured all relevant factors or if not all market participants invest accord-
ingly. Following this argument, Petajisto (2009) puts forth a model in which
CAPM investors, active managers (such as SRI followers), and noise traders
can coexist in equilibrium. The effect of rising SRI demand is more pro-
nounced if the supply of stocks is less elastic. Stocks with a high market
capitalization enjoy higher analyst coverage and larger institutional owner-
ship. It is therefore plausible to assume that the supply of large capitalization
stocks is more elastic than the supply of small capitalization stocks. From
this perspective, our portfolio of small growth stocks portrays a pronounced
case of a relatively inelastic supply. Following this argument, rising demand
from SRI investors will affect stock prices of these companies all the more,
leading to a financial outperformance in form of positive abnormal returns.
There is a body of empirical papers which are consistent with this ar-
gument. They analyze SRI performance in the US, where growth in SRI
assets was particularly strong in the 1990s. In general, most of these studies
find that risk-adjusted SRI returns are comparable to those of conventional
benchmarks. There are some studies, though, which present a positive rela-
tion between certain CSR criteria and financial performance. Derwall et al.
(2005) show that a portfolio scoring high on eco-efficiency criteria outperforms
a portfolio of low scoring firms by 3.3% per year from 1995-2003. Kempf and
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Osthoff (2007b) find that a portfolio with high social responsibility ratings
from KLD outperforms a portfolio with low scores by up to 8.7% per year
over the period from 1992-2004. Eccles et al. (2011a) use a matched sample
of 180 companies and document that, from 1993-2010, a portfolio of high
sustainability companies reveals an annual abnormal performance of 4.8%
compared to a portfolio of low sustainability companies. And most recently,
Derwall et al. (2011) find that a portfolio of positively screened stocks, highly
rated on employee-relations, earned positive abnormal returns of 5.6% per
year from 1992-2002. The exponential growth of SRI assets in Europe in the
last decade coincides with our empirical time frame, which is indicative that
rising demand might have affected financial performance.
Taken together, we identify two channels through which positive abnormal
returns can emerge. Strategic CSR can contain value-relevant information,
which due to errors in investors’ expectations can lead to positive abnormal
returns in the respective stocks. Complementary, rising demand in SRI can
produce positive abnormal returns brought about by market frictions. These
two arguments motivate our hypothesis that particularly in times of rising de-
mand, small and strategic CSR stocks are positively associated with financial
performance, a hypothesis we empirically test for in the next sections.
5.3 Data and methodology
Innovation acts as one particular channel of strategic CSR. Product and pro-
cess innovation require foresight, assessments about future market dynamics,
and likely considerable investments in the present. The focus is not on short-
term profit maximization but on long-term growth, all features commonly
associated with sustainability. With this notion, the sustainability research
team of ZKB identifies small and middle capitalized firms offering innovative
products and services. We henceforth refer to this portfolio as ”innovators”.
These innovators emphasize sustainable solutions from a societal point of
view against the backdrop of climate change and the demographic trend of
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ageing. The firms can be allocated to the following six domains: renewable
energy, energy efficiency, mobility, natural resources, health, and education.
We conjecture that the innovators fit both the strategic CSR argument and
the rising demand argument.
Table A5.3 in the appendix reports the number of firms in the innovator
portfolio and the average annual market value compared to our entire uni-
verse of European firms. Apart from the years 2006 and 2007, the average
size of an innovator is roughly half the market value of the average European
firm included in the Thomson Reuters Datastream and Thomson Reuters
Worldscope database. The number of innovators increases from 16 firms in
2002 to 77 firms in 2009. The portfolio shows a distinct tilt towards the in-
dustrial sector in general and towards energy related industries in particular,
with the services sector playing only a minor role. According to the Inter-
national Classification Benchmark (ICB), Table A5.4 shows that about two
thirds of the 290 firms operate in the ”Oil & Gas” and ”Industrials” industry,
42 in utilities, 17 in the technology industry, and 16 in basic materials. This
highlights that the innovator portfolio is tilted towards certain industries. A
look at industry subsector levels in Table A5.5 reveals that roughly a third of
the innovators deals with renewable energy equipment, followed by clusters
geared towards industrial machinery, alternative electricity, alternative fuels,
and building materials and fixtures. Table A5.6 presents the distribution of
firm-year observations across the European countries. German firms consti-
tute roughly 60 percent of the portfolio. We address both sector and country
bias in our robustness checks in Section 5.
It is worth pointing out again that this selection of firms constitutes a
synthetic portfolio, and not an actively managed one. By virtue of this syn-
thetic construction, we avoid issues of performance distortions such as portfo-
lio manager skills or in- and outflows, which are generally unavoidable when
analyzing performances of (sustainability) funds.3
3Transaction costs such as commissions, bid/ask spreads, and market impact influence
fund performance as well. For that reason, transaction costs are often considered in the
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In the heyday of the CAPM, value weighting would have been the obvi-
ous answer to the question which weighting scheme to apply to our portfolio.
But ever since the empirical shortcomings of the CAPM became known, other
weighting schemes such as Bayesian approaches to estimation error, methods
of moment restrictions, portfolio constraints, optimal combinations of port-
folios, or equal weighting merit consideration as well. After evaluating 14
models in seven empirical datasets, (DeMiguel et al., 2009, p. 1948) come to
the conclusion that the equal weighting 1/N portfolio strategy (which they
dub ”naive diversification”) ”should serve at least as a first obvious bench-
mark”. In order to reduce the influence of idiosyncratic risk in combination
with firm heterogeneity in terms of size, we have therefore opted for the equal
weighting method as our base case for both the innovator and the control
portfolios.4
In order to assess how the innovators perform, we build a synthetic port-
folio. For the appraisal of the performance of both the innovator and the
control portfolios, which we construct in our robustness checks in Section 5,
we employ pan-European risk factors of the standard four-factor capital as-
set pricing model based on Carhart (1997) as control variables. These risk
factors have only recently been calculated by a group of researchers of the
Universities of Aarhus and Zurich and ETH of Zurich (Schmidt et al., 2011).5
Thomson Reuters Datastream and Thomson Reuters Worldscope are the un-
derlying databases for the calculation of these factors. The dataset consists
of 43’005 European firms for the period of 1980 to April 2009. Both static
practical implementation of theoretical investment strategies in synthetic portfolios. In
our case, the inclusion of transaction costs would somewhat reduce absolute and abnormal
returns, but only marginally as 82% of the firms remain in the synthetic portfolio until
2009. Therefore, this strategy would have a low turnover and negligible transaction costs.
4Calculations of value weighted portfolios tend to yield similar results and are available
from the authors upon request.
5By now, these factors also form part of the basis in the analysis of Mollet and Ziegler
(2012), who investigate the performance of firms with high market values in the US and
Europe.
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and dynamic screens as well as numerous other quality checks reduced the
number of firms available to 11’054 for the calculation of the market return,
9’462 for the calculation of the returns for size and value, and 10’035 for the
calculation of the momentum factor, respectively. All financial data were con-
verted into US dollars. For values before 2002, a fixed euro conversion rate
was applied. Other currencies were converted via the at that time current
exchange rate. The resulting database for the factors size, value, momentum,
and the market encompasses the period from January 1985 to April 2009.
Since its introduction, a wide range of empirical studies have shown that the
one-factor model based on the market model (Sharpe, 1964) and the CAPM
(Markowitz, 1952) describe the cross section of stock returns insufficiently.
In particular, small and value stocks reveal systematically diverging stock re-
turns which cannot be predicted by the market model. Based on the evidence
of these ”anomalies”, Fama and French (1993) advocate a three-factor model,
which, in addition to the excess return of the market, adds two factors that
proxy for size and value. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) add to this insight.
They show that stocks which have performed exceptionally well during the
last twelve months tend to continue doing so in the next few months. Carhart
(1997) incorporates this additional momentum factor into Fama and French’s
three-factor model. This four-factor model has proven to be better in terms
of explanatory power of cross sectional stock returns and is now the most
commonly used asset pricing model in financial economics.
rit − rft = αi + βi1(rmt − rft) + βi2SMBt + βi3HMLt + βi4WMLt + it (5.1)
Equation 5.1 formalizes the four-factor model. The excess return of a stock
is decomposed on the basis of the four aforementioned factors market, size
(SMB), value (HML), and momentum (WML). rit stands for the return of
a given stock portfolio in month t, rft is the return of the risk free asset (in our
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case, the euro 1-month libor rate), and rmt is the return of the pan-European
market. The return series for the factor SMBt is the difference between the
returns of portfolios consisting of stocks with low market capitalization and
portfolios consisting of stocks with high market capitalization. The return
series for HMLt is the difference between the returns of portfolios consisting
of stocks with a high book-to-market ratio and portfolios consisting of stocks
with a low book-to-market equity ratio. Finally, the return series for the
momentum factor WMLt is the return difference between a portfolio of past
winners and a portfolio of past losers. The application of the four-factor model
yields estimates for the coefficients βi1, βi2, βi3, βi4, and αi. The coefficients
βi1, βi2, βi3 and βi4 mirror the sensitivities of a given portfolio to the factors
market risk, size, value, and momentum, it stands for the error term, and αi
reflects the average periodical (positive or negative) abnormal performance
which cannot be explained by the four factors.
5.4 Results
The average monthly market return over the entire portfolio time span from
1/2002 to 4/2009 amounts to 0.30% (Table A5.7). This average return over
88 months is 0.01 percentage points below the yield of the risk free rate.
When partitioning the full time period into two equally long sub-periods,
we see that the dismal market performance is attributable to the second
sub-period covering 9/2005 to 4/2009. This sub-period captures the financial
crisis triggered in 2007 and yields an average monthly market return of -0.78%,
while the risk free rate manages to return 0.39%. On the other hand, in the
first sub-period between 1/2002 and 8/2005, the market generated monthly
returns of 1.37%, whereas the risk-free interest rate offered only 0.23%.
Focusing on the average monthly return of the innovators in Table A5.7,
we observe that the yield of 0.74% is substantially higher than the market
return and that this result is driven by the second sub-period, during which
the innovators fared much better than the market. The risk factors offer a
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more nuanced insight of this performance. WML indicates that winners from
the previous months by far outperform recent losers in all time periods: The
momentum strategy generates monthly returns exceeding 1% in all periods.
The returns of the SMB and HML strategy, 0.41% and 0.55% respectively,
are both explained by their strong performance in the first sub-period. In the
second sub-period, these strategies were barely profitable. These observations
are in line with the theoretical reasoning of SMB and HML. The second sub-
period largely covers an economic recession. During these harsh times, small
and value firms are said to perform worse. Small firms exhibit problems in
raising capital, and value firms find themselves unable to substantially lower
any running capital costs, something growth firms are apt to do. Unlike value
firms, growth firms can postpone investment expenditures as they are more
flexible. Table 5.1 reports the Carhart four-factor model regression results
for the full time period and the two sub-periods. Within a given estimation
window, the factor loadings are assumed to be fix even though they might
change as portfolio composition, risk perceptions, and demanded risk premia
are likely to vary through time. In this sense, the sub-periods serve as a rough
first robustness check in terms of temporal dependence. Below, we implement
a more sophisticated approach to this issue. In order to control for possible
distortions in the covariance of the estimates due to heteroskedasticity or
autocorrelation in the disturbance term, only robust heteroskedasticity- and
autocorrelation-consistent z-statistics according to Newey and West (1987)
are reported. In line with common practice (Greene, 2002), the error structure
is assumed to be possibly autocorrelated up to three lags.6
Table 5.1 shows the parameter estimates of the Carhart four-factor model.
The alpha of the equally weighted innovator portfolio is outperforming the
value weighted market monthly by 1.30%, a return which is significant at
the 5% level. In contrast to the descriptive analysis, this outperformance
cannot be clearly attributed to a particular sub-period. Because the market
6Current practice specifies the number of lags to be approximately the fourth root of
the number of time series observations.
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Table 5.1: Parameter estimates and Z-statistics in the four-factor model for
different time periods
α rmt – rit SMBt HMLt WMLt R
2
01/2002-04/2009
1.30** 1.51*** 0.35 -1.16** -0.07 0.61
(2.14) (10.94) (1.18) (-2.37) (-0.30)
01/2002- 08/2005
1.25 1.32*** 0.71** -1.48** -0.26 0.45
(1.14) (4.60) (2.04) (-2.12) (-0.75)
09/2005-04/2009
1.54 1.54*** 0.22 0.59 0.15 0.74
(1.66) (9.01) (0.66) (0.60) (0.56)
* (**, ***) means that the parameter is different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) signifi-
cance level, respectively. The parenthesis below the point estimates contain the z-statistic,
corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to three lags.
beta is always larger than one, the innovator portfolio is magnifying market
movements and is therefore exposed to a higher systematic risk.
The significant and positive SMB loading in the first period highlights
that the innovator portfolio performs well due to its tilt towards small stocks.
On the other hand, the HML factor captures a significant negative loading
variation of the innovator portfolio return in the full time period. This is
attributable to the first sub-period because the point estimate of the HML
loading in the second sub-period is low and not significant. Recall that Ta-
ble A5.7 indicates that value firms outperform growth firms during the first
sub-period, driving the outperformance over the full time span. The innovator
portfolio mainly consists of small growth companies and exhibits a significant
exposure to the risk factors SMB and HML. The outperformance of small
cap stocks in the first sub-period therefore added to the absolute return of
the portfolio. The strong tilt towards growth stocks on the other hand re-
duced the absolute performance in first sub-period when value stocks had
a good run. But the outperformance of the innovator portfolio in compar-
ison to the European market - as displayed by the statistically significant
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alpha of 1.30% per month - was achieved more or less continuously over the
whole observation period. As we will see in the following section, the growth
character of the innovator portfolio is also supported when comparing the
book-to-market-equity ratios in Table A5.10.
The two sub-periods offer only a limited glimpse into the intertemporal
changes in portfolio composition, risk perceptions, and demanded risk pre-
mia. Figure 5.1 gives a more differentiated view by plotting the coefficients
of the four-factor model and their 95% confidence intervals for a moving win-
dow regression. The method uses the estimation technique from Table 5.1
and applies it to a rolling regression time window of 36 months. This win-
dow selection translates into 30 degrees of freedom in the model estimation.
The first regression window covers 1/2002 to 12/2004. Its coefficients and
confidence intervals are plotted at the end of this range. Subsequently, the
plots are updated by moving the time window forward monthly.7 This tech-
nique has the advantage of not relying on disjoint and arbitrary time periods
and allows for flexibility and structural interruptions in the estimates. The
rolling regression plot for the alpha illustrates that the point estimates of the
intercept of the innovator portfolio remain positive throughout the observed
time window. The previous analysis of the two sub-periods revealed that the
positive alpha is not driven by either time window. The rolling regressions are
in line with this view, lending credibility to the robustness of the estimates.8
The results support our hypothesis. The portfolio of small growth firms
with a strategic CSR implementation realizes a systematic stock market out-
7Due to different time windows, the graphical representation of the four-factor model
in Figure 5.1 is not directly comparable with the results in Table 5.1 .
8As an additional robustness check, we estimated the four-factor model with the both
the market return and the risk factors computed on the basis of equally weighted returns.
The results did not change. The aim of the matching specification is to improve the
balance between the innovator firms and the control firms with respect to the variables
assumed to be of relevance. We tried different combinations and transformations of the firm
characteristics SIZE, BEME, and MOM and identified the specification (2) as delivering
the most balanced samples in our favored matching scenario.
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performance during 2002-2009. In terms of the hypothesis, this outperfor-
mance might be attributable to overlooked but value-relevant strategic CSR
characteristics of these firms and to positive stock price effects resulting from
a rapidly growing SRI demand. Due to the size of its stocks, the portfolio
is especially prone to such stock price effects because stock price elasticity is
likely positively related to firm size. However, there remains a methodolog-
ical caveat associated with the findings. The results might not be reliable if
an inappropriate model was applied to describe equilibrium asset prices. To
clear up doubt on the reliability of the results, in the next section we evaluate
the performance of the innovator portfolio compared to similar benchmark
portfolios.
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5.5 Robustness checks
5.5.1 A matching approach
Market efficiency can only be tested jointly with some equilibrium model, in
this case an asset pricing model. Therefore, one might argue that the inter-
pretation of anomalous evidence is ambiguous, because the hypothesis of zero
abnormal returns is tested jointly with the hypothesis that the asset pricing
model used to estimate abnormal returns is valid (e.g. Fama, 1970, 1991).
This so-called joint hypothesis problem is well known in the literature. It im-
plies that if the used asset pricing model provides an imperfect description of
expected returns, the estimated intercept (alpha) represents the combined ef-
fects of model misspecification and mispricing. Indeed, the Fama and French
(1993) three-factor asset pricing model exhibits difficulties in explaining the
average stock return of small firms and firms with high book-to-market ra-
tios (e.g. Barber and Lyon, 1997). In particular, Fama (1998) is concerned
with bad model problems when considering equal weighted portfolios because
all common asset pricing models have systematic problems in explaining the
average returns of small stocks. The joint hypothesis problem thus seems to
be of eminent interest when equal weighted stock returns of small to middle
sized growth firms are analyzed. This motivates further robustness checks in
our case.
Lyon et al. (1999) demonstrate that the three-factor model is misspeci-
fied for samples of non-randomly selected firms. They recommend comparing
sample firms to the general population based on size (SIZE) and book-to-
market equity ratios (BEME) as well as on the pre-event return performance
and other characteristics. Likewise, Barber and Lyon (1997) favor this con-
trol firm approach when comparing different buy-and-hold abnormal return
methods to evaluate long-run abnormal returns in event studies.
In order to investigate if the results in Section 4 are driven by bad model
problems, we investigate whether we find similar anomalous evidence in port-
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folios with similar characteristics as the innovator portfolio. For one, the
innovator portfolio is biased in SIZE and BEME. It also reveals substan-
tial country- and industry-specific expositions. One might argue that some
of these extreme portfolio characteristics produce extrapolation bias or that
the linearly specified Carhart four-factor model might not be well specified
to explain the returns of this portfolio. Ho et al. (2007) illustrate that model
dependence in general can be reduced by combining the estimation of struc-
tural equation models with data preprocessing by matching treatment and
control groups. The central idea of this approach is that if exact matching
is not feasible, common parametric procedures can potentially improve in-
ference even after matching because of variation in the covariates. In this
vein, we compare the asset pricing model estimates of the innovator portfolio
to synthetic reference portfolios with similar characteristics. If these control
portfolios exhibit similar abnormal returns in comparison to the innovator
portfolio, we have evidence that the Carhart four-factor model might indeed
suffer from misspecification for this portfolio type.
Portfolio matching methods have been applied previously in the literature.
Mitchell and Stafford (2000), for example, consider SIZE and BEME in the
construction of reference portfolios on the basis of specific portfolio assign-
ments. In contrast to their approach we construct reference portfolios not
by traditional matching methods but by matching the innovators to all Euro-
pean firms in the market based on a propensity score. Conventional matching
approaches notoriously have difficulties in simultaneously matching multiple
dimensions. Their sequential approach - such as prescreening based on SIZE,
followed by a nearest BEME matching - implies that optimizing matching
quality in one dimension usually comes at the cost of deteriorating matching
quality in other dimensions. In contrast, propensity score matching (PSM)
reduces a multi-dimensional problem to one single score, the propensity score
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
Li and Zhao (2006) use PSM to identify similar firms based on size,
BEME, and momentum. In studying the event-time buy-and-hold abnormal
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return approach of firms with primary seasoned equity offerings, Li and Zhao
compare the mean and median returns of the event and the matched control
firm portfolios, albeit without estimating any parametrical model. They find
that the PSM method delivers better results than the conventional match-
ing methods applied by Lyon et al. (1999), explaining away partially the
anomalous behavior of small issuers. They also find that adding additional
variables in the propensity score specification estimation has only marginal
effects. In other settings, PSM has been applied by Aggarwal et al. (2009)
to compare the governance of US and non-US firms and by Drucker and Puri
(2005) to investigate the benefits of concurrent lending and underwriting. To
our knowledge, PSM has yet to be applied in conjunction with asset pricing
models to evaluate abnormal returns. We take up on the argument of Ho
et al. (2007) and combine PSM with a structural model in order to check for
model dependence.
In the estimation of the propensity score variables affecting the dependent
and the treatment variable should be included, termed ”minimum relevant
information set” by Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004). On this note,
following Li and Zhao (2006) we use firm level SIZE, BEME, and 11-month
pre-matching momentum (MOM) for a 1-to-1 nearest neighbor propensity
score matching. We argue that using a PSM, we can construct an appropriate
evaluation benchmark to reappraise the robustness of our results.
If a firm is identified by the ZKB research team as an innovator in year γ,
the firm is retained in the innovator portfolio in the year γ + 1. This implies
that the innovator portfolio is sorted in December of year γ and its holding
period is γ + 1.
Λ(xτ , β) = Prob(Innovator = yes|xt) (5.2)
x
′
τ = SIZEτ , log(SIZEτ ), log(SIZEτ )
2, log(SIZEτ )
3, (5.3)
BEMEτ ,MOMτ
Each December, we estimate equation 5.2 with a logistic regression. If
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linear covariates in the propensity score estimation are not producing good
matching quality, higher order terms or interaction terms should be added
according to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Starting with linear covariates,
we added transformations of the SIZE variable to obtain better balance on
this dimension, tried different other specifications, and concluded that the
predictor variables in vector xτ of equation 5.3 deliver the best balance as
measured by mean and median differences for pooled PSM over all years.9
The index τ is a monthly indicator and fixed to December of each year in
equation 5.3. SIZEτ is the market value in million USD, the book-to-market
ratio BEMEτ is the ratio of common equity to the market value of equity,
and MOMτ is the geometric average of the monthly returns over a window
of 11 months from t − 12 to t − 2.10 Based on the vector xτ , the proba-
bility of being an innovator firm is predicted for the general population of
European firms. For the matching procedure, we adhere to the guidelines
provided by Guo and Fraser (2009) and use the predicted probability p to
define logit = log(1−p
p
) as the propensity score. In turn, this score is used
for a 1-to-1 matching without replacement in descending order with a caliper
of one-fourth of the standard deviation of the annual propensity scores to
ensure a certain level of common support. The matching procedure is done
using the Stata package psmatch2 from Leuven and Sianesi (2003). Nearest
neighborhood matching is executed separately every year. In the base case
scenario the nearest matches are restricted to the same countries because
our result might have been confounded by the overrepresentation of German
firms in our sample.11 Due to this country restriction and the used caliper,
9The aim of the matching specification is to improve the balance between the innovator
firms and the control firms with respect to the variables assumed to be of relevance. We
tried different combinations and transformations of the firm characteristics SIZE, BEME,
and MOM and identified the specification 5.3 as delivering the most balanced samples in
our favored matching scenario.
10Per common practice, common equity is required to be greater. In addition, we added
investment tax credits to common equity.
11The Thomson Reuters Datastream Variable ’GEOGN’ was used as the country iden-
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innovator firms are being dropped in a specific year if no other firm within
the same country has a sufficiently close propensity score. Control firms con-
stitute firms in the market with monthly return values in the sorting year
and with plausible available values of SIZE and BEME in December of the
sorting year.12 Because the control firm portfolio is held in the months after
December of the sorting year, potential control firms need to remain in the
market for the entire year after the sorting year. In addition to the country
base case we construct two alternative control firm portfolios by restricting
the nearest neighborhood PSM to the same industry and (in the most re-
strictive scenario) to both the same country and industry. The last matching
scenario requires exact matching in two dimensions and inflates the number
of cells considered. It consequently reduces the number of firms in each cell.
Because of the caliper, this results in reduced sample sizes. Whereas our
original sample contains 290 firm-observations, the exact country restriction
and the exact industry restriction yield 237 and 236 firm-observations, re-
spectively. The most restrictive exact country and industry match leaves us
with 199 firm-observations.
Additionally, similar to Mitchell and Stafford (2000) we apply resampling
procedures to derive the expected abnormal performance of the innovators
given their sample composition. We still identify similar firms by PSM but
now match, in each year, the ten most similar firms to every innovator firm.
From this pool of control firms we draw 1’000 calendar-time portfolio samples
and estimate the expected intercept from these random samples by sampling
in each draw (with replacement) 30 control firms in every year. Based on these
draws we also estimate the expected intercept of portfolios of innovators that
are most similar to the sampled control firms. Applying different matching
scenarios, we estimate alpha distributions conditional on differently composed
sample compositions. First we use PSM based on the characteristics SIZE,
tifier.
12Book equity is the sum of common equity and investment tax credit and is restricted
not to be negative. In addition, we rely on the filters applied in Schmidt et al. (2011).
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BEME, and MOM . We then restrict the ten nearest neighbor PSM to the
same country and, in addition, to the same industry. Finally, we require an
exact country and industry match. In this last matching specification we have
to weaken the matching specifications in order to obtain a sufficient sample
size by matching only the five nearest neighbors and by dropping the caliper.
The resampling approach is of interest because there might not be one specific
firm that serves as the definite control firm. Moreover, the considered time
period of eight years is not very long but quite turbulent, making it more
difficult to find significant results. Therefore, the inspection and comparison
of the alpha distribution of resampled control and innovator portfolios might
provide additional insight.
5.5.2 Results with control firms
Table A5.8 reports the number of firm-years in the innovator portfolio and the
generated portfolio of control firms across different industries for the coun-
try match, our base case scenario. Among the industries, ”Oil & Gas” and
”Industrials” continue covering the major part of firm-years in the innovator
portfolio. In contrast, the control firm portfolio reveals a tilt towards ”Finan-
cials”. Table A5.9 verifies the effectiveness of the exact country match. In
Tables A5.10, A5.11, and A5.12, the portfolio characteristics SIZE, BEME,
and MOM of the innovator (I), control (C), and market (M) portfolios are
juxtaposed. The means and medians of these portfolio characteristics offer
a rough picture of the balance improvement achieved by the matching. Ta-
ble A5.10 lists annual means and Table A5.11 reports annual medians for
the three portfolios and the identified portfolio characteristics. On an an-
nual basis, these tables confirm that the characteristics SIZE, BEME, and
MOM are more similar between the innovator and the control firm portfolio
than between the innovator and the market portfolio. These properties are
summarized in Table A5.12. From 2001 to 2008, the mean absolute difference
between the control and innovator portfolio on the one hand and the market
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and innovator portfolio on the other hand shows a tenfold reduction in the
control portfolio for the characteristic SIZE and a threefold reduction for
BEME and MOM in comparison to the market. These absolute differences
are averaged across all the years for the annual means and medians of the
three characteristics. The absolute mean differences of the medians tell a
similar story. The differences in SIZE, BEME, and MOM are two to seven
times smaller for the control firm portfolio than for the market portfolio. The
control firm portfolio thus appears to be a more appropriate benchmark for
the innovator portfolio. The average monthly return of the market and the
risk-free rate in Table A5.13 are taken from Table A5.6. The reduction in the
innovator firm-years reduces the average return of the innovator portfolio for
the overall period by 0.27% points from 0.74% to 0.47%. This is traceable
to the lower return in the first sub-period because the data preprocessing
produced a marginal higher innovator return in the second sub-period. The
average return of the control firm portfolio for the overall period was a mod-
est 0.21%. The control firm portfolio has achieved a high return in the first
sub-period, but this was offset by a large negative return of 1.13% in the sec-
ond sub-period. Table A5.14 presents the regression results for the Carhart
four-factor model for both the innovator and the control firm portfolio. The
alpha of the innovator portfolio, which is now reduced in terms of sample
size, is significant and 1.34% for the entire time period. Although positive,
the according point estimates for the sub-periods are not statistically differ-
ent from zero. In contrast, the portfolio of control firms never exhibits an
alpha different from zero at conventional significance levels. Interestingly,
the control firm portfolio mimics market movements more closely than the
innovator portfolio with a market beta close to one in all time periods. This
holds also true for all the following control firm matching specifications. The
parameter estimates of the four-factor model with control firms derived by
exact industry matching are shown in Table A5.15. Compared to the country
restriction, the industry restriction yields a slightly different sample of inno-
vator firms. However, the alpha for the entire time span remains significant
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at 1.37%. Even though none of the alphas of the control firms are statistically
different from zero, it should be noted that the point estimates are always
positive. What is more, the z-statistic for the overall period proves to be
the highest among all the control firm scenarios. This suggests the presence
of a certain positive industry effect. The results therefore suggest that the
sustainability research team of the ZKB managed to identify outperforming
companies within booming industries. In a last robustness check using one-
to-one nearest neighbor PSM, we match both by country and industry. The
results depicted in Table A5.16 back up the outperformance of the innovator
portfolio. The reduction of the innovator alpha to 1.05% and the upward
shift of the significance level to 10% can be explained by the substantial re-
duction of the sample through the caliper matching. In this scenario as well,
the alphas of the control firm portfolio are not significant. Finally, Table 5.2
presents the alpha distribution of 1’000 resampled control and innovator port-
folios based on the Carhart four-factor model. The parameter values indicate
that the alpha distributions are very symmetric. The resampling shows that
the 5% percentile of the control portfolio is always negative while the same
percentile for the innovator portfolio is always substantially above zero for
the innovators. Therefore, 90% of the alphas as enclosed by the 5% and 95%
percentiles are substantially above zero for the innovators in each matching
scenario while the same distributions for the control firm portfolio include
zero. If the asset pricing model we are using were a perfect description of
expected returns for the analyzed portfolios, we would expect a mean of zero
for the alpha of the control portfolios. However, these means turn out to be
positive with a monthly outperformance ranging between 0.16% and 0.31%.
This indicates that our alpha estimate for the innovator portfolio should be
corrected downwards. We conclude that the returns of our equally weighted
innovator portfolio outperformed the market from 1/2002 to 4/2009 by at
least around 1% monthly. To sum up, despite the stringent country and in-
dustry matchings, the performance of the innovator portfolio remains robust
in all scenarios, providing additional support for our hypothesis.
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Table 5.2: Alpha (α) distribution of random samples of innovator and control
firms for the period 01/2002-04/2009
α
Matching Characteristics Portfoliotype mean p5 p50 p95
Size, BEME, MOM
Innovators 1.42 0.79 1.42 2.06
Control Firms 0.16 -0.44 0.17 0.79
Size, BEME, MOM, Country
Innovators 1.47 0.83 1.49 2.07
Control Firms 0.29 -0.31 0.29 0.92
Size, BEME, MOM, Sector
Innovators 1.49 0.88 1.50 2.1
Control Firms 0.31 -0.33 0.31 0.99
Size, BEME, MOM, Country, Sector
Innovators 0.99 0.42 0.99 1.53
Control Firms 0.23 -0.39 0.23 0.84
p5, p50, and p95 are the 5%, 50%, and 95% percentiles, respectively
5.6 Conclusion
There are no established characteristics that divide firms into an SRI class,
let alone a class that reflects a distinct strategic sustainability concept. In-
stead, many studies apply indices that are specifically built to arrange such a
categorization. It stands to reason that within such indices, elaborate as they
are, specific performance-driving effects of SRI might get lost in aggregation.
In other words, the validity of conclusions with respect to SRI and financial
performance hinges on the construction of the SRI class. Our basket of inno-
vators reflects the specific notion of strategic CSR and therefore circumvents
this issue. In addition, the synthetic portfolio offers a glimpse at a portfolio
selection stage that is not distorted by active portfolio management skills.
The case for positive abnormal returns of this portfolio is given by a
hypothesis that rests upon two channels. On the one hand, value-relevant
information of strategic CSR may not have been priced in by the market.
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On the other hand, market disequilibrium caused by rising demand for SRI
assets might have produced positive returns via stock price effects. To test
the hypothesis of positive abnormal returns, we conduct a portfolio analysis
based on a novel comprehensive dataset with pan-European Carhart risk fac-
tors. This accounts for the well-known systematic risks in SRI portfolios and
eschews mistaken attributions of observed out- or underperformance. The
results of the portfolio analysis strongly support the hypothesis of financial
outperformance with a stable alpha of 1.30% per month.
Even so, one might argue that the financial performance driver might
be confounded by bad model problems due to firm characteristics. To miti-
gate this possibility, we construct synthetic benchmark portfolios with similar
control firms, additionally accounting for country and industry clusters. The
matched portfolios underpin the significant financial outperformance of the
innovators. A final prudent resampling approach yields a more conservative
innovators alpha of roughly 1%. In other words, none of the robustness checks
qualify the general results.
It is instructive to discuss the implications of both arguments of the hy-
pothesis. Most CSR research has focused on easily quantifiable CSR charac-
teristics for large firms. By now, potentially value-relevant factors embedded
within or proxied by these characteristics can be extracted systematically
and with reasonable costs thanks to the surge of CSR databases. In contrast,
CSR features that need to be processed more comprehensively on a case to
case basis, such as strategies, demand skilled expertise and come at a cost,
in particular when the focus is on small firms. One can argue that if there
is something value-relevant to be found, it is more likely to happen in areas
which are tougher to decipher. So any financial outperformance that lures in
these niches has to make up for the research costs that are associated with
this task. This suggests that one might keep encountering financial outper-
formance in market niches that are new and unfamiliar. On that notion, our
results suggest that strategic CSR for small and innovative firms seems to
evoke a market anomaly in terms of systematic outperformance that has yet
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to be priced in by the market.
The mere growth of SRI assets as the second argument draws attention
to an overlooked dynamic in the existing CSR literature. Whenever investors
deviate from market weights, the ensuing rising demand can temporarily give
rise to abnormal returns due to stock market frictions. We present empirical
evidence to support this argument for Europe in the last decade. With an
increasingly saturated SRI market in the US, the ongoing SRI expansion in
Europe lends itself to be a more fertile ground for positive abnormal returns,
particularly with respect to small stocks. By and large, existing SRI research
has focused on big stocks. However, ever since Merton (1987), there is a
theoretical case for small stocks, and given our results, it seems worthwhile
to engage in future research with European SRI data to raise more evidence.
Notably for our portfolio, policy regulations could amplify abnormal returns.
For example, the extensive subsidies for renewable energies in Germany could
have distorted the allocation of SRI assets.
Our results are of high practical importance for both investors and a
firm’s management. At first glance, it seems that investing in small and
innovative firms that focus on strategic sustainability kills two birds with one
stone. Socially responsible investing in strategic CSR can be quite lucrative,
at least on the revenue side. But this comes at a cost. On the expenditure
side, research costs have to be taken into account, costs that are likely to
be associated with expertise that gradually builds up over time. For the
management, our results may serve as important advice. If value-relevant
information is disclosed more transparently, the firm is more attractive to the
market. It falls to the management how this can be conveyed credibly.
It would be revealing to disentangle the two channels. In our case, a
longer time horizon might allow for a distinction of the two effects if we
were to observe how differently, if at all, the abnormal behavior evolves in
the long run. A convergence of future abnormal returns towards zero would
make for a case of errors of investors’ expectations. On the other hand, if
abnormal returns eventually turn negative, it would suggest that equilibrium
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in the SRI investor share has been reached. Finally, if both abnormal and
absolute returns turn negative, we might observe a shrinking proportion of
SRI investors. One might label this situation as the burst of a financial SRI
bubble. Given the magnitude of our results, the two channels might well be
simultaneously at work. If anything, our data is only weakly indicative in
the sense that the lack of an observable negative trend of the alpha point
estimates in the rolling regression does not suggest a decreasing effect of SRI
growth. Analyzing according US data from the past two decades in light of
the slowing growth of SRI assets could shed more light on this question.
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5.7 Tables and figures
Table A5.3: No. of Innovators and market values
Average Market Value (Mio USD)
Year No. of Firms Innovators European Firms
2002 16 332 997
2003 17 595 1299
2004 13 396 1608
2005 17 777 1648
2006 30 1178 2074
2007 45 2288 2364
2008 75 645 1185
2009 77 875 1183
Table A5.4: No. of Innovators across industries
Industries No. of Firms
Basic Materials 16
Consumer Goods 6
Consumer Services 1
Financials 12
Healthcare 3
Industrials 80
Oil & Gas 113
Technology 17
Utilities 42
Total 290
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Table A5.5: No. of Innovators across subsectors
Subsectors No. of Firms
Alt. Electricity 32
Alternative Fuels 16
Auto Parts 4
Banks 8
Building Mat.& Fix. 15
Con. Electricity 7
Containers & Package 4
Dur. Household Prod. 4
Electrical Equipment 3
Electronic Equipment 3
Financial Admin. 7
Forestry 9
Healthcare Providers 2
Hotels 1
Industrial Machinery 31
Industrial Suppliers 1
Investment Services 4
Marine Transportation 1
Medical Equipment 1
Oil Equip. & Services 2
Renewable Energy Eq. 100
Semiconductors 4
Software 1
Specialty Chemicals 7
Telecom. Equipment 12
Waste, Disposal Svs. 8
Water 3
Total 290
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Table A5.6: No. of innovators across countries
Countries No. of Firms
Denmark 9
Finland 4
France 9
Germany 175
Greece 2
Italy 2
Netherlands 2
Norway 11
Spain 14
Sweden 2
Switzerland 26
United Kingdom 34
Total 290
Table A5.7: Average monthly returns over time in %
rmt rft Innovatorst SMBt HMLt WMLt
1/2002 - 4/2009
0.3 0.31 0.74 0.41 0.55 1.12
(0.59) (0.01) (1.06) (0.24) (0.15) -0.45
1/2002 - 8/2005
1.37 0.23 1.4 0.8 1.05 1.08
(0.67) (0.00) (1.38) (0.31) (0.24) -0.68
9/2005 - 4/2009
-0.78 0.39 0.08 0.03 0.05 1.16
(0.95) (0.02) (1.63) (0.37) (0.14) -0.59
Average geometric returns are displayed and standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
Value weighted returns are presented for the market return rmt and the factors SMB,
HML, and WML. Equally weighted returns are displayed for the Innovator portfolio. rft
is the risk-free rate.
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Table A5.8: No. of innovators and control firms across countries (country
matched)
Industries No. of Innovators No. of Control Firms
Denmark 9 9
Finland 4 4
France 6 6
Germany 140 140
Italy 1 1
Netherlands 2 2
Norway 10 10
Spain 13 13
Sweden 2 2
Switzerland 23 23
United Kingdom 27 27
Total 237 237
Table A5.9: No. of innovators and control firms across industries (country
matched)
Industries No. of Innovators No. of Control Firms
Basic Materials 13 15
Consumer Goods 4 26
Consumer Services 1 35
Financials 10 50
Healthcare 3 16
Industrials 68 53
Oil & Gas 88 6
Technology 16 28
Telecommunications 0 4
Utilities 34 4
Total 237 237
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Table A5.10: Annual means of innovator (I), control (C), and market (M)
portfolio characteristics
Year
SIZE BEME MOM No. of Firms
I C M I C M I C M I C M
2002 859 917 1359 0.20 0.21 1.03 -5.81 -4.68 -3.69 10 10 4557
2003 471 526 1285 1.07 1.41 1.20 -6.29 -6.14 -1.37 14 14 4338
2004 285 123 1660 0.93 0.89 0.92 2.06 2.22 2.91 13 13 4235
2005 642 401 2103 0.76 0.59 0.81 1.74 2.70 1.69 15 15 4222
2006 693 597 2221 0.41 0.32 0.71 5.00 4.95 1.79 25 25 4257
2007 1220 1223 2702 0.40 0.42 0.68 1.70 1.24 1.94 31 31 4530
2008 2127 1854 3178 0.41 0.50 0.78 3.42 4.41 1.80 58 58 4343
2009 648 573 1451 1.25 1.41 1.96 -5.14 -5.28 -4.87 71 71 4556
The month December is used to calculate the means. Size stands for the market value of a firm and is
denominated in Mio USD.
Table A5.11: Annual medians of innovator (I), control (C), and market (M)
portfolio characteristics
Year
SIZE BEME MOM No. of Firms
I C M I C M I C M I C M
2002 460 465 75 0.14 0.18 0.68 -6.01 -4.34 -2.01 10 10 4557
2003 76 59 73 0.76 0.62 0.81 -7.50 -3.2 -0.30 14 14 4338
2004 78 66 107 0.76 0.79 0.64 1.83 1.99 2.77 13 13 4235
2005 126 91 140 0.53 0.48 0.57 1.69 2.80 1.82 15 15 4222
2006 244 234 146 0.26 0.28 0.47 4.96 4.31 1.75 25 25 4257
2007 345 339 177 0.29 0.38 0.45 2.01 1.89 2.00 31 31 4530
2008 545 610 204 0.25 0.38 0.46 4.23 3.84 1.76 58 58 4343
2009 190 201 76 0.64 0.78 1.04 -4.27 -4.88 -4.29 71 71 4556
The month December is used to calculate the means. Size stands for the market value of a firm and is
denominated in Mio USD.
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Table A5.12: Mean absolute portfolio difference as compared to the innovator
portfolio over the period 2001-2008
Mean Median
SIZE BEME MOM Size BEME MOM
Control Firms 120.38 0.12 0.50 20.13 0.08 1.13
Remaining Market 1126.75 0.33 1.66 144 0.21 2.25
In every year absolute differences are built between Control Firms and Innovators and the
Market and Innovators for Table 8 and 9. Then the mean over the years is calculated.
Table A5.13: Average monthly returns over time (geometric returns in %)
rmt rft Innovatorst Control Firmst
1/2002 - 4/2009
0.3 0.31 0.47 0.21
(0.59) (0.01) (1.18) (0.81)
1/2002 - 8/2005
1.37 0.23 0.85 1.56
(0.67) (0.00) (1.34) (0.89)
/2005 - 4/2009
-0.78 0.39 0.09 -1.13
(0.95) (0.02) (1.96) (1.34)
Average geometric returns are displayed and standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
Value weighted returns are presented for the market return rmt and equally weighted
returns are displayed for the Innovator portfolio. rft is the risk-free rate.
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Table A5.14: Exact country match: Parameter estimates and Z-statistics in
the four-factor model for different time periods
α rmt – rit SMBt HMLt WMLt R
2
01/2002-04/2009
Innovators
1.34** 1.39*** 0.51 -1.12** -0.33 0.62
(2.17) (12.04) (1.52) (-2.43) (-1.53)
Control Firms
-0.18 0.94*** 0.46** 0.25 -0.17 0.57
(-0.47) (8.82) (2.07) (0.64) (-0.77)
01/2002- 08/2005
Innovators
1.3 1.30*** 1.12** -1.61*** -0.53* 0.49
(1.03) (4.94) (2.12) (-2.74) (-1.74)
Control Firms
0.14 0.83*** 0.31 0.20 -0.19 0.27
(0.15) (5.10) (0.55) (0.36) (-0.52)
09/2005-04/2009
Innovators
1.32 1.38*** 0.27 1.01 -0.08 0.76
(1.49) (9.13) (0.88) (1.1) (-0.31)
Control Firms
-0.15 0.96*** 0.51** 0.41 -0.18 0.78
(-0.31) (7.00) (2.54) (0.81) (-1.06)
* (**, ***) means that the parameter is different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) significance
level, respectively. The parentheses below the point estimates contain the z-statistics,
corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to three lags.
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Table A5.15: Exact industry match: Parameter estimates and Z-statistics in
the four-factor model for different time periods
α rmt – rit SMBt HMLt WMLt R
2
01/2002-04/2009
Innovators
1.37** 1.40*** 0.52 -1.12** -0.32 0.62
(2.21) (12.25) (1.51) (-2.41) (-1.49)
Control Firms
0.78 1.08*** 0.61** 0.47 -0.46** 0.65
(1.36) (10.3) (2.56) (0.74) (-2.07)
01/2002- 08/2005
Innovators
1.43 1.31*** 1.10** -1.63*** -0.52* 0.5
(1.13) (5.06) (2.09) (-2.77) (-1.73)
Control Firms
0.92 0.96*** 0.78 0.56 -0.80*** 0.5
(0.84) (4.45) (1.10) (0.72) (-3.07)
09/2005-04/2009
Innovators
1.27 1.37*** 0.29 1.10 -0.06 0.76
(1.42) (8.86) (0.87) (1.11) (-0.25)
Control Firms
0.44 1.16*** 0.45** 1.02 -0.00 0.78
(0.66) (7.27) (2.39) (1.51) (-0.01)
* (**, ***) means that the parameter is different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) significance
level, respectively. The parentheses below the point estimates contain the z-statistics,
corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to three lags.
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Table A5.16: Exact country-industry match: Parameter estimates and Z-
statistics in the four-factor model for different time periods
α rmt – rit SMBt HMLt WMLt R
2
01/2002-04/2009
Innovators
1.09* 1.28*** 0.55* -1.08*** -0.39** 0.62
(1.75) (12.30) (1.94) (-2.82) (-2.06)
Control Firms
0.08 1.00*** 0.22 0.14 0.06 0.57
(0.14) (8.12) (0.88) (0.41) (0.40)
01/2002- 08/2005
Innovators
0.82 1.32*** 1.03* -1.41** -0.52* 0.48
(0.65) (4.90) (1.94) (-2.66) (-1.80)
Control Firms
0.69 0.84*** 0.58 -0.23 -0.10 0.29
(0.79) (3.62) (1.56) (-0.61) (-0.54)
09/2005-04/2009
Innovators
1.03 1.22*** 0.42 0.78 -0.18 0.77
(1.23) (8.81) (1.50) (0.97) (-0.89)
Control Firms
-0.23 1.04*** -0.04 1.01 0.24 0.72
(-0.32) (6.49) (-0.17) (1.48) (1.00)
* (**, ***) means that the parameter is different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) significance
level, respectively. The parentheses below the point estimates contain the z-statistics,
corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to three lags.
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